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The economics of nuclear power
Over the last two decades there has been a steep decline 
in orders for new nuclear reactors globally. Poor economics 
has been one of the driving forces behind this move away 
from nuclear power.
The civilian nuclear power industry has been in operation 
for over fifty years. During such a long period, it would be usual 
for technological improvements and experience to result in 
learning and subsequently enhancements in economic efficiency. 
However, the nuclear industry has not followed this pattern.
Rising construction costs 
Country after country has seen nuclear construction 
programmes go considerably over-budget. In the United States, 
an assessment of 75 of the country’s reactors showed predicted 
costs to have been �45 billion (�34bn) but the actual costs were            
�145 billion (�110bn). In India, the country with the most recent 
and current construction experience, completion costs of the 
last 10 reactors have averaged at least 300% over budget.
Rising construction times
The average construction time for nuclear plants has 
increased from 66 months for completions in the mid 
1970s, to 116 months (nearly 10 years) for completions 
between 1995 and 2000. 
The longer construction times are symptomatic of a range of 
problems including managing the construction of increasingly 
complex reactor designs. 
Falling construction demand
There are currently only 22 reactors under active construction 
in the world. The majority (17) are being constructed in Asia 
and 16 of the 22 are being built to Chinese, Indian or Russian 
designs. None of these designs is likely to be exported to 
OECD countries.
Construction started on five of the reactors over 20 years ago 
and consequently the likelihood of the reactors being built to 
their current timetable is open to question. There are a further 
14 reactors on which construction has started but is currently 
suspended, 10 of which are in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This low level of nuclear construction provides little relevant 
experience on which to build confidence in cost forecasts.
Untested technology 
The nuclear industry is promoting a new generation of 
reactors (Generation III and III+) and hoping that a wave of 
orders will be placed for them in the next few years. 
Generation III reactors
The only Generation III reactors currently in operation are the 
Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWR) developed in 
Japan. By the end of 2006, four ABWRs were in service and 
two under construction in Taiwan. Total construction costs for 
the first two units were well above the forecast range. Further 
problems have now arisen as cracking has been found in the 
blades of the turbines of two plants. A temporary repair might 
allow the plants back into service in 2007, operating at 10-15% 
below their design rating until new turbines can be supplied. 
Generation III+ reactors
No Generation III+ plant has yet been completed and only one 
is under construction. The most widely promoted of these 
latest designs are the new generation of Pressurised Water 
Reactors (PWRs) and in particular Areva’s European 
Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) and the Westinghouse 
AP1000.
The EPR is the only Generation III+ plant under construction, 
at the Olkiluoto site in Finland – see case study below. 
The AP1000 was developed from the AP600 design 
(Generation III). The rationales for the AP600 were:
1)  to increase reliance on passive safety and 
2)  that scale economies (from building larger units as opposed to 
building larger numbers) had been over-estimated. 
The AP600 went through the US regulatory process and was 
given safety approval in 1999. By then, it was clear that the 
design would not be economic and the AP600 was never 
offered in tenders. Its size was increased to about 1150MW 
in the hope that scale economies would make the design 
economically competitive, with an output increase of 80% and 
an estimated increase of only 20% in costs. The AP1000 has 
so far been offered in only one call for tenders, the call for four 
Generation III+ units for China placed in 2004, and won this 
contract in December 2006. 
Other designs being developed include the Advanced CANDU 
Reactor (ACR-1000) and High Temperature Gas Reactors 
(HTGRs). The most developed of the latter is a South African 
version of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). The 
project was first publicised in 1998 when it was expected that 
the first commercial orders could be placed in 2003. However, 
greater than anticipated problems in completing the design, the 
withdrawal of funders and uncertainties about the commitment 
of other partners has meant that the project time-scale has 
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slipped dramatically and the first commercial orders cannot 
now be taken before 2014.  
Generation IV reactors
Even more speculative are the ‘paper’ designs for Generation 
IV plutonium-fuelled reactors.  While several designs are 
being produced, technical difficulties make it unlikely that they 
will be deployed for at least two decades, if at all, while the 
economics of fuel reprocessing also remain unproven.
Unfavourable market place
The economics of nuclear power have always been questionable. 
The fact that consumers or governments have traditionally borne 
the risk of investment in nuclear power plants meant that utilities 
were insulated from these risks and were able to borrow money 
at rates reflecting the reduced risk to investors and lenders.
However, following the introduction of competitive electricity 
markets in many countries, the risk that the plant would cost 
more than the forecast price was transferred to the power plant 
developers, which are constrained by the views of financial 
organisations such as banks, shareholders and credit rating 
agencies. Such organisations view investment in any type of 
power plant as risky, raising the cost of capital to levels at which 
nuclear is less likely to compete.
The logic of this transfer to competitive electricity markets was 
that plant developers possessed better information and had 
direct control over management and so had the means as well 
as the incentive to control costs. Builders of non-nuclear power 
plants were willing to take these risks, as were vendors of energy 
efficiency services. Consequently, when consumers no longer 
bore the economic risk of new plant construction, nuclear power, 
which combines uncompetitively high prices with poor reliability 
and serious risks of cost overruns, had no chance in countries 
that moved to competitive power procurement. 
Unreliable forecasts
In recent years there have been numerous studies of the 
economics of nuclear power. The values of the key parameters 
used to generate the forecast cost of nuclear power vary 
significantly from one study to another. For example, the 
assumed cost of construction ranges from �725-3600/kW, 
while the assumed construction time varies from 60 to 120 
months. The resultant price of electricity consequently also 
varies significantly, producing a range of between �18-76/MWh. 
Generating costs and capital costs
The most recent of these studies, produced for the UK 
Government, gave a generating cost for nuclear electricity 
of �57/MWh, using many assumptions that would appear       
reasonable, for example 72 month construction time and an 
80-85% load factor. However, given the UK Government’s 
statement that there will be no subsidies, the real cost of capital 
used in this forecast is unreasonably low at 10%. A more 
realistic assumption (15% or more) would result in an estimated 
electricity generating price of around �80/MWh.
Oil prices
The long construction and proposed operating times for the 
reactors require some judgement of the impact of key variables 
far into the future. An important parameter is the price of oil. 
There is still a close price correlation between oil, gas and coal, 
so the price of oil affects the price of electricity. Since 1999, the 
four-fold increase in the price of oil has led to a marked increase 
in some regions in the price of gas and coal, with a consequent 
improvement in the relative economics of nuclear power.
However, there have always been fluctuations in the world price 
of oil, as was seen in the oil shocks of 1975 and 1980 when the 
price of oil increased by a factor of up to eight. However, in the 
first half of 1986, the price of oil collapsed back to 1974 levels. 
The high oil prices of 2005/06 were driven in part by increased 
demand for oil due to the economic boom in Asia and many 
forecast that the price of oil will stabilise at around �60 per barrel 
over the coming decades. 
The price of oil can also significantly impact on inflation and 
therefore increase interest rates, as happened in the 1970s 
oil shocks. These resulted in both lower energy demand and 
a significant impact on the economics of nuclear power, due 
to its large construction costs.
Carbon prices
In the medium to long term, the price of carbon may have 
a significant impact on the economics of nuclear power. 
The introduction of a European Emissions Trading Scheme 
established an international price for carbon for the first time. 
However, the current scheme is tied to the Kyoto Protocol which 
will need to be renegotiated for the post-2012 period, therefore 
there is considerable uncertainty over the future price of carbon 
even in the short term, never mind sixty years from now.
Given the lack of experience of a carbon price in the energy 
market it is difficult to assess its impact on the economics 
of different generators. Fluctuations in the European market 
since its establishment in 2005 have seen a high of �30/tonne 
for carbon, but a collapse at the start of 2007 to �2/tonne. 
Not only does there need to be a long term guarantee for the    
price of carbon, but, according to some, also a price which 
is significantly above the current market price. A recent study 
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) calculated 
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that ‘With carbon taxes in the �50/tC range, nuclear is not 
economical under the base case assumptions’. The study 
went on to assess that nuclear power would only break even 
under its base case assumptions when carbon prices are in 
excess of �100/tC1 (�71/tC).
A nuclear renaissance?
The much touted ‘nuclear renaissance’ assumes that new 
plants will be built cheaper than the alternatives, on time 
and to cost, that they will operate reliably and that the cost 
of dealing with long-term liabilities such as waste disposal 
and decommissioning will stabilise. However, wishing for an 
outcome is not sufficient to make it fact. Until nuclear power 
actually meets all these criteria on a sustained basis, the 
additional risks of nuclear investment will be large.
Subsidies needed
It is now 29 years since the last order for a new nuclear power 
plant in the US and 34 years since the last order for a plant that 
was actually completed. Utilities suffered heavy losses in the 
1980s as economic regulators became increasingly unwilling to 
pass huge cost over-runs from nuclear projects on to consumers, 
forcing utilities to bear the extra costs. The introduction of power 
markets has meant that plant owners are now fully exposed not 
just to the risk of cost over-runs but also to plant unreliability. 
The nuclear provisions of the US Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPACT 2005) are an effort to reverse these changes and 
protect investors from that large economic risk.
The most important nuclear provisions of EPACT 2005 offer 
three types of support:
• a limited number of new nuclear power plants can 
receive an �18/MWh  (�13.7) production tax credit for up      
to �125m (�93.75m) per 1000MW (or about 80% of what        
the plant could earn if it ran 100% of the time);
• a provision for federal loan guarantees covering up to 
80% of project costs.
• up to �500m (�375m) in risk insurance for the first two        
units and �250m (�187.5m) for units 3-6. This insurance is       
to be paid if delays, not the fault of the licensee, slow the 
licensing of the plant. 
These subsidies are said to be worth between �2-20/MWh. 
Without these subsidies, it is unlikely that any US company 
would be considering investing in a new nuclear plant.
Government financial or contractual guarantees would 
effectively take nuclear power out of the market so that it is 
paid for, as in the past, by electricity consumers and taxpayers. 
If nuclear power is to be subsidised in this way, there needs 
to be clear and compelling evidence that this is a cost-
effective and worthwhile way to use taxpayers’ and electricity 
consumers’ money.
Contemporary case study:  
Finland’s Olkiluoto plant
The Olkiluoto construction project in Finland is rapidly becoming 
an example of all that can go wrong in economic terms with 
nuclear new build. It demonstrates the key problems of 
construction delays, cost overruns and hidden subsidies. 
A construction licence for Olkiluoto was issued in February 
2005 and construction started that summer. As it was the first 
reactor ever built in a liberalised electricity market, it was seen 
as a demonstration that nuclear power orders are feasible in 
liberalised electricity markets and as a demonstration of the 
improvements offered by the new designs. To reduce the risk to 
the buyer, Areva offered the plant under ‘turnkey’ terms, which 
means that the price paid by the utility (TVO) is fixed before 
construction starts, regardless of what actually happens to 
costs. The contract allows for fines levied on the contractors if the 
plant is late. The schedule allows 48 months from pouring of first 
concrete to first criticality.
Finance
The financing details have not been published, but the European 
Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) and Greenpeace France 
made complaints to the European Commission in December 
2004 that they contravened European State aid regulations. 
According to EREF, the Bayerische Landesbank (owned by the 
German state of Bavaria) led the syndicate that provided a loan of 
�1.95bn, about 60% of the total cost, at an interest rate of 2.6%.             
Two export credit institutions are also involved: France’s Coface, 
with a �610m export credit guarantee covering Areva supplies,       
and the Swedish Export Agency SEK for �110m.
In October 2006, the European Commission finally announced 
it would be investigating the role of Coface.  Export credit 
agencies normally involved in financially and politically risky 
countries in the developing world, hardly a category that 
Finland would fit into, and credits are not usually provided for 
use within the same internal market. 
Regardless of the result of the Commission’s investigation, the 
arrangements for Olkiluoto are based on substantial state aid that 
will not be available to many plants. The interest rate on the loan 
is far below the levels that would be expected to apply for such an 
economically risky investment. 
Construction problems
In August 2005, the first concrete was poured. Almost 
immediately, things began to go wrong. In September 2005 
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problems with the strength and porosity of the concrete 
delayed work. In February 2006, work was reported to be at 
least 6 months behind schedule, partly due to the concrete 
problems and partly to problems with qualifying pressure 
vessel welds and delays in detailed engineering design.
In July 2006, TVO admitted the project was delayed by about 
a year and the Finnish regulator, STUK, published a report 
which uncovered quality control problems. In September 
2006, the impact of the problems on Areva started to emerge. 
In its results for the first six months of 2006, Areva attributed 
a �300m fall in first-half 2006 operating income of its nuclear          
operations to a provision to cover past and anticipated costs 
at Olkiluoto. The scale of penalties for late completion was also 
made public. The contractual penalty for Areva is 0.2% of the 
total contract value per week of delay (past May 1, 2009) for the 
first 26 weeks, and 0.1% per week beyond that. The contract 
limits the penalty to 10%, about �300m. In December 2006,    
after only 16 months of construction, Areva announced the 
reactor was already 18 months behind schedule, which seems 
to assure that the full penalty will be due.  It now seems likely 
that the project will fall at least �700m over budget.  
Implications
The scale and immediacy of the problems at Olkiluoto have taken 
even sceptics by surprise. It remains to be seen how far these 
problems can be recovered, what the delays will be and how far 
these problems will be reflected in higher costs (whether borne 
by Areva or TVO). However, a number of lessons do emerge:
• The contract value of �2000/kW, which was never – due to       
the turnkey nature of the contract – a cost estimate, now 
appears likely to be a significant underestimate. Actual 
costs seem likely to be no lower than that forecast by EdF, 
�2200/kW. This may yet turn out to be an underestimate.         
• Turnkey contracts may well be required by competitive 
tenders in liberalized electricity markets. Or regulators may 
impose caps on recoverable nuclear construction costs, 
which would have the same effect. The willingness of 
vendors to bear the risk of cost over-runs in the light of the 
Olkiluoto experience is subject to serious question.
• The skills needed to successfully build a nuclear plant 
are considerable. Lack of recent experience of nuclear 
construction projects may mean this requirement is even 
more difficult to meet.
• There are serious challenges to both safety and economic 
regulatory bodies. The Finnish safety regulator had not 
assessed a new reactor order for more than 30 years and 
had no experience of dealing with a ‘first-of-a-kind’ design. 
The alternative
In contrast to the historical problems and future uncertainties of 
the economics of nuclear power there are energy sources and 
measures whose financial performance is more predictable.
There is a growing awareness of the need to move away from 
the predominant use of fossil fuels, for climate and security 
of supply reasons.  Energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sources can supply this need.
Energy efficiency
Energy efficiency must be the cornerstone of future energy 
policies. The potential for energy efficiency is huge. According 
to the French Ministry of Economy, changes in the production, 
transmission and use of energy (including transport) could 
result in a halving of global energy consumption – from the 
business as usual scenario – resulting in the saving of 9,000 
million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) per year by 2050. In 2005 
global nuclear energy production was 627 Mtoe. 
An energy efficiency action plan proposed by the European 
Commission in October 2006 called for a 20% increase in 
energy saving across the EU. If fully implemented, this would 
result in energy consumption in the EU being 1,500 Mtoe by 
2020, instead of the 1,890 Mtoe in the ‘business-as-usual’ 
scenario and compared to 1,750 Mtoe in 2004.  As a result, 
energy bills in the EU would fall by �100 billion per year (over     
the business-as-usual scenario).
Some energy efficiency measures will come at little or no cost, 
but others will require significant investment. Already Germany 
has a highly efficient energy economy, but analysis suggests 
that the country’s energy consumption could be reduced 
by 27% by 2015 using 69 measures across the industrial, 
commercial and residential sectors at an average cost of �69/
MWh. This is an enormous energy saving programme to be 
introduced within a decade. The price of saving is below the 
likely cost of nuclear electricity.
Renewable electricity sources
The contribution of renewables is growing at a rapid rate with 
the annual investment growing from about �7bn (�5.3bn) in  
1995 to �38bn (�29bn) in 2005. During 2005 the total installed        
capacity of non-large-hydro renewables increased by 22 
GW, which compares to a 3.3 GW increase in nuclear, much 
of which relates to increased capacity from existing reactors 
rather than from the construction of new reactors.
Hydroelectricity and wind energy are expected to deliver the 
biggest increases in electricity production by 2020 - roughly 
2000 TWh/year in each case. Both technologies are expected 
to deliver electricity at around �40-50/MWh, which is likely to     
be competitive with nuclear, gas and coal - although this will 
depend on the prevailing price of carbon. The prospects for 
solar thermal electric, wave and tidal stream energy are less 
certain but their generation costs may also be competitive with 
the fossil fuel sources.  
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Past experience
The construction costs of nuclear plants 
completed during the 1980s and early 
1990s in the United States and in most 
of Europe were very high — and much 
higher than predicted today by the few 
utilities now building nuclear plants and 
by the nuclear industry generally.2
…the evidence shows that, historically, 
cost estimates from the industry 
have been subject to massive 
underestimates—inaccuracy of an 
astonishing kind consistently over a 40, 
50 year period.3
I do not have any reason to believe CEZ 
[the Czech utility constructing the Temelin 
nuclear power plant] I have been lied to 9 
times. I do not know why I should believe 
them in the 10th case.4
Analysis of past construction: 
evidence of learning
The civil nuclear industry should be an established and mature 
technology given that it is fifty years since electricity was first 
generated in a nuclear power plant. Since then a total of 560 
civilian nuclear reactors have been commissioned of which 
435 are still operating (see Table 1.1)5. In total over 12,000 
power reactor operating years have been accumulated.
The production costs for most technologies reduce over 
time,due to technological improvements, economies of scale 
and efficiency improvements due to learning. However, not 
all technologies have achieved the same rates of economic 
improvements over time. Analysis undertaken by McDonald 
and Schrattenholzer suggests that the rate of learning, which 
represents the percentage reduction of costs for each doubling 
of the cumulative volume of productions, is much lower for 
nuclear power than for other technologies. A summary of the 
findings of this work can be seen in Table 1.2 below6.
Part 1:  
The technology: 
status and prospects
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Table . Nuclear capacity in operation and under construction in 00
Operating 
plants: Capacity 
MW (units)
Plants under 
construction: 
Capacity MW 
(units)
% nuclear 
electricity 
generation
Technologies Suppliers
Argentina 935 (2) - 7 HWR Siemens, AECL
Armenia 376 (1) - 43 WWER Russia
Belgium 5801 (7) - 56 PWR Framatome
Brazil 1901 (2) - 3 PWR Westinghouse, Siemens
Bulgaria 2722 (4) - 44 WWER Russia
Canada 12584 (18) - 15 HWR AECL
China 7572 (10) 3610 (4) 2 PWR, HWR, WWER Framatome, AECL,  
China, Russia
Taiwan 4884 (6) 2600 (2) n/a PWR, BWR GE, Framatome
Czech Rep 3373 (6) - 31 WWER Russia
Finland 2676 (4) 1600 (1) 33 WWER, BWR, PWR Russia, Asea, Westinghouse
France 63363 (59) - 79 PWR Framatome
Germany 20339 (17) - 32 PWR, BWR Siemens
Hungary 1755 (4) - 37 WWER Russia
India 3483 (16) 3113 (7) 3 HWR, FBR, WWER AECL, India, Russia
Iran - 915 (1) - WWER Russia
Japan 47593 (55) 866 (1) 29 BWR, PWR Westinghouse, GE,  
Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Toshiba 
S Korea 16810 (20) - 45 PWR, HWR Westinghouse, AECL, Korea
Lithuania 1185 (1) - 70 RBMK Russia
Mexico 1360 (2) - 5 BWR GE
Netherlands 450 (1) - 4 PWR Siemens
Pakistan 425 (2) 300 (1) 3 HWR, PWR Canada, China
Romania 655 (1) 655 (1) 9 HWR AECL
Russia 21743 (31) 2850 (3) 16 WWER, RBMK Russia
Slovak Rep 2442 (6) - 56 WWER Russia
Slovenia 656 (1) - 42 PWR Westinghouse
S Africa 1800 (2) - 6 PWR Framatome
Spain 7450 (9) - 20 PWR, BWR Westinghouse, GE Siemens
Sweden 8909 (10) - 45 PWR, BWR Westinghouse, Asea
Switzerland 3220 (5) - 33 PWR, BWR Westinghouse, GE Siemens
Ukraine 13107 (15) - 49 WWER Russia
UK 11852 (23) - 20 GCR, PWR UK, Westinghouse
USA 98145 (103) - 19 PWR, BWR Westinghouse, B&W, CE, GE
WORLD 369566 (442) 19210 (22) 16
 
Source: World Nuclear Association, ‘World Nuclear Power Reactors 2005-07’  (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.htm)
Notes: 
1. Plants under construction does not include plants on which construction has stalled. 
2. Technologies are: PWR: Pressurised Water Reactor; BWR: Boiling Water Reactor; HWR: Heavy Water Reactor (including Candu); WWER: Russian PWR; 
RBMK: Russian design using graphite and water; FBR: Fast Breeder Reactor; GCR: Gas-Cooled Reactor. 
3. Figures for Canada do not include four units (2568MW) closed in the 1990s but which may be refurbished and re-opened. 
4. Figures for USA do not include one unit (1065MW) closed in 1985 but expected to be re-opened in 2007.
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Table . Learning rates of  
selected energy technologies 
Technology Period Learning rate (%)
Wind – OECD 1981-95 17
Solar – PV – World 1985-95 32
Gas Turbine Combined 
Cycle Power Plants 
– OECD
1984-94 34
Nuclear Power – OECD 1975-93 6
Source: McDonald, A. and Schrattenholzer, L. ‘Learning rates for energy 
technologies’ Energy Policy 29, 2001, pp. 255-261
Furthermore, one of the cost and financing papers prepared for 
the Stern Report (the UK Government’s review of the economic 
impact of climate change) stated that:
The costs of energy production and use from all technologies 
have fallen systematically with innovation and scale economies in 
manufacture and use, apart from nuclear power since the 1970s.7
Various reasons have been put forward for the relatively low 
learning rate of nuclear power, including the relatively small 
post 1970s reactor ordering rate, the interface between the 
complexity of nuclear power plant and the regulatory and 
political processes and the variety of designs deployed8. 
While some of these factors may be overcome in the future, 
the UK Government’s Performance and Innovation Unit also 
highlighted a number of areas in which future nuclear power 
plants may not exhibit comparable learning rates to other 
technologies, including:
• Nuclear power is a relatively mature technology and therefore 
dramatic ‘technological stretch’ is less likely than in other 
technologies;
• The relatively long lead times for construction and 
commissioning mean that improvements derived by feeding 
back information from operating and design experiences on 
the first units are necessarily slow; and
• The scope for economies of scale is less in the nuclear case 
than for renewables, due to the latter’s smaller initial scale and 
wider potential application.
Longer construction
Analysis undertaken by the World Energy Council9 has 
shown the global trend in increasing construction times for 
nuclear reactors (see Table 1.3). The significant increase 
in construction times from the late 1980s until 2000 was in 
part due to changes in political and public views of nuclear 
energy following the Chernobyl accident with subsequent 
alterations in the regulatory requirements. More recent 
improvements in construction times reflect the inclusion 
of regulatory changes from the design stage, but still leave 
construction of new nuclear power plants averaging around 
seven years. 
These increases in construction times can be seen 
in various countries across the world. In Germany, in 
the period 1965 to 1976 construction took 76 months, 
increasing to 110 months in the period 1983 to 1989. In 
Japan average construction time in the period 1965 to 2004 
was in the range of 44-51 months, but in 1995 to 2000 
the average was 61 months. Finally in Russia, the average 
construction time from 1965 to 1976 was 57 months, then 
from 1977 to 1993 it was between 72 and 89 months, but 
the four plants that have been completed since then have 
taken around 180 months (15 years)10, due to increased 
opposition following the Chernobyl accident and the 
political changes after 1992.
Table .  Construction time of nuclear 
power plants worldwide
Period of 
reference
Number of 
reactors
Average construction  
time (months)
1965-1970 48 60
1971-1976 112 66
1977-1982 109 80
1983-1988 151 98
1995-2000 28 116
2001-2005 18 82
Source: Clerici (2006): European Regional Study Group, the Future Role of 
Nuclear Energy in Europe, World Energy Council, Alexandro Clerici, ABB 
Italy, 13th June 2006 and for post 2000 figures, calculation based on PRIS 
database, http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html 
Economic impacts
Construction cost and construction time are intimately linked. 
An increase in construction time is likely to be a symptom of 
problems with construction that will lead to a cost increase.  
A delay in construction will increase costs, if only because 
‘interest during construction’ on the capital borrowed will 
increase. The economic performance of nuclear power is 
heavily dependent on the construction costs. Therefore 
delays in construction have had a significant impact on the 
economics  
of nuclear power. These economic problems can be seen in 
different regions around the world.
Asia - India
Much of the current global nuclear energy construction is in 
India, where 7 of the 22 actively under construction are sited. 
Furthermore, with seven reactors completed since the turn of the 
century, India is clearly the country with most recent experience 
in nuclear construction. However, as Table 1.4 shows, the capital 
costs of construction in India have run considerably over budget.
North America - United States
The United States has the largest nuclear fleet in the world, 
with 103 reactors in operation. A further 28 have been closed 
and construction was stopped on an additional 67 units. 
However, it is now over 30 years since a nuclear reactor was 
ordered and subsequently completed in the United States. 
Although there is no doubt that the accident at Three Mile 
Island in 1979 was partially responsible for the drying up and 
cancelling of orders, many of the problems began prior to 
the accident. In particular, cost over-runs and delays in the 
construction of reactors were already evident prior to 1979.

The economics of nuclear power
Table 1.4
 
According to data published by the US Department of Energy        
(DOE) the total estimated cost of 75 of the reactors currently 
in operation was �45bn. The actual costs turned out to be 
�145bn. This �100bn (�76bn) cost overrun was more than 
200% above the initial cost estimates12 
Western Europe - UK
The UK Trade and Industry Committee stated in its 2006 
report that ‘Even the most optimistic estimates for this �new        
construction] are in the region of five years’, but that ‘Experience 
in the UK to date has shown it can take much longer, with an 
average construction period for existing nuclear power stations 
of almost 11 years.’ The most recent reactor, a PWR at Sizewell 
B, experienced increases in capital costs from �1,691m to   
�3,700m,13 (�2,485m to �5,436m) while the construction costs       
of the Torness AGR nuclear reactor in Scotland increased from 
�742m (�1,089m) to a final cost of �2,500m (�3,673m).       14 
Nuclear cost over-runs and delays have not been restricted to 
nuclear power plants. At the time of the public inquiry in 1977 
for the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield 
the expected cost was �300m (�440m). Furthermore, it was    
originally due to start operating in 1987, but by its completion in 
1992 costs had risen to �1.8bn (�2.6bn). If the additional costs     
of associated facilities not originally planned for, including new 
waste treatment buildings, are included, the total bill reaches 
�2.8bn (�4.1bn).15
Central Europe - Czech Republic
In 1987 construction began on four blocks at the Temelin 
nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic. However, following 
the political changes in 1989 this was eventually reduced to 
two reactors. The Temelin reactors were eventually completed 
in 2002 and 2003, after 15 years of construction, using 
Westinghouse instrument and control technology. 
Political and technological changes significantly disrupted the 
construction schedule as can be seen in Table 1.5, based on 
Czech Government figures, and the reactors were eventually 
completed around ten years late and five times over budget.
Table .: History of Temelin cost over-runs
Year of 
announcement
Total budget 
(billion CZK)
Expected year 
of start-up 
1981 20
1985 35 1991
1990 50 1992
1993 68 1995
1995 72 1997
1996 79 1998
1997 85 1999
1998 99 2001
The International Energy Agency has suggested that ‘despite low 
operating costs, amortising Temelin’s costs (total cost: CZK99 
billion, plus CZK10 billion of unamortised interest) will create a 
significant financial burden for CEZ’.16
Declining construction
The last decade has seen a decline in construction of new 
nuclear power plants. Figure 1.1 shows the extent of this decline, 
from a peak in the 1980s of over 30GW of new capacity per year, 
to an average of 4GW per year over the last decade. 
This decline impacts upon the experience the nuclear industry 
can bring to new projects. The European Investment Bank 
noted that ‘very few nuclear power stations have been built in 
the last few years and thus the cost of recent plants does not 
seem a good reference to assess future costs. Additionally, any 
future development of nuclear energy will be based on the new 
generation of reactors and the cost of the new generation is 
uncertain at this stage.18 
The MIT study summarises the current experiences with new 
build:19
• Construction costs in Europe and North America in the 1980s 
and early 1990s were very high;
• The reasons for this poor historical construction costs 
experience are not well understood;
• Construction on few nuclear power plants has started and 
completed anywhere in the world in recent years;
• Information available about the true costs of building nuclear 
plants in recent years is limited;
Station Original cost 
estimate (Rs Crores)
Revised cost 
(Rs Crores)
Criticality year Relative cost 
increase (%)
RAPS I 339.5 732.7 1972 216
RAPS II 5816 1,025.4 1980 176
MAPS I 617.8 1,188.3 1983 192
MAPS II 706.3 1,270.4 1985 179
NAPS I and II 2,098.9 7,450 1989 and 1991 354
Kakrapar I and II 3825 13,350 1992 and 1995 349
Kaiga I and II 7307.2 2,8960 1999 and 2000 396
RAPS III and IV 7115.7 2,5110 2000 353
Tarapur III and IV 24,275.1 62,000 2006 255
 
Note:  Rs Crores = 10 million Rupees
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• The spectre of high construction costs has been a major 
factor leading to very little credible commercial interest in 
investments in new nuclear power plants; and
• The historical experience produced higher costs than 
predicted today by the few utilities now building nuclear 
power plants and by the nuclear industry in general.
The current order book
There has been considerable discussion recently of a ‘nuclear 
revival’. While the possibility of new nuclear power orders is being 
discussed, at least in principle, in a number of countries, this 
revived interest has yet to be reflected in orders for new plants. 
This section examines the existing nuclear order book to see how 
much can be learnt from these plants, in particular whether new 
designs can overcome the economic problems suffered by earlier 
designs; and asks what barriers might exist that would prevent 
this renewed interest being turned into new nuclear orders.
A nuclear revival or decline?
The current list of plants under construction (see Table 1.6) 
is a short one. Sixteen of the 22 units are being supplied 
by vendors from China, Russia and India. It seems unlikely 
that any of these vendors would be considered in Western 
Europe or North America, the markets that would need new 
orders if a global nuclear revival were to take place. Most of 
India’s plants are largely based on a Canadian design from 
the 1960s, long since superseded in Canada. China’s plants 
are also closely modelled on old Western designs – prior to 
the AP1000 order – albeit not so out-of-date as the Indian 
plants. China will probably continue to supply mainly its 
home market with one or two exports to Pakistan.
Minatom is seeking to export plants and was considered in 
the tender for the Olkiluoto order from Finland in 2004. The 
Russain industry is also heavily involved in ‘hang-over’ orders 
domestically and in Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Ukraine, where 
attempts are being made to revive construction on plants 
which were ordered in the 1980s but on which construction 
was halted or slowed around 1990. It is not clear how far 
renewed construction efforts would involve an upgrading of 
the designs to current standards. Atomostroyexport orders 
in Bulgaria, China, India and probably in Iran, involve more 
recent designs that are likely to be closer to meeting current 
safety standards. However, the continuing stigma of the 
Chernobyl disaster that is attributed to Russian design would 
still make an order for Russian technology in the West highly 
contentious even if the latest Russian design were to pass the 
safety regulatory hurdles.
Figure . Installation of new nuclear capacity onto grid 
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Table .: Nuclear power plants under construction or on order worldwide
Country Site Reactor 
type
Vendor Size MW Construction 
start
Construction 
stage (%)
Expected 
operation
Under 
construction:
China Tianwan 2 WWER Russia 1,000 2000 100 2006
China Lingao 3 PWR China 1,000 2005 n/a 2010
China Lingao 4 PWR China 1,000 2006 n/a 2011
China Qinshan 2-3 PWR China 610 2006 n/a 2011
Taiwan Lungmen 1 ABWR GE 1,300 1999 57 2009
Taiwan Lungmen 2 ABWR GE 1,300 1999 57 2010
Finland Olkiluoto 3 EPR Areva 1,600 2005 n/a 2010
India Kaiga 3 Candu India 202 2002 45 2007
India Kaiga 4 Candu India 202 2002 28 2007
India Kudankulam 1 WWER Russia 917 2002 40 2008
India Kudankulam 2 WWER Russia 917 2002 40 2009
India PFBR FBR India 470 2005 0 n/a
India Rajasthan 5 Candu India 202 2002 34 2007
India Rajasthan 6 Candu India 202 2003 19 2007
Iran Bushehr WWER Russia 915 1975 75 2006?
Japan Tomari 3 PWR Mitsubishi 866 2004 28 2009
Korea Shin-Kori 1 PWR KSNP 1,000 2006 n/a 2010
Pakistan Chasnupp 2 PWR China 300 2005 n/a 2011
Romania Cernavoda 2 Candu AECL 655 1983 71 2007
Russia Balakovo 5 WWER Russia 950 1987 n/a 2011
Russia Kalinin 4 WWER Russia 950 1986 n/a 2011
Russia Volgodonsk 2 WWER Russia 950 1983 n/a 2009
TOTAL 17,608
On order:
China Sanmen 1 AP1000 Westinghouse 1,100 n/a 0 n/a
China Sanmen 2 AP1000 Westinghouse 1,100 n/a 0 n/a
China Yangjiang 1 AP1000 Westinghouse 1,100 n/a 0 n/a
China Yangjiang 2 AP1000 Westinghouse 1,100 n/a 0 n/a
 
Sources: PRIS database (http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html), Nuclear News, World list of nuclear plants
In terms of markets, 17 of the 22 units are located in Asia, eight 
of these in the Pacific Rim and eight in the Indian sub-continent. 
The only current orders for Western vendors are the long-delayed 
Lungmen plant in Taiwan (which uses a current design, albeit 
one first ordered 15 years ago), the Olkiluoto plant in Finland and 
four orders, placed in December 2006, after a lengthy delay, for 
China.
Hang-over plants
Of the plants under construction, 5 were ordered 20 or more 
years ago. Construction is reported to still be underway, 
although in some cases, for example Russia, it is difficult to 
get independent confirmation that substantive work really 
is taking place. Work on a further 14 units has stopped (see 
Table 1.7) and while there are frequent reports that work may 
restart at these sites, it is far from clear if and when this will 
happen. Completion of these hang-over plants has a number 
of apparent attractions to the public in these countries:
• Construction on these plants often seems visually more 
advanced than it actually is (the shell is completed before the 
internal work is carried out) and it appears that just a little more 
investment will bring them on-line;
• For plants in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
completion of these units appears likely to allow apparently 
lucrative exports of power; and
• Completion of the plants in Slovakia (Mochovce) and Bulgaria 
(Belene) will replace the power produced by nuclear plants 
that had to be closed (Bohunice and Kozloduy respectively) as 
a condition of the Accession Treaties to the European Union.
However, these ‘hangover’ plants raise a number of issues:
• The designs on which these orders were originally based 
are now well out of date. If completion to standards 
significantly below those currently applied was not 
acceptable, the cost of upgrading could be large and could 
counterbalance the benefit of the work already done, as 
occurred at the Temelin nuclear power plant in Czech 
Republic;
• Much of the equipment already bought has been in store, 
untouched, for at least 15 years. If this has not been 
stored to the highest standards, it could require expensive 
remedial work or even replacement; and
• There must be issues about the quality of work carried out so 
far. Demonstrating that existing work is up to standard will be 
expensive, and if it proves not to be up to standard, remedial 
work could be prohibitively expensive.
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Bulgaria
The orders for Belene, for two 1000MW Russian WWER units 
were placed in 1987 but construction was stopped in 1991 with 
a reported 45% of the work done. A tender to complete two 
units was recently launched. In 2006, it was announced that 
a Russian based company, Atomstroyexport, in collaboration 
with Areva and Siemens, offering a later design of WWER-
1000, the AES-92, beat competition to win the order, with a 
construction contract of about �4bn.
A Skoda-led consortium, also offering a WWER-1000 design 
of an earlier vintage was the main opposition. It is not clear 
how far it will be possible to use the latest design (AES-
92) given that about 45% of the work has been completed 
using the earlier design (AES-87). As part of the agreement, 
it has been reported that Atomstroyexport could buy back 
equipment previously used at the Belene site. After an 
examination, this equipment would be transferred to Russia 
and used at the construction site of the fourth power-
generating unit for the Kalinin nuclear power plant.
However, it is still far from certain that the orders will be placed. 
Two particular problems are the ability to finance the orders and 
the extent to which placing the order will adversely affect the 
credit rating of the owner of the plant.
Private Western banks have been reluctant to finance the order 
and by November 2006, it seemed likely that Russian finance 
provided by the government and possibly a Euratom loan were 
the only credible option. The order was not well-received by the 
financial community and Standard & Poors’ credit outlook for 
the Bulgarian electric utility, NEK, that would own the plant, was 
cut from ‘developing’ to ‘negative’20.
Slovakia
In 1983, orders were placed for four WWER-440 units to be 
built at the Mochovce site. Construction was halted in 1990 
with units 1 and 2 reported to be 90% and 75% complete 
respectively, while the third and fourth units were reported 
to be only 40% and 30% complete. Work on the first two 
units recommenced in 1995 led by a consortium of Siemens, 
Framatome and Czech and Slovak companies and the units 
entered commercial operation in 1998 and 1999.
The cost of completing the plants is not known but the fact that 
it took 3-4 years to finish plants that were said to be already 
75-90% complete suggests the process was far from smooth. 
The problems appear to have been even worse in the Czech 
Republic where completion of two WWER-1000 units at 
Temelin, reportedly 50% complete when work restarted took 
in 1994, took 8-9 years and a substantial cost over-run before 
the units came on line. The reliability of both the Mochovce and 
Temelin plants has been mediocre.
The completion of units 3 and 4 at Mochovce was part of the deal 
that saw the Italian utility, ENEL, take control (with 66% of the 
stock) of the main Slovak generator, Slovenske Elektrarne (SE) 
in May 2006. According to ENEL and various national politicians 
the completion date for the reactors is 2011-12. ENEL is expected 
to finalise a feasibility study in April 2007 and then take a final 
decision whether or not it will invest in the units.
Russia
Russian nuclear sites remain largely closed to international and 
press scrutiny and it is difficult to get independent information 
on the four units reported by the IAEA to be under construction. 
There were reports, not officially confirmed, that the Kursk 5 
unit, the only plant under construction that uses the Chernobyl 
(RBMK) technology, would not be completed. The fact that 
equipment from Belene is expected to be shipped to Kalinin for 
use in completion of unit 4 there suggests construction is not far 
advanced on Kalinin 4.
Argentina
Construction of the Atucha 2 HWR plant, a one-off design 
ordered from Siemens, was started in 1981, but was plagued 
by financial shortages and was suspended in 1994, apparently 
80% complete. In August 2006, it was announced that 
investigations were under way to restart work. Despite the 
apparently high level of construction, completion would take up 
to four years and cost �600m21 (�457m). Work would be carried     
out by the Canadian CANDU supplier, AECL. In November 2006 
Table .: Nuclear power plants on which construction has been stopped
Country Site Tech Vendor Size MW net Construction start Construction %
Argentina Atucha 2 HWR Siemens 692 1981 80
Bulgaria Belene WWER Russia 1000 1987 40
Bulgaria Belene WWER Russia 1000 1987 40
Brazil Angra 3 PWR Siemens 1275 1976 30
N Korea Kedo 1 PWR S Korea 1000 1997 33
N Korea Kedo 2 PWR S Korea 1000 1997 33
Romania Cernavoda 3 Candu AECL 655 1983 10
Romania Cernavoda 4 Candu AECL 655 1983 8
Romania Cernavoda 5 Candu AECL 655 1983 8
Russia Kursk 5 RBMK Russia 925 1985 70
Slovakia Mochovce 3 WWER Russia 405 1983 50
Slovakia Mochovce 4 WWER Russia 405 1983 40
Ukraine Khmelnitsky 3 WWER Russia 950 1986 15
Ukraine Khmelnitsky 4 WWER Russia 950 1987 15
TOTAL 11567
 
Sources: PRIS database (http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html), Nuclear News, World list of nuclear plants
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AECL signed an agreement with Nucleoeléctrica Argentina 
S.A for the upgrading of the country’s other reactor at Embalse 
and the completion of Atucha 2, however, no financial details or 
timetable were published.22
Brazil
In 1976, Brazil signed a deal with Siemens for the supply of up 
to 8 units of 1300MW. Work on two of these was started, but 
continually delayed and the first unit, Angra 2, only came on 
line in 2000. Efforts began then to restart work on the second 
unit, Angra 3, estimated to cost about �3bn (�2.5bn). Little  
construction work had been carried although most of the 
equipment had been bought and delivered, but 6 years later 
work had still not re-started.
Iran
Construction started at the Bushehr reactors in 1975/6.  
Originally, these were Siemens KWU designed 1293 MW light 
water reactors. However, following the Islamic revolution, work 
was abandoned in 1979.  
In August 1992 a Russian-Iranian agreement was signed to 
complete the reactors. This was followed in 1994 with Russian 
experts moving onto site in Iran and in 1998 a timetable for 
the completion of the reactors was agreed. At the time it was 
envisaged that unit 1 would be completed in 52 months. 
Currently, the reactor is due to start up as a VVER 1000 reactor 
in late 2007 with commercial operation in 2008. The Atomic 
Energy Organisation of Iran has announced that construction 
of Unit 2 will proceed. All the fuel for the reactor will be supplied 
from Russia, and it is intended that the used fuel will be 
returned there.
Romania
A deal was originally signed in 1978 for supply by the Canadian 
vendor, AECL, of five reactors. The actual orders were delayed 
and problems of finance slowed work on the units from the 
start. By 1990, the first unit was reported to be less than 50% 
complete. This unit was finally completed in 1996, by which time, 
unit 2 was only 25% complete and construction had been halted. 
Work re-started on unit 2 but completion is still scheduled for 
later this year. For units 3-5, civil work has been carried out but no 
equipment has been purchased yet. In mid-2006 a scoping study 
for the Environmental Impact Assessment was issued for the 
completion of units 3 and 4. A financial assessment is currently 
(early 2007) underway. Building these plants would effectively be 
from scratch and, even on the optimistic current timetables, the 
plants would not come on-line before 2015.
New orders
For a so-called nuclear ‘renaissance’, these hang-over plants 
are of little relevance. A nuclear renaissance must be based on 
impartial decisions by utilities and governments, with strong 
support from the public, that new nuclear orders are a safe, 
sustainable and cost-effective way of generating electricity. 
Table 1.8 shows that few orders can be expected in the next 
couple of years.
China
For more than 25 years, China has been one of the main 
prospective markets for Western nuclear power vendors, with 
China frequently projecting a large expansion in its nuclear 
capacity. However, since the first order was placed in 1987 (five 
years after the order was expected to be placed), only 6 units 
(5GW) have been ordered from international vendors with a 
further 8 units (5GW) bought from Chinese vendors.
In September 2004, China invited bids for four nuclear units of 
about 1,000MW, two at Sanmen and two at Yangjiang. At that 
time the Chinese government planned to construct a further 32 
reactors by 2020, each with a capacity of 1,000MW. It was then 
expected the orders would be placed in late 2005. One of the 
difficulties in the negotiations was the extent of the technology 
transfer demanded. In March 2006, Nucleonics Week reported23:
Les Echos said in its March 15 edition that the French vendor had 
refused to match Westinghouse’s offer to sell the Chinese the 
blueprints for the AP1000 design. Areva had submitted a seventh 
bid in early February that featured more technology transfer, but 
was unwilling to go further, the sources said.
Finally, in December 2006, the Westinghouse AP1000 was 
chosen for these four orders. For the future, orders will probably 
continue to be fewer than forecast by the Chinese Government 
and will be placed with Chinese companies where possible.  It 
is therefore unlikely that China will develop as a large market for 
Western nuclear vendors.
South Korea
As in Taiwan, the increasingly democratic and open regime in 
Korea has resulted in much slower progress with nuclear orders 
than expected and than was achieved in the 1990s. During the 
past two decades, Korea has tried to build up an independent 
reactor supply capability using technology originally licensed 
from US company Combustion Engineering. Combustion 
Engineering’s nuclear business was taken over by the European 
Table .: Possible orders in the next - years
Buyer Site Bidders Need Possible order 
date
Forecast 
completion
France Flamanville 3 Areva (EPR) 1x1600MW 2007 2012
Korea Shin-Kori 2 Korea (KSNP) 1000MW 2006 2012
Korea Shin-Kori 3 and 4 Korea (APR-1400) 2x1400MW 2008 2014
Korea Shin-Wolsong 1 and 2 Korea 2x960MW 2006 2012
Japan Tsuruga 3 and 4 Mitsubishi (APWR) 2x1500MW 2007 2014
USA Various Various 6-8 units 2008 n/a
 
Source: Various press reports
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company, ABB, in the early 1990s. ABB’s nuclear division 
was, in turn, taken over by BNFL in 2000 and merged with its 
Westinghouse division, which, itself, was taken over by Toshiba 
in 2006. Most of the recent orders have used a 1000MW design, 
but for the future, orders are likely to be for the APR-1400, 
based on the System 80+ design developed by Combustion 
Engineering in the 1980s which received US regulatory approval 
in principle in 1997. After long delays, the first orders for this new 
design might be placed in 2008.
Japan
Ordering in Japan has slowed markedly in the past decade and 
only one plant is under construction. As has always been the 
case in the past, a number of sites are listed as likely to host 
new nuclear power plants and the World Nuclear Association, 
in September 2006, listed 11 plants on which construction 
was expected to start in the next 5 years. However, on past 
experience, this will not be fulfilled. The list includes a plant at 
Ohma which was to be ordered in 2006 and two units at Tsuruga 
to be ordered in 2007. The unit at Ohma appears still to be in the 
planning stage, several years away from being ordered, while 
the Tsuruga order has been expected to be placed within a year 
for about 5 years now and completion (2014) is already 5 years 
behind the original schedule.
France
France has long been seen as the one country in Western 
Europe where new nuclear orders were clearly still viable. 
However, the very high proportion of French electricity already 
produced by nuclear sources (about 80%) has meant there has 
been little scope for orders in the past 15 years. France already 
exports a large amount of electricity and is still unable always 
to use the full potential output of its nuclear plants, resulting 
in a need to ‘load-follow24’. The construction of new reactors 
in France would therefore add to the current overcapacity 
and would have to be accompanied with measures to enable 
further export, the closure of existing reactors or further 
measures to ‘load-follow’.
In addition, France’s experience with its most recent orders, the 
four orders for the ‘N4’ design, was poor (see Box 1). This was a 
design that was supposed to build on previous experience and 
solve problems in previous designs. Not surprisingly, the N4 
design has been quietly forgotten for future orders and replaced 
by the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), based on the 
N4 and German Konvoi designs. This too has suffered delays 
and the first order might be placed in 2007 (as is usual in France, 
site work has begun ahead of receiving all necessary consents) 
for a unit to be built at the Flamanville site. The Chinese order for 
the AP1000 design and the technical and licensing problems 
at the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under construction in Finland (see 
later), leading to significant cost over-runs, will increase costs 
to EdF. EdF has been trying to find co-investors, but its main 
targets, ENEL and German utilities, have so far not committed 
themselves to participate in the project. Furthermore, Anne 
Lauvergeon, the CEO of Areva, acknowledged that the EPR 
might be too big for many markets at the announcement of an 
agreement between Areva and Mitsubishi to work on a smaller 
reactor design.25 The Flamanville-3 project is also facing political 
uncertainty, given the opposition of the Socialist presidential 
candidate Royal to the construction of an EPR in France. There 
appear to be no firm plans for any follow-up orders.
USA
There is a possibility that orders for new nuclear plants will be 
placed in the USA in the next 2-3 years, but there are many 
possible sites, buyers and vendors contending for the limited but 
essential subsidies available under the 2005 legislation, and it is 
difficult to predict which are the most likely sites for new orders.
For more information see Part 3, ‘USA’.
Generation III/III+ plants: 
experience and status
The most relevant designs for orders to be placed in the next 
decade in the West are so-called Generation III and Generation 
Box : Experience with the Framatome N design
The N4 design was promoted in the early 1980s when it was announced as the first all-French design of PWR bringing 
together more than a decade of building and operating PWRs. The previous 55 PWRs had all been based much more closely 
on the Westinghouse design licensed by Framatome. However, from the start, things went wrong. Far from being cheaper 
than its predecessors, EDF had to negotiate hard with Framatome to avoid having to pay more per kW of capacity than it had 
paid for earlier reactors. For the first time in the French PWR programme, the period from placing of order to first criticality 
took more than six years, with the N4 units taking between six and twelve years each to build.
Problems continued when the plants started up and a series of technical problems led to the period between first criticality 
and commercial operation, usually a few months, taking from 29-49 months. Reliability in this period was very poor and 
the average load factor for these four units for the first four calendar years after criticality was only 46%. Since commercial 
operation, the average load factor to the end of 2005 was 78%, a considerable improvement but below the world average 
(79%) and well below the levels most Western countries achieve.
Start 
construction
Order Criticality Commercial 
operation
Load factor for 
first four years (%)
Chooz B1 1/84 4/84 8/96 5/2000 40.4
Chooz B2 12/85 1/87 4/97 9/2000 37.2
Civaux 1 10/88 6/91 12/97 1/2002 45.9
Civaux 2 4/91 1/93 12/99 4/2002 60.0
Sources: IAEA PRIS data base http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html except for order dates, Nucleonics Week (various)
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III+ designs. The main distinction between Generation II plants 
and Generation III and III+ plants claimed by the industry is that 
the latter incorporate a greater level of ‘passive’ compared to 
engineered safety. This is contradicted by a report released 
by Greenpeace International, ‘Nuclear reactor hazards’ which 
argues that some of these technological changes are unproven 
and that relying on them could compromise safety26. For example, 
Generation III and III+ designs would rely for emergency cooling 
less on engineered systems and more on natural processes, such 
as convection. A large number of designs have been announced, 
but many are not far advanced, do not have regulatory approval 
and have limited prospects for ordering. There is no clear 
definition of what constitutes a Generation III design, apart from 
it being designed in the last 15 years, but the main common 
features claimed by the nuclear industry are:
• a standardised design to expedite licensing, and reduce 
capital cost and construction time;
• a simpler and more rugged design, making them easier to 
operate and less vulnerable to operational upsets; 
• higher availability and longer operating life - typically 60 years;
• reduced possibility of core melt accidents; 
• minimal effect on the environment;
• higher burn-up to reduce fuel use and the amount of waste; 
and
• burnable absorbers (‘poisons’) to extend fuel life.27
Whether the new designs will actually achieve their stated 
objectives, for example in improved safety, remains to be seen. 
The characteristics listed are clearly very imprecise and do not 
define well what a Generation III plant is other than that the design 
was evolved from existing models of PWR, BWR and Candu. The 
distinction between Generation III and III+ designs is even more 
unclear, with the US Department of Energy saying only that III+ 
designs offer advances in safety and economics over III designs.
Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs)
European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR)
The only Generation III+ PWR yet ordered, apart from the 
four orders placed by China in December 2006, is the Areva 
European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), for the Olkiluoto 
site in Finland. The EPR (III+) has an output of 1,600MW 
although this may be increased to 1,750MW for orders after 
Olkiluoto. The design was developed from the previous 
Framatome design, N4, with some input from Siemens’ (which 
has a 34% stake in Areva NP (Framatome)) previous design, the 
‘Konvoi’ plant. A reduction in the refuelling time is assumed by 
the industry to allow a load factor28 of about 90%.
The Finnish Government issued a construction license in 
February 2005 and construction started in summer 2005. The 
EPR has also been bid for orders in China, but the tender was 
awarded to the Westinghouse AP1000 in December 2006. 
France intends to build at least one EPR (at Flamanville) and 
perhaps five successor units, but these plans, especially for 
the successor plants, are not yet firm. The EPR received safety 
approval from the French authorities in September 2004 and 
from the Finnish authorities in January 2005.
Areva, as part of the Unistar consortium with US utility 
Constellation Energy, has asked the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to begin licensing of the EPR in the USA 
under the US Government’s ‘Nuclear Power 2010’ programme. 
Constellation Energy has identified two sites housing existing 
reactors that might host an EPR. For the US market, EPR will be 
an acronym for Evolutionary Power Reactor.
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s current review 
schedule shows the US EPR design certification review being 
completed by mid-2011, although Unistar hopes that the review 
can be completed about a year earlier.
It is not clear what the consequences would be if the US NRC 
was to demand significant modifications to the design approved 
for use in Europe. Politically, for European countries to be building 
a design apparently not regarded as safe enough for the USA 
would raise serious concerns. Any modifications could also have 
significant cost consequences. Experience licensing the AP600 
is relevant. By the time the AP600 had met all the requirements 
imposed by the NRC and a license had been given, the design 
had become uneconomic (see below).
AP000
The AP1000 (Advanced Passive) is a Generation III+ plant 
designed by Westinghouse and developed from the AP600 
design (Generation III). The rationale for the AP600 was 
to increase reliance on passive safety and also that scale 
economies (from building larger units as opposed to building 
larger numbers) had been over-estimated. An executive of 
Westinghouse justified the choice of a unit size of 600MW rather 
than 1,000-1,300MW by stating that ‘the economies of scale 
are no longer operative’.29 The AP600 went through the US 
regulatory process and was given safety approval in 1999 after 
a 10 year procedure. By then, it was clear that the design would 
not be economic and the AP600 was never offered in tenders. 
Its size was increased to about 1,150MW ironically in the hope 
that scale economies would make the design competitive. 
Westinghouse stated:
Westinghouse recognized that the current estimate of 4.1 to 
4.6¢/kWh for the AP600 is not competitive in the US market. It, 
therefore, embarked on the development of the AP1000, which 
applies economies of scale to passive safety plants to reduce the 
cost per kWh to an estimated 3.0 to 3.5¢.kWh.30
In September 2004, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
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(NRC) granted a Final Design Approval (FDA), valid for 5 years, 
to Westinghouse for the AP1000. The NRC issued a standard 
Design Certification, valid for 15 years in January 2006. The 
licensing process took about four years despite the fact that the 
AP1000 was, according to the NRC ‘based closely on the AP600 
design that NRC certified on December 16, 1999’31.
The AP1000’s modular design is asserted to allow it to be built in 
36 months at a cost of �1200/kW. However, until details of actual 
bid costs are available and until units are built, these figures are 
assertions from an industry with a long history of cost overruns32.
AP1000 has so far been offered in only one call for tenders, the 
call for four Generation III units for China placed in 2004, which it 
won in December 2006. Five US utilities (Duke, TVA, Progress, 
SCANA and Southern) have chosen the AP1000 as the basis for 
‘Nuclear Power 2010’ bids.
AP1000 is seen as an option in Europe, particularly in the 
UK, but no significant work has yet been carried out by any 
of the European nuclear regulatory authorities assessing its 
licensability. As with the EPR in the USA, this lack of progress 
with licensing is a risk and means that the AP1000 is not an 
option for ordering in Europe for at least the 5 years it would take 
to get safety approval.
System 0+/APR-00
Combustion Engineering’s System 80+ design (Generation 
III) received regulatory approval in the USA in 1997 when 
Combustion Engineering was owned by ABB. ABB (including 
the Combustion Engineering nuclear division) was subsequently 
taken over by BNFL and was absorbed into its Westinghouse 
division, which in turn, was taken over in 2006 by the Japanese 
company, Toshiba. The System 80+ has not been offered for sale 
by Westinghouse. However, the Korean vendor, Doosan, has 
used this design under license from Westinghouse to develop its 
APR-1400, which is expected to be ordered for Korea in 2008. 
Korea did try to offer the design for the tender for Generation III 
plants for China won by the AP1000, but it was rejected. It seems 
unlikely that the APR-1400 will be offered in Western markets at 
least in the next decade.
Advanced Pressurised Water Reactor (APWR)
Development of the Advanced PWR (APWR), Generation III, 
by Mitsubishi and its technology licensor, Westinghouse, was 
launched at about the same time as the ABWR (see below) 
about 15 years ago but ordering has fallen far behind that for 
the ABWR and first orders might be placed in 2007 for two units 
(1,500MW) at Japan’s Tsuruga site.
However, the sale of Westinghouse to its Japanese rival, 
Toshiba, appears to have caused a strategic rethink on the part 
of Mitsubishi and in June 2006, it announced it was seeking to 
gain regulatory approval in the USA for a 1,700MW design based 
on the APWR. Mitsubishi expects to submit an application for 
license certification in December 2007 with possible certification 
by the end of 2011. However, NRC resources are stretched and 
with at least five designs ahead of it in the queue for licensing, 
this schedule could well not be achievable. In March 2007, TXU 
announced that it had reached a nonbinding deal under which 
TXU would use the Japanese company’s design for up to three 
potential nuclear reactors in Texas. Mitsubishi is discussing with 
General Electric forming a partnership to sell the APWR in the 
USA. It is not clear whether the APWR that would be offered in the 
USA should be classed as a Generation III or III+ design.
AES- and AES- WWER-000
These are the latest Russian designs offered by Atomstroyexport. 
The AES-91 is under construction in  China (Tianwan) and 
was one of three designs short-listed for Olkiluoto. Finland 
has two earlier generation WWERs (at Loviisa) and because 
of its geopolitical position and previous experience with 
WWER technology, Finland considered the latest Russian 
design. The slightly more advanced AES-92 has two orders 
in India (Kudankulam) expected to enter service in 2007. 
Atomstroyexport bid unsuccessfully for four Chinese plants 
awarded to Westinghouse in 2006.
There is some confusion in the press about which designs are 
being built in China and India. Some reports list the Tianwan 
plants as using the AES-92 design and the Kudankulam plants 
as using the AES-91 design, but the consensus seems to be that 
the Kudankulam plants use the AES-92 design and the Tianwan 
plants use the AES-91 design.”
Atomstroyexport won the order to complete the Belene plant (two 
units in Bulgaria) using a design based on the AES-92, although 
given that quite a lot of work had already been carried out at the 
site, it is not clear how far the plant (if built) would be categorised 
as an AES-87 design, as originally ordered, or an AES-92.
How far the AES-92 can be categorised as a Generation III plant 
is not clear and it seems unlikely it would be considered for any 
Western market other than Finland.
Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
The ABWR(Generation III) was developed in Japan by Hitachi 
and Toshiba and their US technology licensor, General Electric 
(GE). The first two orders were placed in Japan around 1992 
and completed in 1996/97. By end-2006, there were four 
ABWRs in service, all in Japan, and two under construction 
in Taiwan. Total construction costs for the first two Japanese 
units were reported to be �3,236/kW (�2,465) for the first unit     
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in 1997 dollars and estimated to be about �2,800/kW (�2133) 
for the second. These costs are well above the forecast 
range.33 The ABWR received safety approval in the USA in 
1997 and is being considered by two of the US utilities that 
may compete for US government subsidies under the Nuclear 
2010 programme. The existence of four operating units in 
Japan is a useful demonstration of the technology. However, 
since the design has now apparently been superseded by the 
ESBWR (see below), buyers and regulators may be reluctant 
to sanction a design that is no longer state-of-the-art.
The operating units in Japan have suffered technical problems 
in 2006. In June, cracking was found in the blades of the 
turbines (supplied by Hitachi) of the Hamaoka 5 plant owned 
by Chubu Electric. Similar problems were found at the Shika 
2 plant owned by Hokuriku Power. The problems were due 
to design faults in the turbine rather than problems with the 
nuclear island. A temporary repair might allow the plants back 
in service in 2007 operating at 10-15% below their design rating 
until new turbines can be supplied. This is likely to take several 
years while a new turbine design is completed, manufactured 
and installed. Operation at reduced power will cause large 
additional costs. It was not clear by the end of 2006 how far 
these costs would fall on the utilities and how far they would fall 
on Hitachi.34
Economic and Simplified Boiling 
Water Reactor (ESBWR)
The Economic and Simplified BWR (ESBWR) is a 1,500MW 
design developed by GE and is described by GE as Generation 
III+. In October 2005, GE applied to the NRC for certification of 
the ESBWR design. The ESBWR has been developed in part 
from GE’s Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR) and the 
ABWR. The SBWR began the process of getting regulatory 
approval in the 1990s but was withdrawn before the procedure 
was complete and did not win any orders. GE hopes to gain 
Final Design Approval for the ESBWR by the end of 2006 with 
certification following about a year later. The NRC had not 
forecast a completion date by October 2006, although it now 
appears likely certification will not be before 2009. Three US 
utilities are considering the ESBWR for their bids for subsidies 
under the Nuclear 2010 programme.
Other BWRs
A number of other designs have been developed, but none has 
received regulatory approval anywhere and only the SWR has 
been offered for sale. The main BWR designs include:
• The SWR, a 1,000-1,290MW design developed by Areva. This 
was one of the three designs short-listed for Olkiluoto; and
• The BWR-90+, a 1,500MW design developed by 
Westinghouse from the Asea BWR design
Candus
The Advanced Candu Reactor (ACR), Generation III+ was being 
developed in two sizes, ACR-700 (750MW) and ACR-1000 
(1,100-1,200MW). The ACR-700 was being reviewed by the 
US NRC under the sponsorship of the US utility, Dominion, but 
Dominion withdrew its support in January 2005, opting instead 
for GE’s ESBWR, citing the long time-scale of at least five 
years that NRC said would be needed for the review because 
of the lack of experience in the USA with Candu technology. 
As a result of Dominion’s decision to drop the ACR-700 as its 
reference design, AECL says it will concentrate on ACR-1000. 
The most likely market for the ACR-1000 is Canada. British 
Energy, the UK nuclear utility, did participate in the development 
programme for ACR designs but the financial collapse of British 
Energy in 2002 ended its support.
High Temperature 
Gas Reactors (HTGRs)
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), Generation III+, 
is based on designs developed by Siemens (HTR-Modul) 
and ABB (HTR-100) for Germany in the 1980s.35 After poor 
experience with its Uentrop (THTR-300) HTGR plant, which 
operated very unreliably between 1983-89 before it was 
closed, ABB pooled its resources in HTGRs with those of 
Siemens to form a new company, HTR, in 1988 but this 
company failed to win any orders for the pooled design. This 
design is now being developed under license to HTR by South 
African interests. The various takeovers and mergers in the 
reactor vending business mean that the technology license 
providers are now Areva (for Siemens) and Westinghouse 
(for ABB). The technology is being developed by the PBMR 
Co, which had as partners Eskom, the publicly owned South 
African electric utility, BNFL and US utility Exelon as well as 
other South African interests. The project was first publicised 
in 1998 when it was expected that first commercial orders 
could be placed in 2003. However, greater than anticipated 
problems in completing the design, the withdrawal of Exelon, 
and uncertainties about the commitment of other partners, 
including Westinghouse, has meant that the project time-scale 
has slipped dramatically and first commercial orders cannot 
now be before 2014 even if there is no further slippage36.
Chinese interests are also developing similar technology 
with the same technological roots and while optimistic 
statements have been made about development there, the 
Chinese Government seems to be backing development of 
PWRs and perhaps BWRs.
Another design of HTGR, the Gas Turbine Modular High 
Temperature Reactor (GT-MHR), is also under development, 
but there are no immediate prospects for orders.
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Generation IV plants
A new optimism, in some policy arenas, about the future 
of nuclear power has revived the research into plutonium 
fuelled reactors, which are now categorised as Generation 
IV designs. Two international research programmes are 
underway to develop the Gen IV reactors, one launched by 
the United States in 2000, ‘Generation IV International Forum’ 
(GIF), the other launched by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, ‘International Project on Innovative Nuclear 
Reactors and Fuel Cycles'. Globally the nuclear industry is 
aware that uranium reserves are relatively limited and for the 
medium to long term, another design of reactor needs to be 
developed that uses uranium more sparingly. According to 
the GIF, a closed fuel cycle is celebrated as a major advantage 
of Generation IV concepts because they argue that ‘in the 
longer term, beyond 50 years, uranium resources availability 
also becomes a limiting fact, unless breakthroughs occur in 
mining or extraction technologies’.37 The use of plutonium 
and the closed fuel cycle significantly increases the potential 
energy resource that can be obtained from a uranium atom 
and therefore in theory increase the longevity of the resource. 
This was the logic deployed in the 1970s and 1980s when fast 
breeders were being actively promoted. However, the collapse 
of nuclear orders, an increase in availability of uranium 
resources and the technology and economic problems of fast 
breeders and reprocessing have resulted in the continued 
deployment of only one reactor in Russia for electricity 
production.
There are six concepts for the development of Gen IV that have 
been selected for further development in the framework of GIF. 
Four of these use plutonium fuels (see box).
Technological gaps
The majority of the Generation IV reactors currently exist only 
on paper. In order for even prototype versions to be built, 
technological breakthroughs in material development will have 
to be made. This relates in particular to the ability of materials to 
withstand the high temperatures needed within the Generation 
IV designs. The GIF Road Map reports that for the lead-cooled 
fast reactor, gaps exist in the development of the systems and 
materials for the 550°C options, and large gaps for the 750-
800°C options, with similar situations found in the other reactor 
design. Other major potential problems have been identified 
in the ability of the materials and structures to withstand the 
expected corrosion and stress cracking imposed by the 
reactor’s conditions.
Some nuclear regulators in the US are not enthusiastic about 
the new reactor concepts. New nuclear power plants should be 
based on evolutionary, not revolutionary, technology, according 
to an NRC commissioner. The commissioner cautioned against 
BOX :  Six major designs of the Generation IV 
International Programme
GFR – Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor System: The GFR system 
is a helium-cooled reactor with fast-neutron spectrum and 
closed fuel cycle. It uses helium as coolant, due to extreme 
temperatures (850° C outlet; compared to 300° C for PWRs 
and 500°C for FBRs). Consequently, ‘High temperatures and 
extreme radiation conditions are difficult challenges for fuels 
and materials’. It will use plutonium and burn actinides.
LFR – Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor System: LFR systems 
are reactors cooled by liquid metal (lead or lead/bismuth) with 
a fast-neutron spectrum and closed fuel cycle system. A full 
actinide recycle fuel cycle with central or regional facilities 
is envisaged. A wide range of unit sizes is planned, from 
´batteries` of 50–150 MWe, and modular units of 300-400 MWe 
to large single plants of 1200 MWe. The LFR battery option is 
a small factory-built turnkey plant with very long core life (10 
to 30 years). It is designed for small grids, and for developing 
countries that may not wish to deploy a fuel cycle infrastructure. 
Among the LFR concepts, this battery option is regarded as the 
best, concerning fulfilment of Generation IV goals. However, it 
also has the largest research needs and longest development 
time. 
MSR – Molten Salt Reactor System: The MSR system 
is based on a thermal neutron spectrum and a closed fuel 
cycle. The uranium fuel is dissolved in the sodium fluoride 
salt coolant that circulates through graphite core channels. 
The heat, directly generated in the molten salt, is transferred 
to a secondary coolant system, and then through a tertiary 
heat exchanger to the power conversion system. It is primarily 
envisioned for electricity production and waste burn-down. 
The reference plant has a power level of 1,000 MWe. Coolant 
temperature is 700°C at very low pressure.  Of all six reactor 
systems, MSR requires the highest costs for development 
(�1bn/�761m).
SCWR – Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor System: The 
SCWRs are high-temperature, high-pressure water-cooled 
reactors that operate above the thermodynamic critical point 
of water (i.e. at pressures and temperatures at which there is 
no difference between liquid and vapour phase). The reference 
plant has a 1700 MWe power level, an operating pressure of 25 
MPa, and a reactor outlet temperature of 550°C. Fuel is uranium 
oxide. 
SFR – Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor System: The SFR 
system consists of a fast-neutron reactor and a closed fuel cycle 
system. There are two major options: One is a medium size (150 
to 500 MWe) reactor with metal alloy fuel, supported by a fuel 
cycle based on pyrometallurgical reprocessing in collocated 
facilities. The second is a medium to large (500 to 1,500 MWe) 
reactor with MOX fuel, supported by a fuel cycle based upon 
advanced aqueous reprocessing at a centralized location 
serving a number of reactors. According to GIF, the SFR has the 
broadest development base of all the Generation IV concepts.
VHTR – Very-High-Temperature Reactor System: The VHTR 
system uses a thermal neutron spectrum and a once-through 
uranium fuel cycle. The reference reactor concept has a 600-
MWth graphite-moderated helium-cooled core based on either 
the prismatic block fuel of the GT-MHR or the pebble bed of the 
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‘too much innovation’ which would lead to new problems with 
untested designs, and urged the industry not to ‘over promise’ 
the capabilities of new reactor systems39. 
Different agencies suggest significantly different views about 
when these reactor types will be operational. President Chirac 
of France has stated that a prototype Generation IV reactor 
will be deployed in 2020, while the latest report by the US 
General Accounting office has concluded that the programme 
is unlikely to meet its 2021 deadline for deployment.       40 Many 
commentators suggest that 2030-5 is a realistic timetable 
given the technological hurdles still in place.
Economics
Given the technological uncertainties and timescales involved 
many questions remain over the economics of the Gen IV 
reactors. 
The only Gen IV design that is based on previously 
commercial reactors is the sodium-cooled fast breeder 
(SFR). The GIF states that ‘a key performance issue for the 
SFR is cost reduction to competitive levels. The extent of the 
technology base �is known] yet none of the SFRs constructed 
to date have been economical to build or operate.’41
The costs of the fuel cycle concepts –the use of reprocessing 
– required in most Gen IV designs would be very high. 
According to ‘The Future of Nuclear Power’ by the US 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,42 a convincing case 
has not yet been made that the long term waste management 
benefits of advanced closed fuel cycles involving reprocessing 
of spent fuel are not outweighed by the short term risks and 
costs, including proliferation risks. Also, the MIT study found 
the fuel cost with a closed cycle, including waste storage 
and disposal charges, to be about 4.5 times the cost of a 
once-through cycle. Therefore it is not realistic to expect that 
new reactor and fuel cycle technologies that simultaneously 
overcome the problems of cost, safe waste disposal and 
proliferation will be developed and deployed for several 
decades, if ever. 
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From commercial nuclear power’s beginnings, the promise 
of cheap power (infamously, ‘power too cheap to meter’) has 
been one of the main claims of the nuclear industry. As is amply 
demonstrated throughout this report, this promise of cheap 
power has seldom been kept. The nuclear industry continues 
to claim that a combination of learning from past mistakes 
and new, more cost-effective designs will, this time, allow the 
promise of cheap power to be fulfilled.
In the first part of this section, we examine the economics of 
nuclear power, in particular, identifying which are the most 
important factors in determining the cost of power from a nuclear 
power plant. In the second, we examine how liberalisation of 
electricity markets has adversely affected the prospects for 
nuclear power because, for the first time, the owners of the 
power plants will be financially responsible if power plants are not 
built to time and cost or are not reliable. This increased risk raises 
the cost of capital to the detriment of nuclear power because of 
its high construction costs. In the third section, we examine ways 
in which buyers are trying to cope with the extra risks they face, 
for example, by demanding fixed price (‘turnkey’) terms from 
plant suppliers.
In the fourth section, we examine the forecasts of the costs 
of power from new nuclear power plants that have been 
published in the past six years. In particular, we identify which 
of the assumptions are most important in producing optimistic 
estimates and we assess whether these assumptions are 
realistic. Finally, we examine approaches to forecasting variables 
over the very long periods of time a nuclear power plant is 
expected to operate.
Main determinants of 
nuclear power costs
There are several important determinants of the cost of electricity 
generated by a nuclear power plant. The usual rule-of-thumb in 
the past for nuclear power has always been that about two thirds 
of the generation cost is accounted for by fixed costs, that is, 
costs that will be incurred whether or not the plant is operated, 
and the rest by running costs. The main fixed costs are the cost 
of paying interest on the loans and repaying the capital, but the 
decommissioning cost is also included. The main running cost 
is the cost of operation, maintenance and repair, rather than the 
fuel cost. However, as is shown below, there is a huge degree 
of variance in the assumptions made for these parameters from 
forecast to forecast, so the broad split between fixed and variable 
cost should be seen as indicative.
Fixed costs
There are three main elements to the fixed cost per kilowatt 
hour: the construction cost; the cost of capital, which 
determines how much it costs to borrow the money to build the 
plant; and the plant’s reliability, which determines how much 
saleable output there is over which to spread the fixed costs. 
Construction cost is the most widely debated parameter. The 
cost of borrowing was always assumed to be lower because of 
the monopoly status of electricity industries but liberalization 
of electricity industries has led to much greater debate on 
this variable (see below). Reliability has improved significantly 
in recent years with performance finally reaching the levels 
forecast in many countries. However, experience with the most 
recent French design, the N4, shows good reliability cannot 
automatically be assumed (see Part 1).
Construction cost and time
Forecasts of construction cost differ by a factor of two or even 
three43. A number of factors explain why there are such disparate 
forecasts of construction cost.
Many of the quoted construction cost forecasts should be 
treated with scepticism. The most reliable indicator of future 
costs has generally been past costs. However, most utilities 
are not required to publish properly audited construction 
costs, and have little incentive to present their performance 
in anything other than a good light. So utilities’ reports of past 
costs must be treated with caution.
Prices quoted by those with a vested interest in the technology, 
such as promotional bodies, plant vendors (when not tied to a 
specific order) and utilities committed to nuclear power, clearly 
must be viewed with scepticism. Bid prices by vendors are 
more realistic than forecasts by international agencies because 
the companies could be called on to back up these forecasts. 
However, equipment purchases may represent less than half of 
the total cost. Civil engineering and installation, often contracted 
from bodies other than the nuclear power plant vendors, are 
generally a larger proportion. Problems in controlling the cost 
of site work have been the cause of cost escalation more often 
than poor cost estimation of individual components. Contract 
prices may also be subject to escalation clauses that mean the 
final price is significantly higher so even bids cannot be taken 
as reliable indicators of the final cost unless the equipment is 
supplied under ‘turnkey’ terms (i.e., the customer is guaranteed 
to pay only the contract price). As argued in Part 2, offering 
turnkey terms is a big risk for a vendor and genuine turnkey 
terms are rarely available.
Cost of capital
The real (net of inflation) cost of capital varies from country to 
country and from utility to utility, according to the ‘country risk’ 
(how financially stable the country is) and the credit-rating of the 
company. There will also be a huge impact on the cost of capital 
from the way in which the electricity sector is organised. If the 
sector is a regulated monopoly, the real cost of capital could be 
Part 2:  
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as low as 5-8% but might be as high as 15% in a competitive 
electricity market, especially for nuclear power. Part 2, ‘Impact 
of liberalisation of electricity industries’, discusses in detail how 
liberalisation of electricity industries affects the cost of capital by 
shifting the risk from consumers to plant owners and builders.
Operating performance
Higher utilisation improves the economics of nuclear power 
because the large fixed costs can be spread over more 
saleable units of output than if utilisation is lower. In addition, 
nuclear power plants are physically inflexible. Frequent 
shutdowns or variations in output reduce both efficiency 
and the lifetime of components. As a result, nuclear power 
plants are operated on ‘base-load’ (continuously at full 
power) except in the very few countries (e.g., France) where 
the nuclear capacity represents such a high proportion of 
overall generating capacity that this is not possible. A good 
measure of the reliability of the plant and how effective it is at 
producing saleable output is the load factor (capacity factor 
in US parlance). The load factor is calculated as the output 
in a given period of time expressed as a percentage of the 
output that would have been produced if the unit had operated 
uninterrupted at its full design output level throughout the 
period concerned.44 Unlike construction cost, load factor can 
be precisely and unequivocally measured and load factor 
tables are regularly published by trade publications such as 
Nucleonics Week and Nuclear Engineering International. 
As with construction cost, load factors of operating plant have 
been much poorer than forecast. The assumption by vendors 
and those promoting the technology has been that nuclear 
plants would be extremely reliable with the only interruptions to 
service being for maintenance and refuelling (some designs of 
plant such as the AGR and Candu are refuelled continuously 
and need only shut down for maintenance) giving load factors 
of 85-95%. However, performance was poor and around 1980, 
the average load factor for all plants worldwide was about 60%. 
To illustrate the impact on the economics of nuclear power, if 
we assume fixed costs represent two thirds of the overall cost 
of power if the load factor is 90%, the overall cost would go up 
by a third if load factor was only 60%. To the extent that poor 
load factors are caused by equipment failures, the resulting 
additional cost would further increase the unit cost of power. 
However, from the late 1980s onwards, the nuclear industry 
worldwide has made strenuous efforts to improve performance. 
Worldwide, load factors now average more than 80%. The 
USA has an annual average of about 90% compared to less 
than 60% in 1980, although the average lifetime load factor of 
America’s nuclear power plants is still only 70%.
Only seven of the 414 operating reactors with at least a year’s 
service and which have full performance records have a lifetime 
load factor in excess of 90% and only the top 100 plants have 
a lifetime load factor of more than 80%. Interestingly, the top 13 
plants are sited in only three countries, six in South Korea, five 
in Germany and two in Finland. This suggests that performance 
is not random but is determined more by the skills that are 
brought to bear and how well the plants are managed than by 
the technology and the supplier.
New reactor designs may emulate the level of reliability 
achieved by the top 2% of existing reactors, but, equally, they 
may suffer from ‘teething problems’ like earlier generations. 
The French experience in the late 1990s with the N4 design 
is particularly salutary (see Part 1, ‘The current order book’). 
Note that in an economic analysis, the performance in the 
first years of operation, when teething problems are likely to 
emerge, will have much more weight than that of later years 
because of the discounting process (costs that occur in 
the early years weigh more heavily than those in later years, 
see Part 2, ‘Fixed costs’). Performance may decline in the 
later years of operation as equipment wears out and has to 
be replaced, and improvements to the design are needed 
to bring the plant nearer current standards of safety. This 
decline in performance will probably not weigh very heavily 
in an economic analysis because of discounting. Overall, an 
assumption of reliability of 90% or more is hard to justify on the 
basis of historic experience.
Decommissioning cost and provisions
These are difficult to estimate because there is little experience 
with decommissioning commercial-scale plants. The cost 
of disposal of waste, especially intermediate or long-lived 
waste, which accounts for a high proportion of estimated 
decommissioning costs, is similarly uncertain. However, even 
schemes which provide a very high level of assurance that 
funds will be available when needed will not make a major 
difference to the overall economics. For example, if the owner 
was required to place the (discounted) sum forecast to be 
needed to carry out decommissioning at the start of the life of 
the plant, this would add only about 10% to the construction 
cost. The British Energy (the privatised UK nuclear power plant 
owner) segregated fund, which did not cover the first phase of 
decommissioning, required contributions of less than �20m 
(�30m) per year equating to a cost of only about �0.3/MWh           
(�0.45/MWh) (see Annex B).   
The problems come if the cost has been initially 
underestimated, if the funds are lost or if the company 
collapses before the plant completes its expected lifetime. All 
of these problems have been suffered in Britain (see Appendix 
for an account of how decommissioning funds have been 
mismanaged in the UK). The expected decommissioning cost 
of the UK’s first generation plants has gone up several-fold 
in real terms over the past couple of decades. In 1990, when 
the CEGB (the former nationally owned monopoly generation 
company that supplied England and Wales) was privatised, 
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the accounting provisions made from contributions by 
consumers were not passed on to the successor company, 
Nuclear Electric. The subsidy that applied from 1990-96, 
described by Michael Heseltine45 as being to ‘decommission 
old, unsafe nuclear plants’ was in fact spent as cash flow 
by the company owning the plant and the unspent portion 
has now been absorbed by the UK Treasury. The collapse of 
British Energy has meant that a significant proportion of the 
decommissioning costs of the old nuclear power plants will be 
paid by future taxpayers.
Insurance and liability
There are two international legal instruments contributing to an 
international regime on nuclear liability: The International Atomic 
Energy Agency on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 
and the OECD’s Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy, from 1960 and the linked Brussels 
Supplementary Convention of 1963. These conventions are 
linked by the Joint Protocol, adopted in 1988. The main purposes 
of the conventions are to:
1. Limit liability to a certain amount and limit the period for making 
claims;
2. Require insurance or other surety by operators;
3. Channel liability exclusively to the operator of the nuclear 
installation;
4. Impose strict liability on the nuclear operator, regardless of 
fault, but subject to exceptions (sometimes incorrectly referred 
to as absolute liability); and 
5. Grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one country, 
normally the country in whose territory the incident occurs.
In 1997 a Protocol was adopted to amend the Vienna 
Convention, which entered into force in 2003 and in 2004 a 
Protocol was adopted on the Paris Conventions. These both 
changed the definition of nuclear damage and changed the 
scope. For the Brussels Convention new limits of liability were set 
as follows: Operators (insured) �700m; Installation State (public    
funds) �500m; and Collective state contribution �300m; a total        
liability of �1500m. These new limits have to be ratified by all          
contracting parties and are currently not in force.
Not all countries that operate nuclear facilities are party to either 
of the Conventions, for example non-signatories include the 
USA, Switzerland, Canada, China and India.  Furthermore, the 
Conventions only act to create a minimum level of insurance and 
many countries require operators or state cover to exceed the 
covers proposed.
The table (see Table 2.1) below shows the wide range of liability 
limits from very low sums, for example Mexico, to much higher 
sums, for example, Germany.
The scale of the costs caused by, for example, the Chernobyl 
disaster, which may be in the order of hundreds of billions of 
euro, means that conventional insurance cover would probably 
not be available and even if it was, its cover might not be credible 
because a major accident would bankrupt the insurance 
companies.
It has been estimated that if Electricité de France (EdF), the main 
French electric utility, was required to fully insure its power plants 
with private insurance but using the current internationally agreed 
limit on liabilities of approximately �420m, it would increase    
EdF’s insurance premiums from �0.017/MWh, to �0.19/MWh,   
thus adding around 8% to the cost of generation. However, if 
there was no ceiling in place and an operator had to cover the 
full cost of a worst-case scenario accident, it would increase 
the insurance premiums to �5/MWh, thus increasing the cost of      
generation by around 300%47.
There have been proposals that ‘catastrophe bonds’ might 
provide a way for plant owners to provide credible cover against 
the financial cost of accidents. A catastrophe bond is a high-
yield, insurance-backed bond containing a provision causing 
interest and/or principal payments to be delayed or lost in 
the event of loss due to a specified catastrophe, such as an 
earthquake. Whether these would provide a viable way to provide 
some insurance cover against nuclear accidents and what the 
impact on nuclear economics would be will be hard to determine 
until concrete proposals are made.
Variable costs
Non-fuel operations and maintenance cost
The non-fuel operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are 
seldom given much attention in studies of nuclear economics.  
As discussed below, the cost of fuel is relatively low and has 
been reasonably predictable. However, the assumption of 
low running costs was proved wrong in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s when a small number of US nuclear power plants 
were retired because the cost of operating them (not including 
repaying the fixed costs) was found to be greater than cost 
of building and operating a replacement gas-fired plant. It 
emerged that non-fuel O&M costs were on average in excess 
Table .: Operator Liability Amounts and 
Financial Security Limits In OECD Countries  as 
of October 00
46  
 Liability limits Financial security  
  under national security 
 legislation (�m) requirements (�m)    
Belgium 328   
Finland 291  
France  83  
Germany Unlimited 2,500 
Great Britain 164   
Netherlands 311  
Spain 137  
Switzerland Unlimited 866 
Slovakia 75   
Czech Republic 188   
Hungary 109   
Canada  63 
USA 10,937 300 
Mexico 9  
Japan Unlimited 538 
Korea 438  
Source: Unofficial Statistics - OECD/NEA, Legal Affairs

The economics of nuclear power
of �22/MWh (�16.5/MWh) while fuel costs were then more       
than �12/MWh (�9/MWh).48 Strenuous efforts were made to 
reduce non-fuel nuclear O&M costs and by the mid 1990s, 
average non-fuel O&M costs had fallen to about �12.5/MWh 
(�9.4/MWh) and fuel costs to �4.5/MWh (�3.40/MWh).       
However, it is important to note that these cost reductions 
were achieved mainly by improving the reliability of the plants 
rather than actually reducing costs. Many O&M costs are 
largely fixed – the cost of employing the staff and maintaining 
the plant – and vary little according to the level of output of 
the plant so the more power that is produced, the lower the 
O&M cost per MWh. The threat of early closure on grounds of 
economics has now generally been lifted in the USA because, 
on a marginal cost basis, the plants are low cost generators.
It is also worth noting that British Energy, which was essentially 
given its eight nuclear power plants when it was created in 
1996, collapsed financially in 2002 because income from 
operation of the plants barely covered operating costs. This 
was in part due to high fuel costs, especially the cost of 
reprocessing spent fuel, an operation only carried out now in 
Britain and France (see below). British Energy has subsequently 
acknowledged that expenditure in that time was not sufficient 
to maintain the plants in good condition49. Average O&M costs 
for British Energy’s eight plants, including fuel, varied between 
about �24.5-28.0/MWh from 1997-2004. However, in the first       
six months of fiscal year 2006/07, operating costs including fuel 
were �35.5/MWh because of poor performance at some plants.       
Fuel cost
Fuel costs have fallen as the world uranium price has been 
low since the mid-1970s although in recent years, the price 
of uranium has risen, more than doubling in 2006. These 
higher uranium costs have yet to be reflected in fuel costs for 
reactors, although given that much of the cost of fuel relates to 
processing, such as enrichment, the effect will be limited.
US fuel costs average about �5.0/MWh (�3.75/MWh) but  
these are arguably artificially low because the US Government 
assumes responsibility for disposal of spent fuel in return for 
a flat fee of �1/MWh (�0.75/MWh). This is an arbitrary price      
set more than two decades ago and is not based on actual 
experience – no fuel disposal facilities exist in the USA or 
anywhere else – and all the US spent fuel remains in temporary 
store pending the construction of a spent fuel repository, 
expected to be at Yucca Mountain. 
Fuel costs are a small part of the projected cost of nuclear 
power. The issue of spent fuel disposal is difficult to evaluate. 
Reprocessing is expensive and, it does little to help waste 
disposal. Reprocessing merely splits the spent fuel into different 
parts and does not reduce the amount of radioactivity to be 
dealt with or the heat load. Indeed, reprocessing creates a 
large amount of low and intermediate level waste because all 
the equipment and material used in reprocessing becomes 
radioactive waste. The previous contract between BNFL and 
British Energy, before its collapse, was reported to be worth 
�300m (�400m) per year, which equates to about �5/MWh        
(�7.5/MWh). The new contract is expected to save British Energy          
about �150-200m (�225-300m) per year, although this will be       
possible only because of underwriting of losses at BNFL by the 
Government. The cost of disposing of high-level waste is hard to 
estimate because no facilities have been built or are even under 
construction and any cost projections should have a very wide 
margin for error. 
Accounting lifetime
One of the features of Generation III/III+ plants compared 
to their predecessors is that they are designed to have a life 
of about 60 years while their predecessors generally had a 
design life of about half that. For a technology dominated by 
fixed costs, it might be expected that doubling the life would 
significantly reduce fixed costs per unit because there would be 
much longer to recover these costs. In practice, this does not 
apply. Commercial loans must be repaid over no more than 15-
20 years and in a discounted cash flow calculation, costs and 
benefits more than 10-15 years forward have little weight.
There is a trend to life-extend existing plants and PWRs are now 
often expected to run for more than 40 years, compared to their 
design life of around 30 years. At present, life extension in the 
USA appears to be an economically sound decision. However, 
life extension may require significant new expenditure to replace 
worn out equipment and to bring the plant closer to current safety 
standards. Life extension is not always possible and, for example, 
Britain’s AGRs which had a design life of 25 years are now 
expected to run for 35 years, but life extension beyond that is not 
expected to be possible because of problems with the graphite 
moderator blocks.50
Impact of liberalisation 
of electricity industries
When the electricity industry was invariably a monopoly, utilities 
were normally guaranteed full recovery of costs found to be used 
and useful as well as prudent. This made any investment a very 
low risk to those providing the capital because consumers were 
bearing most of the risk. The cost of capital varied according to the 
country and whether the company was publicly or privately owned. 
Publicly owned companies in OECD countries generally have 
a high credit rating and often do not have to raise equity capital 
(which is more expensive than debt) therefore the cost of capital is 
lower than for a commercial company. The range was 5-8%.
Arguably, this low cost of capital was a distortion and led to utilities 
building more capital-intensive options than they should have 
done, because they were not being exposed to the economic risk 
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they were taking. Building a power station of almost any type is a 
highly risky venture: fuel choice could prove wrong, construction 
costs could escalate and demand might not grow at the forecast 
rate. But because consumers or taxpayers usually ‘picked up 
the tab’ if things went wrong, this risk was ignored by utilities and 
financiers. If the risk had been borne by the utilities and if bad 
technology or fuel choices were directly reflected in their profits, 
utilities would have been much more cautious in their investment 
decisions, choosing low capital cost options and options that had 
a low risk of going seriously wrong.
In an efficient electricity generation market, the risk of investment 
would fall on the investors in the power plants not the consumers, 
for it is the investors who have the best information as well as 
control over the project managers. The cost of capital would 
reflect the risks. For example, in 2002 in Britain (by then a fully 
liberalised electricity market), about 40% of the generating 
capacity was owned by financially distressed companies (about 
half of this was the nuclear capacity) and several companies and 
banks lost billions of pounds on investments in power stations that 
they had made or financed. In these circumstances, a real cost of 
capital of up to 15% seems justified.51 If the risks were reduced, for 
example, by government guarantees, the cost of capital would be 
lower, but this would represent a government subsidy (state aid). 
It would distort the efficient resource allocation function of market 
prices by providing a resource (capital) at less than its true cost, 
and it is not clear if this form of ‘state aid’ would be acceptable 
under European Union law.
US experience
Competitive power supply markets came into being largely as a 
result of US nuclear power experience in the 1970s. As nuclear 
plants came on line at prices far above their cost estimates and 
customer bills tripled between 1970 and 1980, public outrage 
resulted in the passage of legislation (the 1978 Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act) requiring US utilities to buy power from 
any supplier offering it at prices below the utility’s own projected 
cost of supplying it.
Initial projections that little such power would be available 
proved wildly inaccurate. By the mid-1980s many utilities 
were using competitive power procurement auctions in which 
companies could bid to supply a forecast need for additional 
power. For example, if it was forecast that demand would grow 
by, say, 500MW, an open contest to supply this power would 
be held and the company that bid the lowest price would be 
awarded a contract to supply the quantity of power offered at 
the price it had bid. Between 1980 and 2002, the percentage 
of US power supplied by independent companies (i.e., not the 
local electric utility) rose from 2.2% to 35%. 
In the US during the period when some 120 nuclear plants were 
built and as many again were ordered and later cancelled, most 
of the risk was borne by the customers. In some cases, where 
regulators found ‘imprudence’, they required the plant owner to 
bear any additional costs resulting from that imprudence rather 
than recovering them from consumers. In addition, customers 
were often protected from paying for the costs of cancelled 
plants.  Generally, however, regulators approved the substantial 
rate increases needed to pay for nuclear cost overruns and for 
many of the cancelled plants, often in the belief that rising oil 
prices would mean that the leading alternative sources would 
be equally expensive.
The development of competitive power procurement meant that 
winning bids contained guaranteed volumes and guaranteed 
prices or price formulas. This meant that the amount and price 
paid for electricity was predictable. However, the economic 
risk that the plant would cost more than the guaranteed price 
was transferred to the power plant developers. Builders of non-
nuclear power plants were willing to take these risks, as were 
vendors of energy efficiency services. Consequently, nuclear 
power, combining uncompetitively high prices with a need to 
have the risks of cost overruns and poor operating records borne 
by the customers, had no chance in the USA or in other countries 
that moved to genuinely competitive power procurement. 
Electricity reforms elsewhere
During the 1990s, following reforms in Chile and Great Britain, 
many of the vertically integrated utilities in the US were broken 
up into separate generation, transmission and distribution 
companies, a process known as restructuring. Restructuring has 
now largely halted in the US as a result of the California power 
crisis of 2000-01, leaving the country divided between areas 
that offer forms of retail customer choice and those that do not. 
However, transforming electricity generation from a monopoly 
to some form of market - which does not necessarily involve 
customer choice at the retail level - remains the rule rather than 
the exception, and competitive power supply procurement 
has spread widely in Europe and Latin America as well as 
sporadically in Asia and Africa.
In many cases, these reforms have been accompanied by the 
introduction of competitive day-to-day power markets. If these 
markets are effective, this will add further to the risks faced by 
power plant owners. In such a market, the owners will not only 
face the risk of having to bear additional costs if the plant does 
not perform to expectations, they also bear the risk because they 
will not know how much power they will be able to sell and at 
what cost.
No new nuclear unit has ever won a competitive solicitation 
anywhere. Indeed, a new nuclear unit has never even been 
bid. Two interconnected factors explain this result. First, 
new nuclear power plants have been more expensive than 
fossil fuel alternatives. Second, competitive markets put 
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the financial risks of failure on investors, and investors have 
been unwilling to bear the risk of a nuclear plant.
In countries still building nuclear power plants, the risk that the 
units will cost too much or perform badly is borne by someone 
other than private investors.52 Sometimes risks are borne by the 
government and by taxpayers; sometimes they are borne by the 
electricity consumers.
Dealing with risks in competitive 
electricity markets
The difficulty of attracting capital to build a nuclear power plant 
(or any other capital intensive or technologically risky option) 
to operate in a competitive electricity market has long been 
recognised. Other technology options with lower construction 
costs and a lower level of technical risk, especially the 
combined cycle gas turbine or CCGT, are able to survive in 
competitive electricity markets. This is because equipment 
suppliers, financiers and sometimes fuel suppliers are willing 
to bear some of the risk that would otherwise fall solely on the 
plant owner. Box 2 shows how CCGTs were financed in the 
British liberalised electricity market. But how feasible is it to try 
to apply such measures to new nuclear power plats?
Construction time
Guarantees on construction time for a nuclear plant will be 
highly risky. In November 2006, Nucleonics Week reported 
that for the Olkiluoto contract (see Part 3, ‘The Olkiluoto order’):
According to industry sources, the contractual penalty for Areva 
is 0.2% per week of delay past the May 1, 2009 commercial 
operation target for the first 26 weeks, and 0.1% beyond that. The 
contract limits the penalty to 10% of the total contract value, or 
about €300m, these sources said.53
If we assume the contract was signed for �3bn and the expected    
Box  : The Market for CCGTs in the UK, 0-
To understand how these risks might be dealt with, it is useful to look back at the terms, to reduce economic risk to the buyer, 
imposed on purchase of the large number of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants ordered in Britain in the first years after 
liberalisation of the electricity industry (1990-92).
• Construction cost: Plants were generally supplied on a turnkey basis, i.e., at a price that was fixed for the buyer. If costs 
escalated, the vendor paid the extra.
• Construction time: Under turnkey terms, if the plants were completed late, the vendors paid compensation to the utility for the 
extra costs (interest on capital, replacement power purchase costs etc).
• Reliability: The reliability of the plants was guaranteed by the vendors or under insurance policies so that if the plant did not 
meet the guaranteed level of performance, the utility was compensated.
• Back-to-back gas purchase and power sale contracts: Gas was supplied on long-term (usually 15 year) take-or-pay 
contracts with limited scope for price escalation. These contracts were matched by power sale contracts, for the same duration 
and a corresponding quantity of energy. This ensured that the receipts for power sales more than covered costs including gas 
purchase. Note that in many cases, the power station owner was also the power purchaser.
There are a number of points to be made about these contracts.
• The vendors believed that they were not too risky because a CCGT is largely a factory made piece of equipment with very little 
site work. This means that the cost is largely under the control of the vendor;
• The vendors believed that the equipment design was mature and the risk of unexpectedly poor performance was low;
• CCGT technology is politically non-controversial and problems of safety concerns, public opposition etc were unlikely to have 
an impact on the operation of the plant;
• The retail market in the UK was only partly open. It was not planned to be opened for 6-8 years and there was doubt that it could 
be opened to residential consumers. This meant that the buyers of the power could assume that about a third of their market 
was captive for at least 6-8 years and possibly longer and any additional costs could be passed on to these captive consumers;
• At that time, the UK was a self-sufficient ‘gas island’ with no scope to trade gas internationally and this meant it was possible to 
price gas at terms not related to the oil price because the only feasible market for UK produced gas then was the UK.
It is worth noting that, even though these contracts were, at the time, seen as essentially risk-free, they turned out to be uniformly 
highly unprofitable to the plant owners, the plant vendors and to consumers. The risks that had not been anticipated were that: 
the price of gas would fall sharply locking the plant owners into uneconomic gas purchases; technical progress mean that by 
1995, the thermal efficiency of a state-of-the-art CCGT had increased from about 50% to more than 55% making the older plants 
technologically obsolescent; the retail market did actually open in 1998, reducing the scope for plant owners to pass additional 
costs on to consumers.
From the vendors’ point of view, the designs proved unexpectedly problematic and large sums of money had to be paid in 
compensation for poor reliability.
Captive (residential) consumers also suffered because this expensive power was allocated to them with their retailers’ cheaper 
purchases being allocated to the more competitive (industrial consumers) market.
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delay is now 18 months, the �300m limit will be reached after      
about 17 months and any further delays will be uncompensated. 
By November 2006, the expected delay at Olkiluoto was indeed 
17 months54. In this context, the existing losses for Areva by end 
2006 of �700m seem likely to be an underestimate, the penalties         
for late completion accounting for 60% of this figure. If the costs 
over-run, by, say, 20%, a modest over-run by nuclear industry 
standards, Areva will end up losing �900m on this order.   
Reliability
Poor performance can be particularly costly for a utility. Take the 
example of a 1,000MW plant that operates at a load factor of 80% 
rather than 90% and the wholesale price of power is �50/MWh. 
The lost income from electricity sales alone will be �44m per year.   
The overall losses could be much higher if the poorer reliability 
increases operations and maintenance cost and the cost of 
buying the replacement power from the market is high.
One of the most impressive achievements of the nuclear 
industry has been the improvement in reliability of nuclear 
plants so that the world average load factor has increased from 
about 60% in 1980 to about 85% in 2005. However, this level of 
performance is no more than has always been forecast.
Experience with the most recent Framatome design, N4 
(predecessor to EPR), shows that reliability is still not assured, 
especially for new, untested designs (see Part 1, ‘The current 
order book’). Until all new plants operate from the start of 
service at levels of 85-90% load factor, it will be too great a risk 
for the nuclear vendors to offer a guarantee of performance. A 
particular problem for nuclear plants is that generally no one 
company controls the whole of the plant. For example, at the 
projected Flamanville plant in France (see Part 3, ‘Flamanville’), 
Areva will supply the nuclear island, Alstom the turbine 
generator, Bouygues, the civil works and EdF itself the architect 
engineering. It is hard to see how one company would gamble 
on the performance of all the other contractors by offering a 
performance guarantee.
The problems with the ABWRs in Japan (see Part 1, ‘Generation 
III/III+ plants’) show that it is not just the nuclear island that 
causes problems. Here, problems with the conventional part 
of a nuclear plant, the turbine generator, at only two units have 
significantly affected Hitachi’s profits and potentially its credit 
rating, because of the cost of repairs and replacement it will have 
to face as well as compensation to the plant buyer.
Power purchase agreements
If electricity markets are not a sham, long-term power purchase 
agreements at prices not related to the market will not be feasible 
unless the cost offered is very low. If the wholesale market for 
power is efficient, most power will be bought and sold at spot- or 
spot-related prices. If retail markets are effective, consumers will 
switch regularly to obtain the cheapest available price. A long-
term power purchase contract to buy the output of the plant at 
pre-determined prices will either be a huge risk, or will not be 
worth the paper it is printed on. If retail markets are well-used, no 
retailer will know from one year to the next what their market will 
be and the risk of company failure will be significant.
The circumstances of the Olkiluoto contract are very particular 
(see Part 3, ‘The Olkiluoto order’). The buyer, TVO, is a not 
for profit consortium of electric intensive industries that have 
contracted for the output of the plant at cost-related prices, over 
its whole life. Such a consortium probably is a credible buyer, 
but if the operating costs of the plant are higher than forecast, 
or the price of power in the NordPool, the wholesale market 
covering the four Nordic countries, is lower than forecast, the 
competitiveness of these companies (for which electricity may 
account for up to 50% of their costs) will be heavily impaired. It is 
hard to see how or why it would be possible for electric-intensive 
industry to form consortia in other countries, effectively gambling 
the competitiveness of their companies on the ability of the 
nuclear industry to control cost and achieve high reliability.
While the moves towards liberalisation are now experiencing 
difficulties and may be halted in some places, it seems unlikely 
that even where generation remains a regulated monopoly that 
regulators will allow generators to pass on imprudently incurred 
costs to consumers. If the terms of a power purchase agreement 
are fixed, this will be a big risk to the generator, who will have to 
absorb additional costs if things go wrong. If the terms are more 
flexible, the buyer will take the risk that they will not be allowed to 
recover their costs from consumers.
Long-term liabilities
From an economic appraisal perspective, long-term liabilities 
such as waste disposal and decommissioning should have little 
impact on the economics of nuclear power. At the start of the 
life of the plant, decommissioning will be 60 or more years away 
and final disposal of spent fuel will also be many decades away. 
In the type of discounted cash flow calculation used in project 
appraisal, costs and income are ‘discounted’ to a ‘net present 
value’. In other words, if there is a cost of, say, �100m in 10   
years’ time, and it was assumed the discount rate was 5%, the 
discounted value of this cost would be �61.3m. The rationale is    
that a sum of �61.3m was invested today at a real (net of inflation)          
interest rate of 5%, after 10 years, it would have grown to �100m. 
By the same logic, income of �100m earned in 10 years would be       
worth only �61.3m today. 
While this has an intuitive logic, over longer periods and at higher 
discount rates, the effect is alarming and seems to trivialise 
huge long-term liabilities. For example, if it was assumed that 
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decommissioning would cost �1bn and the discount rate     
was 15% (reflecting the high risk of investing in nuclear power 
stations), a sum of only �3m would grow sufficiently at this rate to        
produce a sum of �1bn in 60 years.   
The fault in the logic is that if the ‘polluter is going to pay’ the 
assumption that a real interest rate of 15% will be available 
for 60 years is untenable. The discount rate applied to 
construction costs is a ‘rationing’ device to ensure that 
limited funds are channelled to the most profitable use. The 
discount rate applied to decommissioning funds is a minimum 
expected rate of return on investment chosen to reduce the 
risk that funds will not be available.
To provide assurance that funds will not be lost, they are, in 
most countries, invested in very low risk investments paying 
correspondingly low interest rates, perhaps 2-3%. At a discount 
rate of 2%, �1bn discounted over 60 years falls to �300m.       
If, as seems likely to be the case, countries move towards 
systems of providing funds for long term liabilities that minimise 
the risk of a funding shortfall, for example, by requiring 
the plant owner to deposit the full discounted liability for 
decommissioning on the day the plant starts, this will make a 
noticeable difference to the initial cost. For example, if it was 
assumed that Olkiluoto would cost �1bn to decommission, the    
�3bn capital cost would increase by 10%.      
However, costs of decommissioning have been escalating 
rapidly and, for example, the expected cost of decommissioning 
Britain’s first generation plants has increased by a factor of 6 in 
the past 15 years (see Appendix). This represents a major risk to 
plant owners.
For example, if it is assumed decommissioning will cost �1bn 
and will take place 60 years after the plant starts up, at a 
discount rate of 2%, the company will be required to deposit 
�300m at the start of operation. However, if it is discovered           
that, after 30 years, the plant will only operate for 40 years and 
the decommissioning cost is �2bn, the utility will have to find       
another �1.2bn, likely to be enough to bankrupt many utilities.         
On past experience, such shocks would be by no means 
unusual. Insurance companies would be unlikely to be prepared 
to insure against such a risk (or would require a huge premium) 
and plant owners would probably look to government to offer 
guarantees to prevent the exposure to risks from waste disposal 
and decommissioning liabilities.
Recent studies on nuclear 
costs and why they differ
One of the elements driving the debate on nuclear power has 
been the publication since 2000 of a number of forecasts of 
nuclear generation costs from apparently authoritative and often 
independent sources, that appear to show that nuclear power is, 
at worst, competitive with other generation sources, and, at best, 
a cheap generation source. These include:
1. May 2000 ‘The Role of Nuclear Power in Enhancing Japan’s 
Energy Security’ James A Baker III, Institute for Public Policy 
of Rice University55;
2. 2002: Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT). ‘Finnish 
5th Reactor Economic Analysis’56; 
3. February 2002: ‘The economics of nuclear power’ UK 
Performance and Innovation Unit57;
4. September 2002: ‘Business Case for Early Orders of New 
Nuclear Reactors’, Scully Capital58;
5. February 2003: ‘The Future of Nuclear Power: An 
Interdisciplinary MIT Study’59;
6. March 2004: ‘The Costs of Generating Electricity’ The Royal 
Academy of Engineering60;
7. March 2006: ‘Powering the nation: A review of electricity 
generating costs’ PB Power61;
8. August 2004: ‘The economic future of nuclear power’ 
University of Chicago, funded by the US Department of 
Energy62;
9. August 2004: ‘Levelised Unit Electricity Cost Comparison of 
Alternative Technologies for Base load Generation in Ontario’ 
Canadian Energy Research Institute: Prepared for the 
Canadian Nuclear Association63;
10. March 2005: ‘Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 2005 
update’ IEA/NEA64; and
11. April 2005: ‘Financing the nuclear option: Modelling the costs 
of new build’ OXERA65.
12. July 2006: ‘Nuclear Power Generation Cost Benefit Analysis’, 
UK Department of Trade and Industry66.
However, a forecast is only as good as the assumptions that go 
into it and it is necessary to examine these assumptions to see 
what weight should be placed on these forecasts. The section on 
nuclear economics identifies the key assumptions for economic 
appraisals of nuclear power. The most important assumptions 
are the ones that determine the fixed cost per kWh, construction 
cost, cost of capital and reliability. However, operating costs, 
particularly non-fuel operations and maintenance (O&M) should 
not be ignored. Table 2.2 tabulates the key assumptions made in 
each of these studies.
Rice University
The Rice University study examines strategic issues for Japan in 
ensuring its energy security. It uses a forecast of the overall cost 
of generation from plants coming on line in 2010 produced by the 
Japanese Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry 
(CRIEPI).67 This produces a cost per kWh of �75/MWh. However,  
this figure should be seen in the context of the very high price of 
electricity in Japan, partly attributable to the high value of the Yen, 
and without examining CRIEPI’s assumptions in detail it is difficult 
to draw strong conclusions.
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Lappeenranta University of Technology
The Lappeenranta study was widely publicised when the 
decision to go ahead with Olkiluoto was taken. Many of 
the assumptions are not fully specified, being classified as 
commercially sensitive, but the very low cost of capital, the low 
operating costs and the high load factor inevitably lead to a low 
generation cost. The Olkiluoto order is discussed in Part 3.
Performance and Innovation Unit
The Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) of the UK Cabinet 
Office reviewed the economics of nuclear power in 2002 as 
part of the Government’s review of energy policy leading to 
the White Paper of 2003. It estimates the cost of generation 
from Sizewell B, if first-of-a-kind costs are excluded, which 
is estimated to reduce the construction cost of Sizewell B to 
�2250/kW (total cost of �4bn) as about �60/MWh (�90/MWh) if      
a 12% discount rate is applied.
It also reports the forecasts provided by British Energy and BNFL 
and presents them using common assumptions on the discount 
rate. It is difficult to represent all the information in the PIU report. 
The table shows the costs for the 8th unit, built as twin units and 
using AP1000 technology. The assumption is that by the 8th unit, 
all set-up and first-of-a-kind charges will have been met and the 
‘settled-down’ cost will apply. It uses BNFL’s assumptions but 
with PIU’s assumptions of discount rates of 8%, to represent a 
plant built where there was very low risk, for example if there was 
full cost pass-through to consumers, and 15%, to represent a 
plant subject to much greater commercial risk. The 8% case is 
calculated with a 15 year plant life (to represent the likely length of 
a commercial loan) and a 30 year plant life, while the 15% case is 
only shown with a 15 year life. Given that a cost or benefit arising 
in 20 years counts as only 6% of its undiscounted value and one 
arising in 30 years counts as only 1.5% of its undiscounted value 
in a DCF calculation, the difference between a 15 and 30 year 
life is likely to be small. The cost estimates if only one unit is built 
are 40-50% higher reflecting the assumption that first-of-a-kind 
costs will be about �300m (�440m).
Many of the assumptions, such as for construction cost, are 
categorised as commercially sensitive and are not published. 
However, the PIU does state that BNFL’s and British Energy’s 
construction cost estimates are less than �840/kW (�1260/
kW). On load factor, the figures are also confidential although 
the PIU states the assumed performance is significantly 
higher than 80%.
Scully Capital
The Scully report was commissioned by the US of Department  
of Energy and examines the costs of generation from a 1100MW 
PWR (AP1000) under four assumptions of construction cost, 
�1bn, �1.2bn, �1.4bn and �1.6bn, equivalent to �750/kW, 
�900/kW, �1050/kW and �1200/kW. Unlike other reports, the    
Scully approach is to forecast the wholesale electricity price 
and see what rates of return a nuclear plant would yield under 
their performance assumptions. At a market electricity price of 
�35/mWh (�26/MWh), a nuclear plant would achieve an internal        
rate of return including inflation of 7.3-10.7%, depending on the 
construction cost. It compares this to the industry norm of 10-
12%. Only the �1bn (�0.75bn) construction cost case is within this       
range. Sensitivity analyses are carried out on the market price for 
electricity, the load factor, the price of fuel and the construction 
time. There are also sensitivities on the financial aspects including 
the proportion of debt to equity and the cost of borrowing.
MIT
The 2003 MIT study was a very detailed and prestigious study 
of nuclear generation costs compared to fossil fuel generation 
options such as CCGT plants. Energy efficiency and renewable 
energy were not considered.  It has detailed assumptions on 
the important elements. On O&M costs, it assumes that these 
can be 25% less than the average for existing plants because 
of competitive pressures on generators. On construction costs, 
the report acknowledges that its assumed costs are far lower 
than those incurred in the most recent plants in the USA (albeit 
these were completed about 20 years ago). On capacity factor, 
the report considers two cases with 85% as the upper case 
and 75% as the lower case. It bases these assumptions on the 
good recent performance of US plants for the upper case, but 
the many years it took to achieve this level for the lower case. 
The assumptions on decommissioning are not specified but 
it can be assumed they follow current practice mandated in 
the USA of requiring a segregated fund. The assumed cost of 
decommissioning is not specified.
The main sensitivities reported are on load factor and on 
project lifetime, although reflecting the relatively high cost of 
capital, the lifetime extension makes only a small difference to 
the overall cost (about 5%), while the load factor assumption 
change makes a much greater difference (about 10-15%). 
In all cases, the gas and coal-fired options are substantially 
cheaper than nuclear, up to 45% for gas and about 35% 
for coal. Even reducing nuclear construction costs by 25%, 
construction time by 12 months and the cost of capital to 10% 
does not close the gap between nuclear and coal or gas.
The Royal Academy of Engineering
The Royal Academy of Engineering report compared a range 
of generating technologies and found that the cost of power 
from a nuclear plant was very close to the cost of power from 
a gas-fired plant, about 10-30% cheaper than coal (depending 
on the coal technology used) and about a third of the cost 
of renewables. It assumed there were three possible reactor 
choices, the EPR, AP1000 and the ACR. It drew heavily on the 
MIT for its estimates of the cost determinants, although it did 
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not follow them in all cases, citing ‘engineering judgement’ 
where it differed. For example, on O&M costs, it forecast 
costs nearly 50% lower than MIT.68 The report states that 
an allowance for decommissioning cost is included in the 
capital cost, but it does not specify the cost assumptions. Its 
assumptions seem consistently optimistic for all parameters 
and the overall low cost of generation is therefore not surprising.
PB Power
PB Power, the main contractors for the RAE study, produced 
an update of their report in 2006. It used a higher rate of 
return, but a lower construction cost and yielded much the 
same result as the RAE study.
University of Chicago
The University of Chicago study reviews a range of estimates of 
nuclear costs, but does not produce its own cost estimates. In its 
‘no-policy’ scenario, it calculates the levelised cost of electricity 
(LCOE) for three different cases of plants of 1000MW, the most 
expensive representing the EPR ordered for Olkiluoto, the middle 
case representing a plant on which first-of-a-kind (FOAK) costs 
would be incurred (e.g., the AP1000) and the lowest, one on 
which the FOAK costs had already been met (e.g., the ABWR 
or ACR-700). The results shown in the table do not adequately 
summarise the results of the study, which presents a wide range 
of sensitivities, but they do illustrate that even with extremely low 
construction costs, a relatively high discount rate does have a 
severe impact on overall costs.
Canadian Energy Research Institute
The Canadian Energy Research Institute study compares 
the forecast costs of generation from coal and gas-fired 
generation with the cost of generation from a pair of Candu-6 
units (1346MW total), the current generation of Candu, and a 
pair of ACR-700 units (1406MW total), the Generation III Candu 
design.69 We focus on the ACR-700 option, which is forecast 
to be cheaper than the Candu-6. Decommissioning costs are 
assumed to be about �250/kW (�375/kW) and payments are    
made into a fund through the life of the plant, amounting to 
�3.6m (�4.9m) per year over 30 years or 0.03p/kWh (�4.5/MWh).         
The overall cost is relatively low and most of the assumptions are 
similar to those used in other studies.
International Energy Agency/ 
Nuclear Energy Agency
The IEA/NEA study is based on questionnaire responses from 
national authorities on the cost of generation options. It is difficult 
to evaluate this report because of the huge range of national 
assumptions, with Eastern European countries often providing 
very low costs and Japan very high. The key factor is the very low 
discount rate used, which with relatively optimistic performance 
assumptions gives low generation costs.
OXERA
Consultancy group OXERA’s report of April 2005 was followed 
by a second report in June giving more details on the 
assumptions behind the cost estimates.70 The OXERA report 
includes very detailed financial analysis of the economics but it 
relies mainly on other reports for its assumptions on technical 
performance. For example, a very high assumption on load 
factor of 95% is included with no justification. The OXERA report 
follows the same approach as the Scully report of calculating 
the rate of return that would be achieved at a given electricity 
price. With a base-load electricity price of �27-33/MWh (�40-
49), about the rate British Energy received in 2006, the internal 
rate of return would be 8-11% for a single reactor (depending on 
the proportions of debt and equity). For a programme of 8 units, 
the return would be more than 15% for the last units. It should 
be noted that while the construction costs are higher than some 
forecasts, they are much lower than for Sizewell and lower than 
the reported cost of Olkiluoto. Its assumptions on load factor 
and operating cost, drawn partly from the IEA/NEA report and 
the Scully Capital report, require a huge improvement on the 
current generation of plants.
On the basis of these cost projections and on the cost of the 
Government’s current programme on renewables, which 
OXERA estimates to be �12bn (�18bn), OXERA estimates that    
a nuclear programme would achieve a similar impact in terms 
of carbon dioxide emissions reductions at a cost of only �4.4bn 
(�6.6bn) plus the cost of public insurance risk. The �4.4bn          
(�6.6bn) is made up of �1.1bn (�1.65bn) in capital grants and           
�3.3bn (�5bn) in loans guarantees. OXERA does not estimate        
the cost of public insurance risk.
UK Energy Review 2006
This is reviewed in detail in Part 3. While many of the assumptions 
are essentially the same as in the previous government review 
carried out by the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), the 
placing of the Olkiluoto order at a cost of about �3bn meant that   
the PIU’s very low assumption on construction cost was not 
credible. As noted in Part 3, ‘The UK’, the Central case assumes 
only four plants are built, while the figure assumed by the PIU is 
only achieved after eight units have been built.
The Review used a figure of the Olkiluoto price plus 20%. In 
practice, adjustments (of a dubious nature) to take account of 
the fact that the reported Olkiluoto cost includes interest during 
construction reduced the figure to a similar level to the Olkiluoto 
cost, but more than 50% higher than PIU used. However, the 
Energy Review assumed a cost of capital of only 10%, a third 
less than the most realistic rate (a rate for a free market decision) 
assumed by PIU. The net result was that the two changes 
approximately cancelled each other out producing about the 
same generation cost.
To put this result in perspective, the PIU report shows that using 
BNFL’s figures, increasing the cost of capital from 8% to 15% 
increases generation cost by about 50%. As a first approximation, 
we can assume increasing the cost of capital from 10% to 15% 
would increase generation cost by about 40%. So it seems that 
if the Energy Review had used a more realistic cost of capital, the 
generation cost would have been about �80/MWh (�53/MWh). 
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Long-term forecasting
The large construction costs and long operating times make 
nuclear power uniquely vulnerable to changes in markets. 
UBS Investment Research undertook an assessment of 
the European market for equity investors which concluded 
that ‘endorsing new nuclear is… a potentially courageous 
60-year bet on fuel prices, discount rates and promised 
efficiency gains…71. Other economic forecasters agree with the 
importance of these parameters and would include the price of 
carbon as an additional important factor.
Fuel prices
In the time of the oil shocks in the 1970s and 1980s the world 
was much more dependent on oil than is currently the case. This 
is partly the reason why the oil price increase from 1998-2005, 
where the price of oil has increased five fold, has not had the 
same economic impact as a similar price spike had during the 
1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s oil had a much wider application 
and was, for example, used to generate electricity, which is much 
less the case today.
However, there is still a close price correlation between the price 
of oil and the price of electricity as the prices of oil is linked to that 
of natural gas, and to a lesser extent that of coal. As natural gas is 
increasingly used in the production of electricity, oil and electricity 
price movements have a causal linkage. 
The period of higher oil prices from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s 
was also one of optimism for the nuclear industry, with orders still 
being made in the United States (before Three Mile Island) and in 
Europe before the orders tailed off following Chernobyl. 
The European Commission has undertaken analysis on the 
impact of higher oil and gas prices on the use of different energy 
technologies. In their base case scenario the price of oil in 2030 
in 2005 dollars is �63/barrel, but under a high price scenario it 
reaches �99/barrel. In the high oil and gas price scenario the 
use of nuclear increases, but only by 6.5%, compared to the 
increased use of renewables of 12.5%72.
The future price of oil is uncertain, with significantly differing 
views. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 
for 2006 estimates in its base-case scenario that the price of oil in 
2030 will be – in 2005 dollars – �55/barrel.
Interest rates
The large construction costs of nuclear power make it 
susceptible to changes in interest rates and in fact more 
susceptible than other energy sources that have lower 
construction costs and times. The amount of interest that 
a utility has to pay for borrowing the necessary finance to 
construct a nuclear power plant impacts significantly upon 
expected costs of the electricity produced. In economic 
models the effect of changing interest rates is defined as the 
discount rate (which is the sum of the initial investment plus the 
interest accumulated divided by the length of time the loan is 
taken out for). This has a significant impact on the economics 
of nuclear electricity. Based on the economic data put forward 
by the Nuclear Energy Agency, it is possible to see that 
increasing the discount rate from 5% to 10% in the economic 
models increases by 50% the cost of nuclear electricity73. 
Carbon pricing
The recognition of the environmental and economic 
consequences of climate change has increased the pressure 
to reduce CO2 emissions. Through the Kyoto Protocol many 
countries have agreed to put a limit on their CO2 emissions. 
However, the Protocol effectively excludes nuclear energy 
as an operation from its flexible mechanisms that Annex I 
parties to the Convention can use to meet their reductions 
targets.  Specifically, nuclear power is excluded from the Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM, Article 12) and projects 
implemented jointly (Article 6). Nuclear power was not directly 
excluded from emissions trading schemes.74
 In order to meet this target signatories have had to put in 
place mechanisms to reduce emissions in particularly from the 
power sector. In Europe this has resulted in the introduction 
of an Emissions Trading System which puts a ceiling on the 
amount of CO2 fixed sources can emit and has resulted in the 
establishment of a carbon market, as CO2 producers trade their 
emissions permits. 
Over the last two years, since the establishment of the 
European carbon market, the price has fluctuated in the range 
of �2-30/tonne carbon, due to changes in energy prices, actual         
or anticipated availability of emissions permits and market 
speculations.
Nuclear power does not receive emissions permits within the 
framework of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (unlike 
existing fossil fuel electricity generators) as it does not produce 
CO2 during electricity generation. However, despite the fact that 
during the first round of the ETS there was considerable over-
allocation of emissions permits and these were largely given for 
free to the electricity utilities, the establishment of the scheme 
has resulted in the general increase in electricity prices75.  As a 
result it has been said that the main economic winners of the 
current scheme have been the coal and nuclear utilities76. 
Many see the introduction of a long term carbon price as an 
important future issue for the nuclear industry and absolutely 
necessary for the construction of nuclear reactors. The chief 
executive of EdF has stated ‘To make a commitment of billions of       
pounds to a project with a time-scale of half a century, investors 
above all need predictability about price. They must know the 
value society will place on carbon reduction not just tomorrow, 
but 10, 20, 30, 40 years from now.’77 This would require a 
significant change in the current emissions trading schemes.   
Not only does there need to be a long term guarantee for the 
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price of carbon, but, according to some, also a price which 
is significantly above the current market price. The MIT study 
calculated that ‘With carbon taxes in the �50/tC range, nuclear 
is not economical under the base case assumptions’. The 
study went on to assess that nuclear will only break even under 
its base case assumptions, when carbon prices are in excess 
of �100/tC78 (�71/tC).   
Finland: the Olkiluoto order
The Olkiluoto order is currently the only live new order in 
Western Europe or North America and the first to be placed 
since the Civaux 2 order in France placed in 1993 and coupled 
to the grid in 1999.
Olkiluto is often portrayed as the exemplar of the capabilities 
of current designs. It is predicted to be cheaper to build and 
operate, and safer. It is also seen as a demonstration that nuclear 
power orders are feasible in liberalised electricity markets. 
Many commentators claimed that nuclear power orders were 
unfeasible in liberalised markets because consumers would 
no longer bear the full risk of building and operating new power 
plants (see Part 2, ‘Dealing with the risks of competitive electricity 
markets’). It is therefore important to examine the circumstances 
of the Olkiluoto order. To understand the Olkiluoto order, it is 
necessary to look at four aspects:
• Finland’s background in nuclear power;
• The commercial arrangements for the order;
• The buyer; and
• Experience to date.
Finland’s background in nuclear power
Finland ordered four relatively small nuclear power plants from 
1971-75. Two of these at Loviisa (both 440MW net) used the first 
generation Russian design (VVER-440) but were upgraded to 
Western standards with the assistance of Siemens. The two at 
Olkiluoto (both 660MW net) use a Swedish BWR design similar to 
some plants built in Sweden. The reliability of all four plants has 
always been high and even today, when reliability is much higher 
in the rest of the world than it was in the 1980s; all four units are in 
the top 20% in the league table of nuclear power plants ordered 
by lifetime load factor. Their load factors have been better than 
for similar plants built in other countries. In addition, the output of 
the plants has been significantly upgraded, with the Loviisa units 
now able to produce 11% more than their original design rating 
and the Olkiluoto plants 30% more. So the image of Finland as a 
nuclear operator is relatively good and Finland is probably likely 
to be more receptive to new nuclear orders than countries with 
worse experiences.
Work on the EPR design (1,600MW) started in 1991 and by the 
late 1990s, pressure on EdF to order the plant and to maintain the 
nuclear capability was mounting. The EPR design has been said 
by its supplier, the Framatome division of Areva79, to be ready to 
order for nearly a decade and regulatory approval for the design 
by both the German and French safety authorities was granted in 
2000. Areva has been increasingly concerned that, with orders in 
France continually delayed, regulatory approval would lapse if an 
order was not placed and the design proven in practice. In 1993 
the Finnish Parliament rejected a proposal to build a fifth reactor. 
However, this was not the end of the debate and the issue was 
retabled. In May 2002, the Finnish Parliament finally agreed, by 
107 to 92, that a fifth order could be placed and a call for tender 
was issued in September of that year. The main bidders and the 
model bid were:
• Areva, EPR (an evolutionary PWR);
• Areva, SWR (a passive safety version of the Siemens BWR)
• Atomstroyexport WWER91/99 (a modernised version of the 
1000MW Russian PWR design); and
• GE, ESBWR (a passive safety BWR).
Westinghouse did not place a bid.
In December 2003, TVO, the Finnish company buying the plant 
announced it had selected the Areva EPR bid and a contract was 
placed with Framatome for supply of the nuclear island and with 
Siemens for the turbine generator. In March 2005, the Finnish 
safety authorities issued a construction license and construction 
began in August 2005.
The commercial arrangements 
for the order
To reduce the risk to the buyer, Areva offered the plant under 
turnkey terms. Modern Power Systems reported:80
It is a fixed price contract, with the consortium having 
total responsibility for plant equipment and buildings, 
construction of the entire plant up to and including 
commissioning (excluding excavation), licensability, 
schedule and performance. The overall project cost has 
been estimated by TVO at around €bn.
The turnkey terms fixed the price TVO would have to pay and 
allowed for fines to be levied on the contractors if the plant was 
late. The schedule allowed for a 48 month period from pouring of 
first concrete to first criticality.
Some care must be taken in comparing the reported 
Olkiluoto contract price with other plants because the 
reported cost includes two reactor cores and covers interest 
during construction (IDC). Conventionally, for the purposes 
of comparing costs, the quoted cost does not include IDC 
and includes the cost of the first fuel core81. So to make fair 
Part 3: 
A nuclear revival?

The economics of nuclear power
comparisons with other cost estimates, the cost of one of the 
cores and the IDC should be subtracted. Given the low rate of 
interest on most of the finance (2.6%), IDC will be relatively small 
(of the order �150m), while the cost of the additional core is         
difficult to estimate but may be of the same order of magnitude.
The details of how the plant would be financed have not been 
published, but the European Renewable Energies Federation 
(EREF) and Greenpeace separately made complaints to 
the European Commission in December 2004 that they 
contravened European State aid regulations. According to 
EREF, the Bayerische Landesbank (owned by the state of 
Bavaria) led the syndicate (with Handelsbanken, Nordea, BNP 
Paribas and J P Morgan) that provided the majority of the 
finance. It provided a loan of �1.95bn, about 60% of the total      
cost at an interest rate of 2.6%. It is not clear if this is a real or 
a nominal rate. If it is a nominal rate, the real rate is effectively 
zero. Two export credit institutions are also involved: France’s 
Coface, with a �610m export credit guarantee covering Areva      
supplies, and the Swedish Export Agency SEK for �110m.
In October 2006, the European Commission finally 
announced it would be investigating the role of Coface. It is 
not clear whether the Bayerische Landesbank loan and the 
SEK guarantee would be investigated, nor is it clear what 
the consequences would be if the investigation was to find 
against Coface.
Regardless of the result of the Commission investigation, it 
is clear that the arrangements for Olkiluoto are unlikely to be 
reproducible. The loan from the syndicate if the rate reported 
is accurate is far below the levels that would be expected to 
apply for such an economically risky investment. The role of 
the export credit agencies (ECAs) is also surprising. ECAs are 
normally involved in financially and politically risky countries in the 
developing world, hardly a category that Finland would fit into.
The buyer
The buyer Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) is an organisation 
unique to Finland. For the Olkiluoto 3 unit, the largest 
shareholder, PVO, holds 60% of TVO’s shares. PVO is a 
not-for-profit company owned by Finnish electric-intensive 
industry that generated about 16% of Finland’s electricity in 
200582. Its shareholders are entitled to purchase electricity 
at cost in proportion to the size of their equity stakes. In 
return, they are obliged to pay fixed costs according to the 
percentage of their stakes and variable costs in proportion 
to the volume of electricity they consume. The other main 
shareholder in TVO is the largest Finnish electricity company, 
Fortum, with 25% of the shares. The majority of shares 
in Fortum are owned by the Finnish Government. This 
arrangement is effectively a life-of-plant contract for the 
output of Olkiluoto 3 at prices set to fully cover costs.
Experience to date
In August 2005, first concrete was poured, but almost 
immediately things began to go wrong. Issues about the 
strength and porosity of the concrete delayed work in 
September 2005.83 By February 2006, work was reported to be 
at least 6 months behind schedule, partly due to the concrete 
problems and partly to ‘problems with qualifying pressure 
vessel welds and delays in detailed engineering design’84.
In February 2006, STUK, the Finnish safety regulator launched 
an investigation into these delays85. By April 2006, TVO’s project 
manager for the plant, Martin Landtman acknowledged the 
delays were now 9 months.86 The plant suppliers appeared 
partly to blame lack of local skills87 and instability in the Finnish 
regulatory environment88 for the delays.
In March 2006, it emerged that EdF expected the second 
EPR order, for its Flamanville site, to cost 10% more than the 
contracted Olkiluoto price (�3.3bn) and that the lead-time     
would be 54 months instead of the 48 month period forecast 
for Olkiluoto.89
In July 2006, TVO admitted the delay was now about a year90and 
the STUK report into the delays was published91 . The report 
revealed a range of problems, ‘It has been very difficult to find the 
root cause, because there are so many interconnected factors.’
The head of the investigation team, Seija Suksi said:
…the time and amount of work needed for the detailed design 
of the unit was clearly underestimated when the overall 
schedule was agreed on’, Areva ‘is not so experienced in 
construction work. First of all, they didn’t understand that the 
base slab is also safety-related construction and they didn’t 
have enough experience to give advice to the subcontractors. 
The tight cost frame is also a problem in selecting and 
supervising subcontractors. They have very often chosen a 
subcontractor who has given the lowest tender.’, ‘we had the 
impression that Framatome tried to show that the concrete 
problems were all caused by the subcontractor, but the root 
causes are much deeper in the overall management of this 
project.’ STUK wants TVO ‘to communicate more clearly to 
the personnel on this project that turnkey delivery doesn’t 
mean that they can stand apart from the project. TVO should 
remember that they are responsible for the safety of the power 
plant. That responsibility cannot be transferred to the supplier.92
In September 2006, the impact of the problems on Areva 
started to emerge. In its results for the first six months of 
2006, Areva attributed a �300m fall in operating income     
of its nuclear operations to a provision to cover past and 
anticipated costs at Olkiluoto.93 The scale of penalties for late 
completion was also made public. The contractual penalty 
for Areva is 0.2% of the total contract value per week of delay 
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past the May 1, 2009 commercial operation target for the 
first 26 weeks, and 0.1% beyond that. The contract limits the 
penalty to 10%, about �300m.
More technical problems emerged in October94 and Areva 
announced it was replacing the head of project.95 Further 
unconfirmed reports suggested that Olkiluoto was then 2-3 years 
behind schedule (La Tribune November 10) and Capital, citing 
nuclear industry sources, reported on 20 October that ‘Areva 
could lose over �1bn in Finland’ because it had ‘botched’ the        
negotiation of the Olkiluoto contract. 
In December 2006, Areva announced the reactor was 18 
months behind schedule96 and the French newspaper, Les 
Echos, reported that Areva would take a �500m charge on the    
Olkiluoto contract in 200697. In December, Le Monde reported 
that the French Ministry of Finance had said that the losses had 
reached �700m.98
By January 2007, relations between Areva and TVO were 
seriously strained. In a report on Finnish television Philippe 
Knoche, Areva representative for Olkiluoto 3 said: ‘TVO and 
we have had problems, for which we were not prepared for 
beforehand. We were not properly ready for the fact that this 
is a new kind of reactor and that it has to be adjusted to the 
Finnish conditions.’ The turnkey deal appeared to be unraveling 
and Knoche stated: ‘Areva-Siemens cannot accept 100 % 
compensation responsibility, because the project is one of vast 
co-operation. The building site is joint so we absolutely deny 100 
% compensation principle.’
TVO did not accept this interpretation and Martin Landtman, 
when asked about Knoche’s statement said: ‘I don’t believe 
that Areva says this. The site is in the contractor’s hands at 
the moment. Of course, in the end, TVO is responsible of what 
happens at the site. But the realisation of the project is Areva’s 
responsibility.99 
Lessons
Whilst there were suspicions amongst sceptics that the Olkiluoto 
plant would be problematic, the scale and immediacy of the 
problems have taken even the sceptics by surprise. It remains to 
be seen how far these problems can be recovered, what the final 
delay will be, how far these problems will be reflected in higher 
costs and how these additional costs will be distributed between 
Areva and TVO). However, a number of lessons do emerge:
• The contract value of �2000/kW now appears likely to be      
a gross underestimate and any forecasts of nuclear costs 
should probably be based on a figure higher than that 
forecast by EdF, �2200/kW, which may yet turn out to be        
an underestimate;
• Turnkey contracts represent a huge risk for plant vendors and 
the experience at Olkiluoto may well mean that vendors will 
see contracts that offer such a high degree of price assurance 
as Olkiluoto are unjustifiable;
• The skills needed to successfully build a nuclear plant to 
the standards required are considerable and lack of recent 
experience of nuclear construction projects may mean this 
requirement is even more difficult to meet;
• There are serious challenges to a regulatory body. The 
Finnish regulator had not assessed a new reactor order for 
more than 30 years and had no experience of dealing with 
a ‘first-of-a-kind’ design.
France: Flamanville
The French nuclear industry has been lobbying government 
and Electricité de France (EdF)100 for nearly a decade to place 
an order for an EPR. After a long process, the Flamanville 
site was selected and is expected to receive the French 
equivalent of a construction permit (Decret d’Autorisation 
de Creation, or DAC) in 2007. Work on site was started in 
October 2006, but the main orders for the plant will not 
be placed before second part of 2007 with first concrete 
expected to be poured in December 2007.101 The plant is 
scheduled to take 54 months to build with first power in mid-
2012, 6 months longer than Olkiluoto’s original schedule. 
EdF expects the plant to cost �3.3bn, 10% more than the     
contracted cost for Olkiluoto. However, unlike the OL3 
contract, this cost does not include the cost of the first 
fuel load (conventionally included in the cost of a nuclear 
plant).102 Electricité de France is carrying out its own architect 
engineering and is procuring major items, like the turbine 
(Alstom), the nuclear island (Areva) and the civil works 
(Bouygues) separately.
Whether EdF will be able to keep to the costs it forecasts 
remains to be seen, but the fact that the most experienced 
nuclear utility in the world expects the EPR to cost more than 
10% more than an inexperienced utility like TVO does suggest 
that the Olkiluoto contract price is totally unrealistic.
Nevertheless, EdF does expect subsequent units to be 
significantly cheaper than Flamanville, although it has not 
said by how much. It is worth noting that from 1974 to 
1984, when EdF completed more than 30 nuclear units, 
the real cost of the plants actually increased by 54%103. 
Whether EdF will choose the EPR has not been determined. 
Bernard Dupraz, the EdF’s senior executive vice president 
for generation, said in May 2005 that EdF will need to begin 
replacing its existing reactors around 2015-2020, which 
means it will have to choose a strategy after the initial 
operation of Flamanville-3. Dupraz said the utility will take a 
close look at what models are available on the world nuclear 
plant market at that time. ‘We will see if there are other 
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efficient models with a price differential’ compared to EPR 
that would make them more attractive to EdF, he said.104
The UK
In May 2006, pre-empting the publication of the UK Government’s 
Energy Policy Review105 in July 2006, Tony Blair said ‘Nuclear 
power is back on the agenda with a vengeance’106. His chief 
scientific adviser and other government spokespeople suggested 
that up to 20 new nuclear units would be needed. This was taken 
by many, internationally, as a signal that the UK was about to 
launch an aggressive new programme of nuclear power stations.
Is this really what will happen? And on what assumptions is 
Blair making the forecast that nuclear power should be ‘back 
with a vengeance’? The detail of what is being proposed 
and the assumptions are to be found in the Energy Review 
itself and in the supporting documentation, especially a cost 
benefit analysis for nuclear power.107
Scale of programme, government 
support and benefits
Scale
What is perhaps most striking is that the scale of the programme 
is modest. The Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) case states:
Should the private sector take commercial decisions to invest 
in new nuclear, the economic analysis suggests that there 
is scope for adding a relatively small amount of new nuclear 
capacity in the period to 2025 (p 1).
It is likely that the first new nuclear plant could be added 
by around 2021, if not before, assuming an eight year pre-
development period (for pre licensing, public enquiry, licensing, 
etc) starting in 2007, and six years construction (p 1).
The analysis identifies scope for replacing existing capacity 
by adding 6 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2025 in the base 
case (p 2).
This is a rather modest target requiring only that about four 
plants (depending on their size) be built with the first order not 
placed for nine years, a period during which two or possibly 
three general elections will take place. So there is ample 
scope for the programme to fail before it has even started. A 
programme of four orders would fall far short of the level of 
ordering estimated by the PIU to be necessary to achieve a 
‘settled down’ cost. Note also that the PIU assumed that it was 
necessary to build plants in pairs to achieve optimal costs and 
unless it was possible to build the 4 units as pairs of units on just 
two sites, the costs would also be higher than the optimal level. 
Government support
The scale of government support offered is also extremely 
limited. The Review stated:
Any new nuclear power stations would be proposed, 
developed, constructed and operated by the private sector, 
who would also meet full decommissioning costs and 
their full share of long-term waste management costs. The 
Government does not take a view on the future relative costs 
of different generating technologies. It is for the private sector 
to make these judgements, within the market framework 
established by government. The actual costs and economics 
of new nuclear will depend on, amongst other things, the 
contracts into which developers enter, and their cost of capital 
for financing the project.
In evidence to the Trade and Industry Select Committee, the 
Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks, was blunter108.
It is not for government to say that we shall have X nuclear 
reactors and so on. Government will not be building nuclear 
reactors, will not say they want X number of nuclear reactors. 
I always thought myself that if at the moment one fifth of our 
electricity is from nuclear, if the market came forward with 
something to replicate that broadly in the future, from my 
own point of view it seems to me that would make a useful 
contribution to the mix. We are not going to do anything to 
facilitate that, nor this percentage nor that percentage.
And in response to a question on subsidies (‘Is that the 
Government’s position? No direct subsidies and no indirect 
subsidies. Am I clear on that?’), he said:
No cheques will be written, there will be no sweetheart deals.
And
No, there will not be any special fiscal arrangements for nuclear. 
It should not be a surprise, with respect, because we have said 
it very clearly in the Energy Review. You could pursue this if you 
wanted by saying that nuclear waste is quite a complex subject 
and we are going to look very carefully at that to make sure that 
the full costs of new nuclear waste are paid by the market.
The main concession was on licensing:
The idea of pre-licensing is that you can say here is a wind farm, 
here is a nuclear reactor or a gas-powered station let us pre-
license it so that the regulators are satisfied that it is safe and 
all the other things as a piece of kit. Then the local inquiry can 
purely be about local issues rather than becoming a national 
or international occasion to re-open the whole debate about 
whether windmills or nuclear are desirable. That is what we are 
trying to do.
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Benefits
In the Government’s central cases for gas and nuclear, nuclear 
has a small cost disadvantage, with the central figure for gas 
�34.6/MWh (�52/MWh) compared to �37.5/MWh (�56/MWh)     
for nuclear. The case for nuclear power, unless the central 
case for nuclear is too pessimistic and/or the central case for 
gas is too optimistic, therefore rests on an assumption that the 
strategic advantages of nuclear, for example, reducing gas 
dependency or increasing low-carbon generation.
The range for the nuclear costs is plus or minus about 20%, 
compared to nearly 30% for gas (see Table 3.1).
Table .: Costs for nuclear and gas  
(£ per MWh/� per MWh)
Low Medium High
Nuclear 30/45 37.5/56 43.7/65.5
Gas 24.5/37 34.6/52 45.2/68
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Nuclear power generation cost 
benefit analysis’ July 2006 http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31938.pdf
Assumptions
However, to determine whether this cost can be seen as a 
reliable, it is necessary to scrutinise the key assumptions to 
check how plausible they are (see Table 3.2)
Table .:  Assumptions adopted 
in the UK CBA
Variable Assumption
Construction cost �1250/kW (�1875/kW)
Construction time 72 months
Load factor 80%, rising to 85% after 5 years
Operational life 40 years
O&M cost �7.7/MWh (�11.5/MWh)
Fuel cost �3.9/MWh (�11.8/MWh)
Decommissioning cost �400/kW (�600/kW)
Discount rate 10%
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Nuclear power generation cost 
benefit analysis’ July 2006 http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31938.pdf
Construction cost
The UK Government claims that it is assuming an overnight 
capital cost equivalent to the reported price of the Olkiluoto 
order plus 20%. At first sight, this seems a sensibly conservative 
estimate reflecting, for example, the possibility that the Olkiluoto 
contract has been under-priced. However, if we look at the 
assumptions, this conservatism is less apparent
The cost of the Olkiluoto plant has been widely reported as �3bn, 
which equates to �1,875/kW for a 1,630MW unit. In December       
2006, the �/� exchange rate was 1.5, which makes the cost         
�1,250/kW or a total of �2bn. However, in the past six years, the 
exchange rate has varied between 1.36 and 1.75, a variation of 
nearly 30%. This variability alone should raise questions about 
whether the risk analysis really reflects the extent of the risk. Most 
of the equipment and fuel will be priced in international currencies 
and if the pound falls against the Euro, the sterling cost will go up. 
An increase in cost of 10-15% is by no means implausible from 
currency exchange rate variability alone.
The reported �3bn cost for the Olkiluoto plant includes interest        
during construction (IDC) and the cost of two reactor cores109. 
Conventionally, comparisons of construction cost exclude IDC 
but include the cost of the first fuel charge. So to standardise 
the Olkiluoto cost we need to subtract the IDC and the cost 
of one reactor core. The CBA does not appear to make an 
adjustment for the cost of the second core. The cost of the 
Olkiluoto plant, excluding IDC is assumed to be �1,050/kW. 
The CBA does not specify the assumed exchange rate, but 
if we assume the analysis was based on May 2006 rates 
when the �/� exchange rate was about 1.45, this translates        
to a construction cost of about �1,500/kW or about �2.5bn.    
Given that, as acknowledged by the CBA, most of the finance 
was borrowed at an interest rate of only 2.6%, this seems 
a little high. If the �2.5bn had all been borrowed at the start        
of a construction period of four years, the interest during 
construction would only have amounted to �270m, so IDC may    
be no more than about �150m with such low interest rates. On       
these grounds, the assumed cost of the Olkiluoto plant seems 
to be an under-estimate.
The CBA claims that the assumed cost for a UK plant would be 
�1,250/kW, about 20% more than Olkiluoto. This premium is 
based on three factors:110
• ‘The possibility that costs of this project have been 
discounted as part of a wider marketing strategy.
• The possibility that costs have been underestimated.
• Potentially more onerous regulatory requirements in the 
UK as opposed to the Finnish context, notwithstanding 
arguments above that planning process design can 
reduce pre-development and construction costs.’
The first two explanations are clearly valid although the third 
explanation does have a rather jingoistic flavour and is hard to 
justify. To balance these upward price pressures, the CBA offers 
grounds for the price to be lower (CBA, p 18):
‘The central case is regarded as being conservative, 
particularly because the cost for the TVO Project relates to 
one plant rather than a nuclear programme. Unit construction 
costs for a programme are estimated to be 25% or more 
lower than for the addition of one plant. The differential 
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reflects one off costs (e.g. finalising a design to meet national 
regulatory requirements) and possible scale/scope economies 
associated with programme build (e.g. through batch 
production of components). The central case assumption 
builds in a 40% premium relative to the French forecast 
overnight cost for a 10 GW programme.’
These assumptions are rather less plausible. Whether 3 or 
4 orders can be regarded as a programme is questionable. 
It is not clear whether the Review’s assumptions on how 
construction costs fall with experience can be reconciled with 
the views of the PIU, which assumed minimum achievable costs 
would only be achieved after 8 units have been built and if units 
are built as pairs.
Whether, in a competitive market, a utility could commit to build 
4 units is even more dubious. If we assume there are still about 
6-8 main generators in the UK market when the first order is 
expected to be placed, they would have a capacity each of 
about 10GW. For one of these to make a decision to build the 
equivalent of 60% of their capacity with one technology at one 
time would appear an enormous risk. The only circumstances 
in which it would be possible would be if wholesale electricity 
competition no longer existed or the main generators had formed 
a consortium to build these plants. Again, this would be feasible 
only if competition between generators was superficial.
The assumption that building several plants would reduce 
costs is logical. However, French experience with its nuclear 
programme is very different. It is worth noting that from 1974 to 
1984, when EdF completed more than 30 nuclear units, the real 
cost of the plants actually increased by 54%111.
The Flamanville 3 order, expected to be placed in 2007, is 
expected to cost �3.3bn. However, this cost does not include the        
cost of the first fuel core or the interest during construction. The 
UK Government’s CBA notes that Electricité de France (EdF, the 
main French utility) expects Flamanville 3 will cost 10% more than 
Olkiluoto. However, adding on the first fuel core will significantly 
increase this cost, perhaps by 10-20%. This already takes the 
cost estimate up to the level assumed by the UK Government for 
the first UK unit. This makes the UK estimate seem significantly 
less cautious than is suggested in the CBA for two main reasons:
• Historically, forecasts of nuclear plant construction cost 
almost invariably turn out to be under-estimates so it is 
likely the Flamanville plant will cost more than is currently 
forecast.
• France is the most experienced builder of nuclear plants 
in the world in the past 30 years, ordering and completing 
about 50 plants in that time, whereas the UK has ordered 
only three plants in that time, two of which used a 
completely different technology. Its record of completing 
these three plants to time and cost was poor.
Construction time
The assumed construction period is 72 months from 
placement of order to commercial operation. This compares 
to the 48 months forecast for Olkiluoto and 54 months 
forecast for Flamanville 3. However, these periods appear 
to be from first structural concrete (which often occurs up 
to a year after placement of order) to first criticality (which 
precedes commercial operation by about 6 months) so the 
assumption is similar to that adopted by EdF. Olkiluoto is 
already 18 months late after only 18 months of construction, 
so this assumption is far from conservative.
Load factor
The CBA again stresses that the assumed load factor is 
conservative. It is indeed in line with experience at Sizewell B, 
where after 10 years of operation, the cumulative load factor is 
85% (this makes it by far the most reliable plant built in the UK). 
This assumption therefore seems reasonable although it is by 
no means assured that the target will be met.
Operating life
Again, the CBA stresses that the assumed lifetime is very 
conservative, 40 years compared to the design life of 60 years. 
From an economic point of view, with an assumed real cost of 
capital of 10%, the difference between assuming 40 years and 
60 years is negligible. Any benefits earned more than 40 years in 
the future would have a tiny ‘present value’.112 
For an economic analysis, the relevant measure is not the 
physical life, but the economic life. While the economic life 
cannot exceed the physical life, it is highly likely the economic life 
will be shorter than the physical life. Power plants are generally 
retired when they are no longer economic or would cost more 
to keep in service than they would earn, not when they are 
thoroughly worn out. Making an assumption about the type of 
power plant that would be economic in, say, 2060 is heroic. This 
is especially so in competitive markets where plants that are 
uneconomic will be quickly retired. It is worth remembering that 
British Energy collapsed financially in 2002, when the Sizewell B 
plant was only 7 years old. Had the UK Government not chosen 
to rescue the company, at huge expense to the taxpayer, it 
is questionable whether a buyer would have been found for 
Sizewell B. If, as seems entirely plausible, British Energy fails 
again, the chances of finding a buyer are even more remote.
O&M cost and fuel cost
British Energy publishes figures on the operating cost of its 8 
plants. These costs have increased from about �16/MWh (�24/
MWh) in 2002 to about �25/MWh (�37/MWh) in 2006, far above     
the level assumed for a new plant of �11.6/MWh (�17.4/MWh). 
However, experience to date with UK reactors may not be a good 
indicator of operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of future 
plants because only one of British Energy’s stations is a PWR 
comparable to the type of plant that might be built.
The USA does collect and publish operating costs and in 2004, 
the average was �17.2 (�13.1). At an exchange rate of �1=�2.0,       
this equates to about �9/MWh. However, the dollar was very 
weak against sterling in December 2006 and at more realistic 
rates, the assumed value may be about the same. The main 
factor that might increase UK costs compared to US costs 
is that US costs include a figure of �1/MWh (�1.33/MWh) to  
dispose of spent fuel. This is a nominal sum, set nearly 30 years 
ago and does not reflect real experience. A more realistic figure 
is likely to be significantly higher.
Nevertheless, the assumed figure does appear to be reasonable, 
although again, particularly if the reliability was worse than 
forecast, it could easily prove too low.113
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Decommissioning cost
The CBA assumes a decommissioning cost of �636m (�950m) 
or �400/kW (�600/kW). This must be regarded as a highly        
speculative figure given that no full-size nuclear power plant 
that has completed a significant number of years of service 
has ever been fully dismantled and disposed of114. A particular 
uncertainty is the cost of full decommissioning and disposal 
of waste. Estimating the cost of decommissioning and clean 
up alone, has been described by one former BNFL insider 
as ‘more of an art than a science’.115 This is especially true for 
intermediate level waste, high level wastes and spent nuclear 
fuel for which no facilities exist in the UK. While this figure 
is in line with forecasts, it is significantly less than the latest 
estimates for the UK first generation plants that are in the 
early stages of decommissioning. The costs per kW are highly 
variable, ranging from �4000/kW, to about �1000/kW. While 
these costs are for a very different technology, it is worth noting 
that the estimates are necessarily much more fully developed 
than those relating to plants not even built yet and, in the past 15 
years, the estimated cost has gone up by a factor of about 6.
Of perhaps as much importance as the amount estimated is the 
way in which the provisions are held and the assumptions on 
what rate of interest any provisions would earn. It is assumed 
that any new plant owner would have to operate a segregated 
decommissioning fund: in other words, a fund that the plant 
owner would not be able to access for purposes other than 
decommissioning. If the provisions are expected to earn even a 
relatively moderate real rate of interest, say 5%, and provisions 
are collected over the life (say 40 years) of the plant, the impact 
will be much less than if the plant owner is required to provide 
the funds on the day the plant starts and the fund is expected to 
earn, perhaps 2% real for, say 20 years. The latter arrangement 
would reflect an arrangement where funds could only be 
invested in very low risk investments and a funding shortfall 
would be much less likely if the plant failed to complete its 
expected life. For example, a fund that grows at 5% per year will 
grow by a factor of 7 over 40 years, while a fund that grows by 
2% over 20 years would only grow by a factor of 1.5.
The CBA does not specify its assumptions in this respect. 
 It states (CBA, p 4):
Back end costs (decommissioning and waste management), 
whilst potentially of a large order of magnitude far into the future, 
would need only a relatively small annual contribution over time to 
ensure that the required amount is available. No decisions have 
been taken on the specific mechanism required.
This implies that funding would be drawn over a relatively 
long projected life, rather than at the start of operation and a 
significant positive interest rate is assumed.
If we assume a low interest rate (2%), a lifetime of 20 years and 
a decommissioning cost of �636m (�934m), this would require    
that the plant owner would deposit (and obtain guarantees to 
ensure the full sum was available even if the plant did not operate 
for 20 years) about �400m (�588m), effectively increasing the    
construction cost by about 20%.
Cost of capital
This is the assumption that is crucial and most controversial. 
When the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) of the 
Cabinet Office examined nuclear economics in 2002 for the 
Government’s 2003 energy review, the PIU took a range of 
discount rates (real post-tax cost of capital) – 8% and 15% 
– the 8% rate corresponding to the rate applied to appraisal for 
Sizewell B when the electricity industry was a publicly owned 
monopoly. The 15% discount rate produced costs per kWh 
about 50% higher than the 8% rate.
At that time, 15% was widely seen as the minimum rate required 
for any power plant operating in the competitive market. It is 
therefore surprising that the CBA takes as its central case 10% 
with a high case of 12% and a low case of 7%. It is hard to see, 
given the government strictures on subsidies, how a 7% rate 
could be feasible, while even a 10% rate would represent a very 
low risk investment not consistent with a plant that had to operate 
without special taxpayer or electricity consumer support.
Unless the Government’s statements on subsidies and 
guarantees are not to be taken seriously or the Government 
assumes that by the time the plant is ordered, the wholesale 
electricity market will be so lacking in competitive pressure that 
plant owners are effectively able to recover all cost incurred from 
consumers, no matter how imprudently incurred, even the 12% 
‘high’ case seems far too low.
Capacity need
The CBA states:116
There is a relatively small need for new capacity between 
2018-2025. The economic analysis suggests that new 
investment should only take place when there is a need for 
capacity: to replace existing capacity upon retirement and to 
meet demand growth.
This is a particularly curious suggestion given the 
Government’s stated intention to allow the market to determine 
investment decisions. According to this market philosophy, 
a plant will be retired when it is no longer profitable and built 
when it is expected to be profitable. The idea that a company 
could make a decision in 2007 about whether there will be 
a need for capacity in 2021 is preposterous. The UK market 
has swung from large surplus in 2002 to near shortage in 
only 3-4 years as companies responded to low electricity 
prices by retiring old plants and postponing investing in new 
plants, so the suggestion that there will be a small capacity 
need between 2018 and 2025 represents a misunderstanding 
of how markets operate and cannot be taken as a given. In 
markets, investments are taken as the result of market signals, 
not government planning, and the existence or otherwise of 
a capacity need in 2021 will be the consequence of many 
commercial decisions taken between now and then.
Reactor technology and vendor choice
While the Government has repeatedly stated that decisions on 
nuclear power will be taken by the private sector, the logic of 
the Government’s programme is that it will choose the reactor 
technology and vendor. The process of obtaining regulatory 
and planning approval is expected to start in 2007, leading to 
plant order in 2015. Does the Government really believe that it 
is feasible, in a competitive electricity market, for a company 

The economics of nuclear power
to commit to build a reactor 14 years before that plant comes 
on-line? Even committing to a new nuclear power plant 6 years 
in advance, a period during which the market could swing from 
shortage to surplus and back again, stretches belief. From 
the Government’s current position it appears to follow that it 
will choose the reactor technology and frame the regulatory 
approval for it. Obtaining regulatory approval for all the feasible 
designs would be hopelessly wasteful and would stretch the 
regulatory bodies’ already over-extended resources far too 
far. The US Government has chosen this option, but with a 
much better resourced regulatory body and at huge cost to US 
taxpayers. If, when the time to order the plant came, the design 
proved uncompetitive compared to its rivals, the process might 
well have to go back to square one unless measures were 
introduced to support the design originally chosen. 
Evaluation of the UK’s 
proposed programme
What is striking from the Government’s analysis is that the 
economic benefits, even with some highly suspect assumptions 
on economic parameters promise only slender returns and only in 
the more favourable scenarios. The benefits are strategic, mainly 
relating to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The CBA 
states, that nuclear power is justifiable on the following grounds:117
• Adding new nuclear capacity could help to reduce forecast 
carbon emissions and to reduce the level of forecast gas 
consumption imports;
• Within power generation, new nuclear appears to be a cost 
effective means for meeting carbon emissions reduction 
targets. Adding new nuclear capacity would not preclude 
investment in other forms of low carbon generation;
• Investment in nuclear new build would result in carbon 
abatement cost savings sufficient to offset the nuclear 
cost penalty relative to gas fired plant in a central gas price 
scenario;
• Adding new nuclear power station would also partially 
mitigate risks associated with dependence on imported 
gas. In particular, costs associated with insuring against 
the risk of fuel supply interruption (e.g. through adding 
gas storage capacity) could be reduced as nuclear plant 
is added. Investment in new nuclear capacity would also 
provide a hedge against the risk of high gas prices; and
• Nuclear investment is not justified at the higher end of the 
range of costs, or in a low gas price world, or in a central gas 
price world where there is no carbon price.
Yet the Government states:118 ‘Any new nuclear power stations 
would be proposed, developed, constructed and operated by 
the private sector.’ Why private, profit-maximising companies 
should decide to invest in nuclear power, given all its specific 
economic risks, when, in the Government’s central case, with 
dubious assumptions, there are no clear economic benefits to 
them is a mystery.
If the Government expects private industry to make decisions 
where the primary benefit is a strategic national one, it will have to 
compensate industry for the additional costs and risks it is taking. 
The Government has very clearly stated it will not do this: ‘No 
cheques will be written, there will be no sweetheart deals.’
In summary, the idea that ‘nuclear power is back with a 
vengeance’ is not supported by the scale of the programme 
envisaged, even if the programme was capable of being 
realised. The assumptions on which the Government’s case for 
nuclear power plants rests, while significantly less outlandish 
than many recent forecasts, are still optimistic. A particular 
concern is the choice of a very low discount rate, a rate that 
would only be feasible if taxpayers and/or electricity consumers 
were shouldering the economic risk of the programme, an 
outcome the Government appears to have totally ruled out.  
On many criteria, the programme is impractical. It would require 
companies to make decisions on plant construction far in 
advance of when the plants would come on-line, an option only 
feasible in a planned monopoly electricity industry. It would 
require the Government to make a choice of technology and 
vendor, a decision it has no powers to make in a liberalised 
energy market.
In February 2007 the High Court declared that the 
Government’s decision to back the construction of new nuclear 
power plants was unlawful.  The judge overseeing the case, 
brought by Greenpeace, declared that the consultation process 
was “seriously flawed and that the process was manifestly 
inadequate and unfair” because insufficient information had 
been made available by the Government for consultees to make 
an “intelligent response”.  In particular the judge criticised the 
Government for the lack on information available during the 
consultation on economics and nuclear waste.
As a result of this decision the Government will in 2007 
undertake another public consultation process on nuclear 
power before finalising its policy towards nuclear new build.
USA
There are 103 commercial nuclear reactors in operation in 
the United States, making it the largest, by some margin, 
commercial fleet in the world. However, this fleet is the result 
of ordering and construction in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, and 
no new reactor has been ordered for 30 years that was not 
subsequently cancelled. 
The collapse and cancellation of orders was in part due to the 
increase in costs associated with new build. Reactors being 
completed in 1976/7 were 3.4 times more expensive per kW than 
those in 1966/7. This has been accredited to the rapid progress 
to larger power plants, the non-emergence of the expected 
economies of scale and changes in design and equipment119.  
The Bush administration has made a concerted six year effort 
to revive nuclear ordering, including its Nuclear Power 2010 
programme, launched in 2002. It has yet to achieve a new order.  
The programme focuses on Generation III+ designs (see below). 
Under the programme, the US Department of Energy (USDOE) 
expects to launch cooperative projects with industry:
‘.. to obtain NRC approval of three sites for construction of 
new nuclear power plants under the Early Site Permit (ESP) 
process, and to develop application preparation guidance for 
the combined Construction and Operating License (COL) and 
to resolve generic COL regulatory issues. The COL process is a 
‘one-step’ licensing process by which nuclear plant public health 
and safety concerns are resolved prior to commencement of 
construction, and NRC approves and issues a license to build 
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and operate a new nuclear power plant.’120
A total of up to �450m (�342m) in grants is expected to be       
available for at least three projects. Two main organisations 
have emerged to take advantage of these subsidies and have 
signed agreements with the USDOE to develop COLs. Nustart, 
launched in 2004, was the first utility grouping to express an 
interest. It comprises a consortium of eight US utilities including 
Constellation Energy, Entergy, Duke Power, Exelon, Florida Power 
& Light, Progress Energy, Southern Company and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA, providing staff time not cash). The French 
utility, EdF, and the vendors, Westinghouse and GE are also 
members but have no voting rights. 
This was followed up by the nuclear provisions of the US Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005). The Bush programme is best 
understood as an effort to reverse the power market lessons of 
the 1980s and 1990s. Since investors have proven unwilling to 
assume the risks of building new nuclear units, even after all the 
improving of designs and streamlining of the licensing process, 
EPACT 2005 reverts to the 1960s and 70s by reassigning risk 
back to those who are given no choice, this time the taxpayers 
instead of the customers. 
The most important nuclear provisions of EPACT 2005 offer three 
types of support. First, a limited number of new nuclear power 
plants can receive a �18/MWh (�13.5/MWh) production tax credit    
for up to �125m (�93.75m) per 1000MW (or about 80% of what        
the plant could earn if it ran 100% of the time).121 The second 
benefit is a provision for federal loan guarantees covering up to 
80% of project costs. The third benefit provides up to �500m 
(�375m) in risk insurance for the first two units and �250m           
(�187.5m) for units 3-6. This insurance is to be paid if delays not             
the fault of the licensee slow the licensing of the plant.122 
These provisions lower the price of nuclear power without 
lowering its cost, at least not for many years. This occurs 
because some of the costs and risks are moved out of the price 
charged to customers and onto the shoulders of taxpayers. For 
example, the production tax credit deprives the US Treasury of 
funds that must be made up from other sources. Whether the 
benefit flows through to customers or is retained by investors 
will vary with the economic regulatory approach used, but either 
way prices can be kept lower than would be the case if the credit 
did not exist. Similarly, the loan guarantees assure lenders that 
they will be repaid no matter what happens at the power plant. 
Essentially, their guaranteed loans are converted into government 
obligations. This lowers both the interest rate and the amount of 
more expensive equity capital that must be raised, as was used 
for the financing of the Olkiluoto 3 reactor in Finland.
Taken together and combined with other benefits recently 
conferred on the industry in the United States (such as the 20 
year extension of the law limiting nuclear power plant exposure 
to liability for the costs of a serious accident)123, the benefits in 
the recent U.S law have substantially increased the likelihood of a 
new US nuclear power plant order in the next few years. Indeed, 
the incentives are structured to provide maximum benefit to 
plants ordered before the end of 2008 (see Table 3.3 for a list of 
possible applicants. 
At a recent conference, three US industry CEO’s made clear the 
impact of the 2005 Congressional action: 
[TXU CEO John Wilder] said there were now projects totalling 
about 26 gigawatts lining up for limited federal incentives, which 
could provide ‘anywhere from a $2 per megawatt-hour advantage 
to a $20 per megawatt-hour advantage.’ He said he didn’t believe 
it would be known which companies would receive those benefits 
until about 2012. ‘Quite frankly, that’s all the difference between 
these projects working or not working,’ he said.
NRG Energy President/CEO David Crane, also speaking on a 
September 26 conference panel with Wilder, said the measures 
in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 were key to his company’s 
decision to pursue potential construction at South Texas 
Project. ‘I do think those are absolutely necessary to get nuclear 
plants under way,’ he said. ‘In fact, until I actually knew what 
they were, we would not have even contemplated it.’
Exelon Nuclear’s [President Christopher] Crane said that 
the incentives were a key factor in his company’s decision to 
prepare a COL. But other factors would influence whether 
Exelon commits to building a new reactor.124
Table .: Construction/operating license (COL) applications
Applicant Site/no of units Technology COL submission date
Amarillo Power TBA / 2 ABWR TBA
Dominion North Anna / 1 ESBWR 11/2007
Duke Cherokee / 2 AP1000 10/2007
Entergy River Bend / 1 ESBWR 5/2008
Exelon Clinton / ? TBA 11/2008
NRG Energy TBA / 2 ABWR Late 2007
NuStart/Entergy Grand Gulf / 1 ESBWR 11/2007
NuStart/TVA Bellefonte / 1 AP1000 10/2007
Progress Harris / 2 AP1000 10/2007
Progress TBA / 2 AP1000 7/2008
SCANA Summer / 2 AP1000 10/2007
Southern Vogtle / 2 AP1000 3/2008
TXU Comanche Peak / 2 TBA Late 2008
Unistar Calvert Cliffs / 1 
Nine Mile Point / 1
EPR 
EPR
Late 2007 
Mid 2008
 
Source: Nuclear News, January 2007, p 26 
Notes: Excludes applicants that have not identified a site or technology
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The significance of such orders for the future of nuclear power 
is uncertain. Plants ordered between now and 2008 will not be 
licensed before 2010 and will not be online before 2014 at the 
earliest. They will have to operate competitively for a few years 
before their performance can inspire the confidence needed 
for a fleet of privately financed orders based on principles of 
standardisation. 
All that this round of orders can demonstrate for the near future 
is that government can build nuclear plants by compelling 
taxpayers and customers to pay for them.
China
Energy demand in China is growing at a rapid rate. As a 
consequence there are plans to develop more energy supply 
in every sector: oil, gas, renewables, coal and nuclear. 
Currently, nuclear power in China only provides a relatively 
minor contribution to the country’s electricity (1.9%) supply. 
The country currently operates ten nuclear reactors, built 
using Canadian, French, Russian and domestic designs. A 
further four are under construction, one of Russian design, the 
rest domestic, and in December 2006, four further orders for 
AP1000 units were placed.
Planned units
Yangjiang and Sanmen
In 2003 preliminary approval was given for construction of 2 
units at Yangjiang plant in Guangdong and two more at Sanmen 
in Zhejiang (near Qinshan). In February 2005 the government 
agency, the State Nuclear Power Technology Co (SNPTC), 
closed bids for these four identical units. However, some suggest 
that it might be that each site might have different reactors. 
Three companies lodged bids for the construction, Areva, 
Westinghouse and Atomstroyexport. 
Areva: Areva claims that it has the lowest bid and proposes not 
only full technology transfer but also a series of joint ventures 
in the nuclear cycle, including for the first time reprocessing. 
Further reports suggest the deal will involve French assistance 
with Chinese participation in uranium mines in Niger, Kazakhstan 
and Mongolia. The design on offer is the European Pressurized 
Water Reactor (EPR) or potentially the US Evolutionary Power 
Reactor (US EPR) – largely the same design of reactor. 
Westinghouse: In February 2005 the US Export Import 
Bank gave a �5 billion (�3.8bn) preliminary commitment for    
Westinghouse to build four AP1000 units in China. A further 
detailed examination of the transaction will only take place at the 
time of the final commitment application. The Westinghouse bid 
is also reported to include a comprehensive transfer package 
for production of advanced PWR fuel. The Westinghouse bid is 
part of a consortium with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Shaw, 
Stone & Webster Nuclear Services. In October 2006 the sale of 
Westinghouse to Toshiba was completed.
Atomstroyexport: Little information is available about this bid.
 
In December 2006 the construction contract was awarded 
to Westinghouse. The total price of the contract was not 
disclosed and was said to include ‘complete and rapid 
technology transfer’ and be in the range of �5-8 billion (�3.8-
6.1bn)125, but does not include the cost of the turbine island, 
which will be part of a separate subcontract. Ground breaking 
is expected to begin in 2007, with two units scheduled for 
completion in 2013 and the other two in 2014-15.
It is reported that a framework agreement to govern the sale 
is expected in early 2007, which will give more details of the 
financial and technical expectations for the project126.
Guangdong 
In February 2007, the French press reported that a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between 
EdF and the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation 
(CGNPC). In this deal EdF is seeking to act as architect-
engineer as well as the project owner.  Earlier in 2007 
Areva also signed a MoU with CGNPC to build two EPRs at 
Guangdong.
Qinshan
In April 2006 and January 2007 the first construction 
began on units 3 and 4 respectively.   The reactors are 650- 
megawatt (MW) Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) units, 
which use CNP600 technology developed by the CNNC
Weihai
In November 2005 approval was given for the construction 
of a High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR, a type of 
pebble bed reactor) by a consortium led by Huaneng Group 
– the country’s largest generating company, but without 
nuclear experience – with Tsinghua University and China 
Nuclear Engineering and Construction.
Proposed units
It is reported that the country will spend some 400 billion yuan 
(�39.4bn) on building new nuclear power plants by 2020,         
to increase the amount of installed and under construction 
nuclear power capacity to 40 GW. CNNC expects further 
expansion to enable a total of 60 GW of installed capacity, 
accounting for 6% of the country’s electricity production. 
The first part of this plan is set out in the 11th 5-year plan (2006-
10). More than 16 provinces, regions and municipalities have 
announced intentions to build nuclear power plants, most 
of which have preliminary project approval by the central 
government but are not necessarily construction schedules. 
These total around 40 new reactors. It is reported that 
provinces will put together firm proposals with reactor vendors 
by 2008 and submit them to the central government for 
approval before 2010.
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The International Energy Agency127 has suggested renewables 
are at a crossroads – ‘no longer a theoretical possibility, but not 
yet a major market presence’. Including hydro-electricity the 
proportion of renewables in global electricity generation was 
about 18% in 2004. Within this figure, geothermal energy, solar, 
tidal and wind accounted for 334 TWh, or about 2% of global 
electricity production. In 1990, the corresponding amount was 
1%. Since global electricity production has increased by 50% 
since 1990, electricity production from ‘new renewables’ (i.e. 
excluding hydro) increased threefold in that time - a compound 
annual growth rate of 14%. In practice, the growth rates in 
wind and solar energy have been higher than this, but lower in 
geothermal and tidal. Annual investment in renewable energy 
has grown from about �7bn (�5.3bn) in 1995 to �38bn (�29bn) 
in 2005.128 During 2005 the total installed capacity of non-large 
hydro renewables increased by 22 GW, which compares to an 
increase of 3.3 GW increase in nuclear, much of which relates to 
increased capacity from existing reactors.
Resource and potential: overview
There are three principal sources of renewable energy: the sun, 
the moon, and the earth itself. The sun is the source of solar 
energy and, indirectly, of hydro energy (through evaporation), 
wind energy, wave energy and biomass energy (through 
photosynthesis). The moon is the source of tidal energy and 
the earth of geothermal energy. A good indication of renewable 
energy resources is provided by Czisch129, who suggests that 
the solar energy potential varies from 1000 kWh per square 
metre per year in Northern Europe and Canada, to over 2000 
kWh per square metre in equatorial regions. Although there is a 
two to one variation in the solar resource, there are nevertheless 
numerous applications for solar energy in Northern Europe 
and Canada, particularly for “off-grid applications”, where the 
costs of other energy supplies may be very expensive. Broadly 
speaking, the most attractive regions for wind energy -- which 
have annual mean wind speeds of 7 m/s and above -- are in 
the coastal zones of all five continents, but higher wind speeds 
are found in many mountain regions and offshore. Wind energy 
generation costs in zones with lower wind speeds will be more 
expensive, but not necessarily uneconomic.
High temperatures close to the surface -- suitable for 
geothermal electricity generation -- are found in parts of central 
Europe, the Far East, and the western part of the American 
continent. This chapter focuses only on electricity generation 
but there is increasing interest in “ground source heat pumps”, 
which, broadly speaking, can be used anywhere.  The further 
development of hydro power resources is limited, not by the 
resource potential, but by the availability of suitable sites 
and these are very restricted in the developed world.  Large-
scale developments are therefore likely to be restricted to 
less populated areas in central Africa, parts of Asia and the 
Americas, but there is further scope for small-scale hydro in 
many areas, although the total potential is limited.
The prospects for renewable energy may be assessed by 
examining progress towards the projections for 2010 set out 
in the European Commission’s White Paper on renewable 
energy130. Table 4.1 reflects the conclusions of a review and 
includes the latest figures for installed capacity.
The table below shows that wind energy has performed very 
well, with current European capacity already in excess of the 
2010 projection. Hydro (large and small) had more modest 
growth targets but the projection has already been met, 
with good performance at the large-scale compensating for 
slower growth at small-scale. Photovoltaics were given the 
most demanding projection (a 100-fold increase, albeit from a 
small base) and are expected to exceed it – but the electricity 
production is modest. Although biomass electricity output has 
increased by factor of three since 1995, the further three-fold 
increase necessary to meet the target is unlikely to be realised. 
Finally, geothermal energy is expected to come very close to 
meeting its target. 
Part 4: 
Renewable energy: resource, 
economics and prospects
Table 4.1:  EC White Paper Projections, progress and prognosis
131
 
Date 1995  2010  2005 2010 MW projection 
   projection  actual will be achieved?
Technology Capacity, MW Output, TWh MW TWh MW  
Wind 2500 4 40,000 80 40,455 Already exceeded 
Hydro, large 82,500 270 91,000 300 96,418 Already exceeded 
Hydro, small 9,500 37 14,000 55 11,600 ~10% under 
Photovoltaics 30 0.03 3,000 3 1,794 Will be exceeded 
Biomass (1) 22.5  230 68 TWh No 
Geothermal 500 3.5 1,000 7 822 (2) Slight undershoot
Notes: 
1. Some biomass used to ‘co-fire’ with fossil plant, so capacities not relevant 
2. 2004 figure
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Economic overview
Broadly speaking, gas provides the cheapest electricity in many 
parts of the European Union and in some of the United States, 
but many existing hydro sources are already competitive, as 
they were installed several years ago, so capital costs are now 
sunk. Of the ‘new renewable’ energy sources, wind is becoming 
increasingly competitive where wind speeds are high, for 
example in Germany, Denmark, northern France, Britain, 
Ireland, southern Spain, Portugal, China, India and some US 
states as well as Canada. Numerous islands are also ideal 
locations for wind and solar energy, as many are not connected 
to mainland grids and so electricity costs are high, due to the 
need to import the fuel. Photovoltaics are particularly suited 
to household applications and island locations due to their 
modular nature and minimal maintenance requirements.
Future prospects
Table 4.2 summarises data on future projections for the 
renewable sources, drawing on estimates by the European 
Renewable Energy Council132 and elsewhere. The data has been 
checked with other sources, particularly the White Paper from 
the International Solar Energy Society133 and the International 
Energy Agency134. The latter only quotes estimates for 2010 
and, for the rapidly developing technologies of wind and 
photovoltaics, they are closer to the ‘low’ estimates from EREC. 
In the case of the other technologies, the differences between 
the ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates are relatively modest. For wave 
and tidal stream energy, mid-range estimates from the Carbon 
Trust135, applicable to Europe, have been doubled to allow for 
other worldwide developments.
Costs
The larger-scale developments in renewable energy 
technologies deliver economies of scale and currently have the 
lowest generation costs and are best able to produce energy 
in quantities to match the output of thermal plant. In the case 
of wind energy, for example, not only are installed costs per 
kilowatt lower with large wind turbines and wind farms but 
higher energy yields are achieved as the bigger machines reap 
the benefit of the higher wind speeds that are found at greater 
heights. There is a much wider range of costs at smaller scales 
and these are not covered here.
Wind energy
Wind energy has a good combination of resource, proven status 
and cost. Worldwide growth is following an exponential path, as 
shown in Figure 4.1, increasing at 25-30% per annum. Capacity 
at the end of 2006 was over 74,000 MW.
Table 4.2:  Projections of renewable energy capacities and electricity generation
Date 2005  2010  2020  Source 
Technology MW TWh MW TWh MW TWh 
Wind, 
low estimate 59,206 124 135,543 299 560,445 1375 GWEC, ‘moderate growth’ 
high estimate   153,759 337 1,072,928 2632 GWEC, ‘advanced wind’
Hydro, 
large 740,000 2747  3095  3590 EREC, ‘advanced policies’ 
Small Incl above   220  570 EREC, ‘advanced policies’
Photovoltaics,  
low 5,442 6 10,000 12 145,000 175 EREC, ‘current policies’ 
high   18,000 20 230,000 276 EREC, ‘advanced policies’
Solar thermal 
electric 400 2 2154 6 16,854 45 Aringhoff et al136, 
Biomass  200  390  1010 EREC, ‘advanced policies’
Geothermal 8910 55 20,000  134  318 EREC, ‘advanced policies’
Wave     3500 9 Carbon Trust (2006), see text
Tidal stream     3500 9 Carbon Trust (2006), see text
If all the projections at the ‘high’ end were realised, the proportion of renewable energy contributing to world electricity needs would rise from the current level of 
18% to 22% by 2010 and 35% by 2020.
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Figure 4.1:  World wind and PV 
capacity from 1990 to 2005.
Every doubling of global wind energy capacity has been 
accompanied by a reduction in turbine costs of between 8% and 
15%137. Figure 4.2 illustrates a typical ‘learning curve’; the data 
used reflects a 15% reduction. Since 2004, an increase in steel 
and copper prices, and a worldwide shortage of wind turbines, 
means the fall in prices has ceased. This will have a significant 
impact on other generating technologies, such as nuclear, which 
are capital-intensive. By 2005, the average price of onshore wind 
turbines was �800/kW, and the average installed cost of wind 
farms was just under �1200/kW .
Figure 4.2:  Cost data for wind 
turbines and solar modules.
Note that the units used for price do not influence the estimate of the 
learning rate. Data for the early wind years comes from total shipments from 
America,
138
  for the central years from data compiled by the Danish Wind 
Turbine Manufacturers Association (http://www.windpower.org/), and the last 
point (at 30,000 MW) comes from a wind turbine catalogue.
139
 PV data comes 
from Shell and the World Energy Council.
Alongside the fall in machine costs, the productivity of wind 
turbines increased as their size increased – in Denmark, for 
example, from around 1,300 kWh/kW for each kilowatt of 
capacity installed in 1983, to over 2000 kWh/kW in 1996140. The 
combined effect of lower prices and better productivity accounts 
for the 18% reduction in generation costs per doubling of 
capacity cited by the International Energy Agency141. 
Generation costs depend on wind speed and figure 4.3 shows 
estimates for �1,000/kW and �1,400/kW, which takes in most 
of the spread. Lower installed costs tend to be associated with 
Table 4.2:  EC White Paper Projections, progress and prognosis
139
Date 1995 2010 
projection
2005 actual 2010 MW projection 
will be achieved? 
Technology Capacity, MW Output, TWh MW TWh MW
Wind 2500 4 40,000 80 40,455 Already exceeded
Hydro, large 82,500 270 91,000 300 96,418 Already exceeded
Hydro, small 9,500 37 14,000 55 11,600 ~10% under
Photovoltaics 30 0.03 3,000 3 1,794 Will be exceeded
Biomass (1) 22.5 230 68 TWh No
Geothermal 500 3.5 1,000 7 822 (2) Slight undershoot
Notes:  
1. Some biomass used to ‘co-fire’ with fossil plant, so capacities not relevant 
2. 2004 figure
The table shows that wind energy has performed very well, with current European capacity already in excess of the 2010 projection. Hydro (large and small) 
had more modest growth targets but the projection has already been met, with good performance at the large-scale compensating for slower growth at small-
scale. Photovoltaics were given the most demanding projection (a 100-fold increase, albeit from a small base) and are expected to exceed it – but the electricity 
production is modest. Although biomass electricity output has increased by factor of three since 1995, the further three-fold increase necessary to meet the 
target is unlikely to be realised. Finally, geothermal energy is expected to come very close to meeting its target. 
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lower wind speeds sites and the figure shows generation costs 
of �75/MWh at 6 m/s, down to �49.4/MWh at 7.5 m/s. At the 
upper end of the installed cost range, generation cost range 
from �64/MWh at 7.8 m/s, down to �51/MWh at 9 m/s.
Figure 4.3.  Generation cost estimates 
for onshore wind.
These have been calculated using an 8% test discount rate 
and 20 year repayment period. The discount rate is typical for 
mature technologies in the private sector and this repayment 
period is commonly used for wind energy projects.  If a 6% 
discount rate - more typical of ‘public-sector’ utility projects is 
used, generation costs are about 12% lower.142
Similar curves can be generated for solar energy, with incident 
solar radiation as the independent variable, and for wave energy, 
with wave power per metre as the independent variable. To 
simplify the data for comparative purposes, representative load 
factors have been used, linked to typical wind speeds, solar 
radiation levels and wave power. In the case of wind energy, the 
load factor range is from 15% (the overall average for all German 
wind plant) to 30% (the overall average for all UK wind plant).
A review of future costs by the Sustainable Development 
Commission143 suggested that installed costs onshore in 2020 
will lie between 55% and 92% of the 2001 level. Applying a 
cautious multiplier of 81% to the 2005 level144 - after costs 
had risen – suggests the 2020 level may be around �960/kW, 
provided there are no further rises in steel costs. Table 4.3 
suggests that there will be at least three doublings of capacity 
by 2020, so the 20% reduction by this time reflects a modest 7% 
reduction per doubling. A more optimistic cost projection from 
GWEC145 suggests �760/kW. A conservative load factor for 2020 
of 25% assumes that most of the higher wind speed sites will 
have been utilised by then.
Offshore wind is less well developed, with worldwide capacity 
around 750MW, but there are substantial plans in the pipeline. 
Two of the estimates in the Sustainable Development 
Commission report suggest installed costs by 2020 will be 
about 57% of the 2003 level. Taking a figure of �1,800/kW for 
the latter suggests the 2020 figure will be around �1,200/kW. A 
similar estimate is quoted by de Noord.146
Recent projects: Onshore – Summerview, Alberta, Canada. 38, 
80 m diameter wind turbines, each rated at 1.8MW (68.4MW 
total). Annual generation: 208GWh. Project cost C$100m (€70m), 
completed 2004. Source: Vision Quest and Windpower Monthly, 
December 2004.
Offshore – North Hoyle, off north Wales coast, UK. 30, 80m 
diameter wind turbines, each rated at 2MW (60MW total). Annual 
generation 191GWh. Project cost £81m (€120m). Completed 
2004. Source: DTI
Photovoltaics
Photovoltaic capacity, like wind, has been growing rapidly, 
as shown in figure 1, and now exceeds 5,000MW, although 
only about 1,800MW of this was grid connected at the end 
of 2004. Prices have fallen by a factor of around five since 
the 1980s and grid connected systems now cost around 
�5,000/kW. As with wind, prices rose in 2004/5 due to rising 
demand and increased silicon prices, but the downward 
trend is expected to continue.147 The data plotted in figure 
4.2 suggests a price reduction per doubling of capacity of 
22% and other studies have yielded similar estimates.148 The 
International Energy Agency in its 2000 report suggested 
generation costs fell by 35% per doubling of capacity 
between 1985 and 1995, reflecting improvements in the 
efficiency of the systems. Although the contribution to 
electricity supplies is expected to be modest, markets in the 
developing world are substantial and this is the driving force 
behind much of the work currently in progress.
Estimates of installed cost for 2020 show some variation. 
The Danish Energy Authority149 suggests �2,000/kW and the 
International Energy Agency150 around �1,500/kW. A mean 
value of �1,750/kW is roughly consistent with a price reduction 
per doubling of capacity of 20%. Generation cost estimates 
for 2020 take into account, in addition, improvements in the 
efficiency of the systems.
Recent project (under construction): Serpa Solar Power Plant, 
Portugal. 52,000 PV panels, with tracking system. Rated output 
11 MW, greenhouse gas saving 30,000 tons/year. Project costs 
€59m. Source: Powerlight Corporation and Modern Power 
Systems, June 2006
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Solar Thermal Electric 
(concentrating solar power)
The world solar thermal electric capacity is currently modest 
(around 400 MW). There is a wide spread of current costs 
(between �1700-2400/kW) and load factors are around 21%. By 
2020, installed costs are expected to fall to around �1000/kW, 
with load factors reaching 30%.
Recent project (completed 2006): ‘PS10’ power plant, Sanlucar, 
near Seville, Spain. 624 tracking heliostats focused on steam 
generator producing steam at 40 bar, 250ºC. Rated output 11 
MW, generation 23 GWh. Project costs �35m. Source: www.
solarpaces.org
Hydro
Hydroelectric is the best established of all the renewable 
technologies. 740,000 MW are spread across the world and 
generated 2620 TWh, 17% of all electricity in 2005. Capacity has 
grown at just under 2% p.a. over the past 10 years. The scope 
for further development of large-scale hydro in the developed 
world is modest, with the possible exception of Canada, and 
there are only limited opportunities for cost reduction or technical 
improvements.  In the developing world there may be further 
scope, subject to such projects being environmentally and 
socially acceptable.   The scope for further deployment lies 
in ingenuity in installing new ‘small’ (under 10 MW) systems, 
including run of river schemes, some of which are only tens of 
kilowatts in size. 
Planned project (small scale): Mira, Ecuador. 1 MW output, 
annual generation 8.1 GWh. Project cost �1.9m (�1.5m). Source: 
International Water Power and Dam Construction, July 2005.
Biomass
Biomass refers to material of plant or animal origin.  When 
converted to energy it is low or zero carbon, as the CO2 emitted 
is not from fossil fuel origin, but from the current/recent carbon 
cycle. As well as dedicated biomass plant using e.g. forestry 
or agricultural residues, biomass can be grown specifically for 
the energy uses.  These “energy crops” are grown for power 
generation, heat production or for the manufacture of transport 
bio-fuels.  
Municipal solid waste – MSW or industrial and commercial waste 
ICW can also comprise of or contain significant proportions 
of biomass.  MSW in the UK typical comprises around 65% 
biomass.  Landfill gas and sewage gas is also derived from 
biomass sources, and is thus regarded in EU and UK policy as a 
renewable energy source.
UK engineering institutions are pushing for waste management 
policy to be guided by the climate change agenda, rather than 
targets for outcomes such as recycling rates.  It may not always 
be best, from the objective of reducing global warming to recycle 
wastes, energy recovery could be a better overall environmental 
option.  
 Worldwide biomass electricity-generating capacity is now about 
39 GW and electricity production is expanding in Europe, driven 
mainly by developments in Austria, Finland, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. The latter has seen recent growth in ‘co-firing’ 
(burning small shares of biomass in coal-fired power plants).  
 Landfill gas and waste combustion are among the cheapest 
electricity generating costs.  However the landfill gas resource 
in Europe will decline as less waste is landfilled in the future as a 
consequence of the Landfill Directive.  The Energy from waste 
sector should benefit thought less waste being landfilled, as more 
is likely to be converted to energy.  Operators are paid a “gate 
fee” for taking the waste, and the economics can be favourable, 
however site acquisition can be a difficulty, so growth may be 
retarded by the difficulty of obtaining planning consents. 
Characteristics common to most sources are small plant sizes 
(generally not exceeding about 10MW); there are no technical 
problems inhibiting the construction of large plant but logistical 
problems arise in moving large quantities of waste products over 
large distances and, in the case of energy crops, finding sufficient 
land near the plant. Generation costs vary widely – between 
€30/MWh for landfill gas and large biomass plant, up to around 
€90/MWh for advanced gasification plant, but the latter costs are 
expected to fall by 2020. For consistency, data for two types of 
plant has been drawn from the Danish Energy Authority:151
• Large-scale plant (up to 400 MW) burning residues from wood 
industries or forests and residues from agriculture (straw), 
often delivered as pellets.
• Gasification plant with higher efficiency, fed on wood chips, 
industrial wood residues, straw or energy crops. 
The EU projection for 2010 was 230 TWh, indicating that the 
potential is large, but it is unlikely to be realised (Table 4.2)
Recent project: Simmering, Vienna, Austria, commissioned 
October 2006. 23.4MW output (summer), 15MW, plus 37MW 
(thermal) in winter. Fuel: fresh wood from forestry. Project cost: 
€52m. Source: Modern Power Systems, June 2006 and www.
oekonews.at 
Geothermal energy
The best geothermal resources are in the Pacific Rim, 
especially New Zealand and the Philippines, the United 
States, Iceland and Italy, which has the highest capacity of 
geothermal electric generation in the EU, but France, Germany 
and Belgium have several schemes for thermal purposes and 
smaller amounts for electricity generation. Most schemes use 

The economics of nuclear power
warm water reservoirs, but research is in progress into ways 
of improving drilling processes, using ‘hot dry rocks’ as a heat 
source, and into alternative thermal cycles for harnessing the 
heat. Installed costs vary considerably as they depend on the 
depth of drilling required and recent contracts span a range 
from �1,000/kW (Costa Rica) to �3,000/kW (Canada, New 
Zealand). There is a matrix of generation costs that depends on 
the drilling depth and the temperature of the water that comes 
to the surface. The Geothermal Energy Association152 suggests 
that electricity costs for most projects are in the range �44/
MWh to �60/MWh.
Recent project (planned): 25.5MW plant in California to 
generate 200GWh/year. Estimated cost $90m (€70m). 
Source: Western Geopower Corp
Tidal barrages
Although the technical feasibility of tidal energy is not in doubt, 
load factors tend to be low, which leads to high electricity 
generation costs. France hosts the only large size commercial 
tidal barrage (240MW). Canada has a smaller project (20MW) 
and has considered expanding that capacity. India, Australia and 
China are also examining the potential. A major British project 
– the Severn barrage – has been under consideration for many 
years and costings from this are used in Table 4.4.
Existing project, operating since 1966: La Rance, France - 
barrage length 750 m, 240 MW rated output. Average tidal range 
8 m. Output 438-600 GWh. 10-year refurbishment programme 
nearing completion. Source: EdF and Second international 
symposium on wave and tidal energy, Cambridge, England, 
1981. BHRA Fluid Engineering
Wave energy
Research into wave energy has been in progress since the 
mid-1970s, in Britain (whose programme was suspended from 
1982 to 1999), Norway, Denmark, Japan and the United States. 
The first commercial devices are now under test, and installed 
costs are in the range �1500/kW to �2500/kW. However, there 
is insufficient performance data to produce robust current 
generation costs for Table 4.4. 
Future wave energy costs will be critically dependent on how 
rapidly the technology is deployed. Sorensen153 suggests a 
goal ‘well below �1430/kW’ by around 2016, and Ragwitz154 
et al  suggests costs will fall to 60% of the 2002 level by 2020. 
Using the current levels quoted above, this implies a range 
between �900/kW and �1500/kW and this has been used for the 
generation cost estimates. The results are consistent with data 
from the 2006 Carbon Trust report – which quotes generation 
costs as a function of cumulative capacity – and with the 
International Energy Agency in 2003, which suggests �1000/kW 
will be reached by 2030.
Project planned: Off Pavoa de Varzim, N Portugal. Three 
‘Pelamis’ P-750kW machines, each 150m long, 3.5m 
diameter. Cost �8m. Source: Ocean Power Delivery Ltd.
Tidal stream energy
The currents in tidal streams and marine currents can be 
harnessed in a similar way to wind energy, especially where 
topographical features amplify tidal movements. (Tidal streams 
are currents that flow with the tide, whereas marine currents are 
more or less constant). The advantages of the technology are 
straightforward: the energy availability is accurately predictable; 
visual impact is close to zero; and there are few environmental 
disturbances. While the resource is potentially large, 
commercial exploitation requires stream velocities of around 2 
m/s or more, which substantially reduces the feasible sites. As 
with wave energy, there is a very limited database of present-
day costs and performance. Forecasts of future installed costs 
are also very similar to those of wave and so, in the light of the 
uncertainties, a common set of data is used.
Recent project (R&D): Lynmouth, Devon, UK. Installed 2003, 
currently under test. First commercial-scale 11m diameter rotor, 
rated at 300kW. Operates with the tide in one direction only. 
Cost �3.4m (�5m)
Electricity costs 
Current plant costs and performance
Table 4.3 summarises the key cost and performance 
parameters associated with renewable energy systems at 
present. ‘Load factor’ has the usual definition of the ratio 
between the average output and the rated output.
The costs quoted aim to indicate the levels that encompass a 
wide range of installations, but do not include all projects. Wind 
energy load factors, for example, range from around 12% to 51%. 
Generation costs have been derived for two test discount rates 
- 5% and 8%. The lower figure is in line with Nuclear Energy 
Agency155 practice and the latter is an up-to-date figure for 
mature technologies financed by the private sector156. The 
capital repayment period is 20 years. The table also includes 
current payments from the German and Irish ‘feed in tariffs’, to 
corroborate the estimates in the preceding columns, although it 
may be noted that German wind speeds are quite modest which 
leads to relatively high payments. Further corroboration comes 
from actual contract prices where data is available.
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Generation costs for hydro, geothermal, biomass and tidal 
barrages are unlikely to change appreciably by 2020. Although 
plant costs for hydro and geothermal may fall slightly, this is 
likely to be offset by the higher costs of exploiting lower quality 
resources. It is difficult to project future generation costs 
for biomass since there is such a wide range of options and 
generating costs are critically dependent on agricultural and 
other subsidies.
For the technologies where substantial decreases in generation 
costs are anticipated, Table 4.4 summarises generation cost 
estimates for 2020, drawing on the sources cited in the text or in 
the table.
Integration issues
Wind, wave and solar energy are variable, and generally 
unpredictable. Both forms of tidal energy are variable, but 
predictable, and the other renewable energy sources are 
steady. However, the impacts of variability are quite modest. 
It must be remembered that the output from all generation 
sources is intermittent, rather than variable, as power 
stations are frequently disconnected from the network due 
to mechanical, electrical or instrumentation faults. Moreover, 
consumer demands are not totally predictable and so all power 
system operators carry reserves that enable them to deal with 
mismatches between demand and supply. When systems 
operate with significant quantities of unpredictable renewables 
what matters is the additional uncertainty, as this influences 
the scheduling of additional reserves and hence the costs. 
Table 4.3: Current data: Indicative installed costs, 
performance data and generating costs for renewable energy. 
Technology Installed 
costs, €/kW
Load 
factor, 
%
Generation costs 
€/MWh
Contract 
prices
5% test 
discount 
rate
8% test 
discount 
rate
German tariff Irish tariff
Onshore Wind 1000-1200 15-30 46-72 56-88 84 for ~ 5 years, 
then 53
57 �45/MWh, 
Canada
Offshore Wind 1800 33-40 52-63 64-77 91 for ~ 12 years, 
then 62
� 67-69/MWh, 
Denmark
Hydro 1000-1800 50-75 17-43 22-53 37-97 (1) 72
Solar (PV) 4900-5400 8-16 316-697 393-865 540-570 (1)
Geothermal 2000-8000 75-95 31-53 38-65 72-150 (1) � 46/MWh, 
California
Large biomass 1300 89 18 23 39-89 (2) 72
Biomass 
gasification
3500 85 56 67 70
 
Notes: 1. Size dependent. 2. Type dependent. 
Table 4.4 2020 data: Installed costs, performance data 
and generating costs for renewable energy.
Technology Installed costs, €/kW Load factor, 
%
 Generation cost €/MWh 
5% tdr 8% tdr
Onshore wind 760-900 16-25 35-55 43-67
Offshore wind 1200 33-40 35-42 42-51
Solar PV 1400-3100 8-16 316-697 393-865
Solar thermal electric 1000-2000 21-30 35-54 58-68
Biomass gasification 2250 97 36 43
Wave/tidal stream 900-1500 30 28-47 43-72
Tidal barrage 1584 22 60 (1) 106 
Note: 1. Assumes capital is repaid over 40 years, possibly feasible with a public sector project.
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Numerous worldwide studies have quantified the additional 
costs of this reserve, which is generally around �4/MWh for wind 
generation, when the wind contribution to electricity supplies 
is 20%. A comprehensive review of all the relevant issues has 
recently been published by the International Energy Agency157. 
Conclusions
Hydro electricity and wind energy are expected to deliver the 
biggest increases in electricity production by 2020 – roughly 
2000 TWh in each case, depending on the growth rate in wind. 
Each of these technologies is expected to deliver electricity 
at around �40-50/MWh, which is likely to be competitive with 
nuclear, gas and coal – although this depends on the price of 
carbon by that time. The prospects for solar thermal electric, 
wave and tidal stream energy are more uncertain but their 
generation costs may also be competitive with the fossil fuel 
sources. Although the generation costs for solar photovoltaics 
appear high, there is enormous world wide potential, 
particularly for household and off-grid applications where other 
sources of electricity supply are likely to be expensive.  The 
downward trend in costs for wind energy and photovoltaics has 
halted recently but is expected to resume, due to a combination 
of improved production techniques, larger installations and 
the impacts of research and development. The slowdown in 
cost reduction, in each case, has been partly due to increased 
commodity prices but it should be noted that further increases 
in these would also affect the costs of nuclear power as this is, 
similarly, very capital-intensive.
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Civilian nuclear reactors generate electricity in 31 countries 
around the world. Of these, eight have become technology 
exporters. These are all members of the G8, (Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Russia, UK and USA), plus 
China. The only non-exporting G8 member is Italy, which 
phased out nuclear power following a referendum in 1987. 
The UK no longer has a commercial reactor design and 
manufacture capability, while France and Germany have 
effectively merged theirs through the creation of Areva. 
Japan has yet to win an export order for a reactor although 
it is becoming increasingly active in bidding contests. In 
two other countries a domestic industry has now been 
developed, India and the Republic of Korea. 
In all other countries significant technology import would be 
required to construct further nuclear reactors.
In recent years the major nuclear vendors have merged or 
created strategic alliances, which has significantly reduced 
the range of separate companies or consortia now offering 
nuclear reactors.
Mergers of reactor vendors
Areva NP-Mitsubishi: Areva was formed by the merger of 
Framatome and the Siemens nuclear power division in 2001. 
In October 2006 Areva and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
announced a strategic partnership to develop a new 
generation of nuclear power plants.
Westinghouse-Toshiba: Westinghouse was sold to BNFL in 
1998. During this ownership period the ABB nuclear division 
(which had already taken over the Combustion Engineering 
nuclear capability) was brought by BNFL for �485m (€369m) 
in 2000. In February 2006 Toshiba won the takeover battle 
to purchase the Westinghouse nuclear division (including the 
ABB nuclear division) for �5.4bn (€4.1bn).
GE-Hitachi: Hitachi has, for many decades licensed 
nuclear technology from GE. In November 2006, GE 
and Hitachi announced the intention to create a global 
alliance. Hitachi and General Electric will hive off their 
nuclear power operations into two joint ventures that will 
build, maintain and develop nuclear plants, with a final deal 
expected in early 2007. Hitachi will own 40% of the US 
venture and at least 80% of the Japanese venture, with the 
rest going to its American partner.
Atomic Energy Canada Limited: AECL was founded in 1952 
and remains a Crown Corporation. It currently has partnership 
agreements with a number of companies, including: Babcock 
and Wilcox, Bechtel, China National Nuclear Corporation, 
General Electric Nuclear Products (Canada), Hitachi, Siemens 
Canada and SNC Lavalin
China National Nuclear Corporation: While China 
is continuing to import, or at least offer tenders for the 
construction of nuclear power plants, it is also increasingly 
constructing its own nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities, 
through the China Nation Nuclear Corporation.
Atomstroyexport: The Russian, formerly Soviet, nuclear power 
industry has been responsible for the export of reactors across 
the world. Most were deployed in Europe, but others were sold 
to China, India and Iran (in service or under construction) and to 
Cuba and Libya (not completed). The main construction firm is 
Atommash, with the export of equipment being undertaken by 
Atomstroyexport. 
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL): 
responsible for design, construction, commissioning and 
operation of thermal nuclear power plants. 
Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC): involved in 
the construction of nuclear power plants, both with strategic 
partners e.g. AECL and as main contractor.
Nuclear power and international 
financial institutions
Despite the significant number of nuclear exports, to date the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) have not funded nuclear 
power development to any great extent.
European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD)
The EBRD is the only IFI that has a specific remit to lend for 
nuclear power projects. In 2006 the Bank relaxed its rules on 
lending for nuclear projects. Previously, the Bank would only 
lend for the completion or upgrading of nuclear power projects 
on the condition that ‘they are directly linked with the closure of 
high-risk reactors operating in the country concerned’. However, 
this linkage requirement has been removed and now the major 
requirements for the Bank’s involvement are158:
• the Bank will not consider providing financing to new reactors;
• it will provide financing to an operating facility in relation to 
nuclear safety improvement;
• the safe and secure management of radioactive waste and 
spent fuel;
• nuclear projects will have to meet the same least-cost criteria 
(including the review of supply and demand-side energy 
alternatives) as non-nuclear projects.
The EBRD has assessed three projects: the completion of the 
Mochovce 1 and 2 units in Slovakia (1995); the completion of 
Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (K2R4) in Ukraine (2000) and a 
post completion upgrading project of the K2R4 project (2004). 
 Annex A -  
Exporting reactors

The economics of nuclear power
However, the Bank has only ever given one loan, €50m for the 
second K2R4 project.
World Bank
In 1998 on its web site, The World Bank stated that ‘The 
Bank has never financed a nuclear power station’. In 2006, it 
expanded on this policy:
Q.  Will the Bank fund nuclear energy and, if not, why not?
A.  The Bank has never financed a nuclear power station. Nuclear 
power produces no particulates, sulphur, or greenhouse gas 
emissions and thus appears to offer a clean, non-fossil-fuel 
alternative for power generation. However, world experiences 
with high investment costs, time-consuming and costly 
approval processes, lack of sustainable waste disposal 
options, risks of major accidents - together with the Chernobyl 
disaster-have raised grave doubts about the future viability 
of nuclear power. Private investors shy away from such risky 
high-cost investments.
 Financing for nuclear development is usually available from 
suppliers’ credits and export financing agencies. 
Q.  Given its work on shadow prices of carbon, at what price does 
the Bank believe that nuclear energy is warranted in the fight 
against global warming?
A.  The issues surrounding nuclear power go beyond economic 
costs alone. Nuclear energy is not acceptable in many parts of 
the world because of concerns over reactor safety, disposition 
of nuclear wastes and proliferation of fissile materials. The 
trade-offs are thus complex and cannot be boiled down to a 
single carbon shadow value.
In its Environment Assessment Sourcebook it makes the 
following comments on nuclear power159.
• The Bank takes the position that, as the financier of last resort, 
it is unnecessary for its funds to be used for this purpose.
• Given the limited number of suppliers, procurement on the 
basis of International Competitive Bidding is not possible.
• Cost of nuclear projects typically come in at two to three 
times the original estimates, delays have been substantial, 
and production problems have resulted in output well below 
capacity.
• The economic case is clear: under present cost structures, 
the Bank would not finance new plants because they are 
uneconomic. In the unlikely event that nuclear plants become 
economic, the Bank would not finance them because there 
are other sources of funds available and, as financier of last 
resort, Bank funds are not required.
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
The ADB is clear in its view that it should not fund nuclear 
power. In its 1995 energy policy it states:
Continued use of nuclear power in developed and developing 
countries and its further expansion require not only firm 
assurances that technical and institutional measures will 
be effective in protecting public health and safety, but also 
sustained public confidence and broad political support. The 
technical complexity of nuclear power technology is a barrier 
to public understanding, which makes it difficult for members 
of the public to evaluate safety questions for themselves. The 
Bank is very much aware of this background and has not been 
involved in the financing of nuclear power generation projects in 
the DMCs [Developing Member Countries] due to a number of 
concerns. These concerns include issues related to transfer of 
nuclear technology, procurement limitations, proliferation risks, 
fuel availability and procurement constraints, and environmental 
and safety aspects. The Bank will maintain its policy of non-
involvement in the financing of nuclear power generation.160
Other IFIs or regional development banks do not mention nuclear 
power within their energy policy and have not to date provided 
finance for commercial nuclear power plants. This includes:
• European Investment Bank;
• InterAmerican Development Bank; and
• African Development Bank
Export credit agencies
The controversy around nuclear power has tended to 
reduce the involvement of IFIs in the funding of nuclear 
power. To compensate for this, governmental export credit 
agencies (ECAs) have provided guarantees for a large 
number of nuclear projects, for example, it is suggested 
that the US Export-Import Bank has granted financial 
assistance of over �8bn (€6.1bn) of nuclear projects since 
the 1960s. Table A1.1 indicates recent ECA involvement in 
nuclear power projects throughout the world.
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Table A1.1: ECA financing of nuclear power
Exporting 
Country
Recipient 
Country 
Project
Canada China 
Romania
Quinshan III 
Cernavoda I and II 
France China 
Finland
Ling Ao 1 and 2 
Olkiluoto
Germany China Lianyungang
Italy Romania Cernavoda II 
Japan China 
Mexico
Quinshan II and III 
Laguna Verdi
Russia China 
India 
Iran
Lianyungang 
Kudankulam 
Busher
UK China Quinshan II 
Ling Ao
US Bulgaria 
China 
Czech Republic
Kozloduy 5 and 6 
Quinshan II and III 
Temelin 1 and 2
Source: Financing Disaster
161
The most recent is that of the Olkiluoto project in Finland, 
where controversially French and Swedish ECA guarantees 
were involved in a project within the European Union. This 
arrangement is now the subject of the European Commission 
State Aid complaint and formal investigation.
The involvement of the ECAs is said by one of the parties 
making a formal complaint, the European Renewable Energy 
Federation, to have enabled the project to access cheaper 
financing. Such a mechanism has been put forward by the 
International Energy Agency in its World Energy Outlook, 
when it notes a number of policies that might be introduced 
to enable increased nuclear power generation, including ‘loan 
guarantees to reduce the cost of capital.’162
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Introduction
Most people assume that the cost of decommissioning retired 
nuclear plants and dealing with the waste will have a significant 
impact on the cost of power from a nuclear power station. They 
assume that the ‘polluter should pay’, meaning that consumers 
should be required to make payments so that a sufficient sum of 
money is available to the future generation that ends up having 
to do the job. However, as explained in Part 2, these operations 
are expected to take place many decades in the future, perhaps 
more than a century after plant start-up or after the spent 
fuel has been removed from the reactor. This means that in 
most economic analyses, where future costs and benefits are 
‘discounted’ to bring them to a comparable base, such costs 
are very small.
The basic premise of discounting is reasonable. A bill of �1 
that must be paid today should weigh more heavily in financial 
analyses than a bill of �1 that must be paid in a year’s time. If 
money can be invested to earn, say, a real interest rate of 5%, 
a sum of about 95c can be invested today and will have grown 
sufficiently after 1 year to pay the bill. In this case, the discounted 
value of the �1 liability would be 95c and the discount rate, 5%.
The introduction of competition to the electricity industry has 
dramatically increased the discount rate applied to power 
station projects of all types and 15% is now a minimum rate for 
a plant exposed to a competitive environment. If this rate was 
applied to the long-term liabilities, they would ‘disappear’ from 
the calculations. A liability of �1bn (the order of magnitude of the 
sum of money that might be needed to decommission a nuclear 
power plant) would, in a ‘discounted cash flow calculation’ 
reduce to a discounted value of only �1m after discounting 
for 50 years. However, it would be wrong to apply this rate to 
liabilities of this type.
There is a moral imperative for the ‘polluters’ to take all 
reasonable measures to ensure that those that have to perform 
the clean-up are given sufficient money to do the job. This 
imperative has three main dimensions:
• Estimates of the expected cost should be conservative or 
pessimistic, especially where the cost is not well established 
so that funds are not inadequate because the cost is greater 
than expected;
• Funds collected from consumers should be placed in very low 
risk investments to minimise the risk that the funds will be lost. 
Such investments inevitably yield a low interest rate;
• Funds should not be accessible by the company that owns the 
plant other than for decommissioning purposes.
Experience from the UK
The experience of the UK in dealing with long-term liabilities 
is salutary, with costs consistently under-estimated and 
provisions not adequately safeguarded.
As a result, Britain has ended up with liabilities estimated in 
2006 at about �75bn (�112bn) but rising fast, resulting from the 
decommissioning needs of the civil nuclear power programme 
and no more than a few hundred million pounds in real funds 
to pay for this. On present plans, these liabilities will be paid for 
by tax-payers of the day as the work is carried out over the next 
140 years.
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) owns all these 
sites except the eight, more modern nuclear power plants 
owned by British Energy. If we look at the liabilities in more detail, 
about �43bn (�65bn) is accounted for by the non-reactor sites 
previously owned by the nationally-owned British Nuclear Fuels 
(BNFL), nearly �40bn (�60bn) alone for Sellafield. Another �5bn 
(�7.5bn) is accounted for by sites previously owned by United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA, also nationally 
owned), nearly �3bn (�4.5bn) of which is for the Dounreay site. 
The Magnox power stations account for about �13bn (�20bn), 
British Energy’s plants for about �8.6bn (�13bn) and a further 
�7bn (�11bn) represent some additional costs that the NDA 
has identified that will be incurred for ‘more LLW �low-level 
waste] than can fit into the LLW repository near Drigg and the 
larger amounts of contaminated land than had been originally 
anticipated.’ The British Energy liabilities for decommissioning 
alone increased by 65% between 2005 and 2006.
However, if we focus on the �20bn (�30bn) needed for the 
commercial civil nuclear power plants we find a sorry story of 
failure to safeguard consumer provisions.
Up to 1990
Up to 1990, the previous nationalised owners of the nuclear 
plants (Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and South 
Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) for the three Scottish stations) 
had collected provisions valued at �3.8bn (�5.7bn). These existed 
only as accounting provisions, effectively the assets of the 
companies. However, when the electricity industry was privatised 
(for only about a third of its asset value), the temptation for the 
government to keep all the revenue was too much. Instead of 
passing the provisions on to the new owners, Nuclear Electric 
and Scottish Nuclear, the Treasury kept all the privatisation 
proceeds. Because the nuclear plants were then unsaleable, 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear remained in public 
ownership.
1990-96
Nuclear Electric was expected not to be able to cover its costs 
and meet its liabilities, so to allow it to continue to trade, the 
government introduced a consumer subsidy, the Fossil Fuel 
Levy (FFL), payable to Nuclear Electric (Scottish Nuclear was 
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subsidised under different arrangements). The FFL raised 
about �1bn (�1.5bn) per year. The then Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Michael Heseltine, told Parliament in 1992 it was ‘to 
pay for the decommissioning of old and unsafe stations’. This 
was inaccurate and the Energy Minister in 1990 described it 
accurately when he said it was to keep Nuclear Electric ‘cash 
positive’. There were no restrictions on how Nuclear Electric 
could spend the money and it used the money as additional cash 
flow. A small amount was spent on decommissioning, nearly half 
was unspent, but the rest was spent by Nuclear Electric meeting 
its immediate costs. Nuclear Electric was effectively bankrupt 
and its marginal spending was building the Sizewell B PWR, 
which it did without recourse to borrowing. Given that the FFL 
was marginal additional income to Nuclear Electric, it must be 
concluded that up to �3bn (�4.5bn) of the subsidy was spent on 
Sizewell B, completed in 1995 at a cost of over �3bn (�4.5bn).
One year later in 1996, the more modern nuclear plants, the 
seven AGR stations and Sizewell B were privatised in a new 
company, British Energy, for about �1.7bn (�2.5bn). The sale 
price was probably less than a tenth of the replacement cost 
of these eight stations. Despite the fact British Energy was 
effectively given its plants, it still collapsed financially in 2002 
and had to be rescued by the UK Government at a cost to future 
taxpayers, estimated then to be in excess of �10bn (�15bn). The 
older plants remained in public ownership in a new, publicly-
owned company, Magnox Electric.
British Energy 1996-2005
The British Government required a segregated fund to be set 
up to pay for British Energy’s decommissioning requirements 
using �227m (�340m) of the unspent FFL to launch it. 
However, it was clear that if the fund had had to cover all the 
decommissioning liabilities, the Government would have had 
to pay the buyers to take the company. The little-publicised fix 
was to require that the segregated fund pay only for stages 2 
and 3 of decommissioning with stage 1 paid for from company 
cash flow. Stage 1 is essentially removal of the fuel and is a 
technically simple stage entailing continuing activities that 
have been carried out throughout the life of the plant. Because 
completion of Stage 1 allows the work-force to be sacked 
(the plant is no longer a criticality risk), it is usually carried out 
as quickly as possible, provided there is somewhere to put 
the fuel. The cost of stage 1 is about 10% of the total cost of 
decommissioning. Stage 2 is also relatively routine requiring 
the clearance of uncontaminated or very lightly contaminated 
buildings. It might account for about 30% of the undiscounted 
cost. The economic incentive is to delay this as long as possible 
to allow provisions longer to earn interest, so fewer provisions 
are needed to meet a given liability.
Stage 3 is much the most expensive and challenging part, 
involving the cutting up and disposal of the contaminated parts, 
requiring strict worker protection from exposure and generating 
large amounts of radioactive waste. It might account for about 
60% of the liability.
If we assume stage 1 is carried out immediately, stage 2 after, 
say, 40 years and stage 3 after 70 years, and we assume 
funds earn a real rate of return of 3.5%, the picture for relative 
discounted costs is very different. Stage 1 accounts for 43% of 
the discounted cost, stage 2 for 33% and stage 3 for 23%. The 
overall discounted cost is less than a quarter of the undiscounted 
cost and the discounted cost of stage 3 is less than 10% of the 
undiscounted cost. This ‘fix’ allowed British Energy to contribute 
about �18m (�27bn) a year to a fund that had to deal with a 
liability (including stage 1) then estimated to be about �5bn 
(�7.5bn).
The assumption that British Energy would have enough cash 
flow to pay for anything was proved wrong in 2002 when 
the company collapsed. In fact, the trustees (the Nuclear 
Trust) of the decommissioning fund, the Nuclear Generation 
Decommissioning Fund (NDF), appear to have precipitated the 
collapse of British Energy by serving a default notice relating to 
the solvency of British Energy because it was unable to pay even 
the small sum required for the NDF. British Energy was rescued 
using taxpayers’ money and re-launched in January, 2005. In the 
last British Energy annual report (2003/04) before its re-launch, 
the value of the NDF was reported to be �440m (�660m).
BNFL 1996-2005
Most of the unspent proceeds of the FFL (about �2.7bn or 
�4bn) were passed to the new owners of the Magnox stations, 
Magnox Electric. This was because the Magnox stations are 
expensive to decommission and were near retirement so the 
need for funds was more urgent than for the British Energy 
stations. In 1998, Magnox Electric became a division of BNFL. 
The unspent proceeds were separately identified in BNFL’s 
accounts as the Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP) 
and were invested in a way intended to ensure they would not 
lose value. By 2004, with additions from BNFL and interest, 
the fund had grown to a little over �4bn (�6bn). However, the 
fund was an internal one, not rigorously separated from BNFL’s 
business. In addition, BNFL was in increasingly deep financial 
trouble because it could not cover its liabilities and was allowed 
to continue to trade only through government assurances (the 
Secretary of State’s Undertaking).
The Government finally lost patience with BNFL in 2003 and 
decided to take away all BNFL’s sites and give them to the NDA, 
leaving two main operating divisions, Westinghouse (sold to 
Toshiba in 2006) and BNG (expected to be privatised in 2007). 
BNG has to compete to operate the facilities previously owned 
by BNFL. The Treasury quietly absorbed the NLIP into its other 
income, effectively leaving an IOU. This is an empty gesture 
because the state would be obliged to pay for decommissioning 
in any case if no other funds existed.
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NDA 2005 onwards
The NDA now has no guaranteed access to funds. It must 
compete for all other calls on the Treasury for its funds. When the 
NDA was set up, there was a lot of discussion about measures 
that would guarantee its income such as segregated funds and 
funding on a 10-year basis. But in the end, the heavy hand of the 
Treasury was felt, no segregated fund was set up and its funding 
was committed only three years forward.
The NDA has ambitious and admirable plans to reduce the 
timescale for completion of Magnox decommissioning from 
over 100 years after plant closure to completion in only 25 
years. This will have huge implications for public spending. 
Jobs that are currently expected to be postponed effectively 
indefinitely will now require major public spending within 
the next decade as decommissioning of the Magnox plants 
already retired (some more than 15 years ago) is completed. 
All things being equal, the undiscounted cost of stage 3 
would increase significantly because there would be much 
more waste to dispose of and, for example, jobs that could 
be done by a human 60 years after plant closure, might need 
to be done by a robot. It remains to be seen whether the 
Treasury will allow this. On the evidence of the way in which 
funding for the NDA was dealt with, it seems unlikely.
The NLF 2005 onwards
When British Energy was re-launched, the NDF became 
the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) and is now required to 
pay for ‘qualifying uncontracted nuclear liabilities’ as well as 
‘qualifying decommissioning costs’. The former is essentially 
the cost of dealing with spent fuel from Sizewell B, while the 
latter is presumably stage 2 and stage 3 decommissioning 
costs. In addition to the �440m (�660m) that was in the NDF 
in 2004, British Energy issued �275m (�412m) in New Bonds 
to the NLF on its re-launch.
Income to the NLF is expected to come from three sources. 
British Energy will put in a flat amount of �20m (�30m) per year 
(indexed to inflation but tapering off as the stations are closed) 
and �150,000 (�225,000) for every tonne of uranium in the fuel 
loaded into Sizewell B. However, the most important contribution 
is a ‘cash sweep’. Under this, the Government is entitled to take 
65% of British Energy’s net cash flow which it must place in the 
NLF.
Some interesting changes took place in the reporting of 
liabilities between 2004 and 2006 (see Table A2.1). The 2004 
report for decommissioning presumably shows only the timing 
of stage 1 operations because this is what British Energy was 
liable for. The fact that no decommissioning expenditure is 
expected within 5 years in the 2005 report presumably reflects 
the life extension for the oldest units. The 2005 report confirms 
that a high proportion of the money for decommissioning will be 
spent after year 50 implying that decommissioning will probably 
not be completed until more than 50 years after plant closure.
The very large reduction in contracted fuel costs must reflect 
the new contracts with BNFL that came into force when the 
restructuring of British Energy became effective. It is not clear 
how this new contract could reduce the uncontracted liabilities 
by nearly a quarter.
However, the most remarkable change is the increase in 
decommissioning liability from �5.2bn (�7.8bn) to �8.6bn 
(�12.9bn). This remarkable increase followed the completion 
of a ‘quinquennial’ review of the liabilities required by the safety 
and environmental regulatory authorities.
On the face of it, using the fund to also pay for the uncontracted 
liabilities seems reasonable. However, is there another 
explanation? If stage 2 of decommissioning is delayed after 
plant closure, it would be many years before the NDF could be 
accessed. Perhaps, the Treasury is hoping that the NLF can be 
accessed much earlier to pay for some of Sizewell’s fuel disposal 
(uncontracted fuel costs), which arise immediately, delaying the 
time when taxpayers’ money will be required for that purpose.
Table A.: Timing of British Energy liabilities
2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 
Decom Fuel not 
contracted
Contracted 
fuel costs
Decom Fuel not 
contracted
Contracted 
fuel costs
Decom Fuel not 
contracted
Contracted 
fuel costs 
< 6 years 126 43 1340 - 54 934 21 6 956 
6-10 years 206 123 1181 340 99 920 666 16 915 
11-25 years 320 422 1575 591 338 1139 2244 136 1002 
26-50 years 54 1079 649 473 1093 - 1271 350 - 
> 50 years - 3060 485 3777 2061 - 4376 2042 - 
Total not discounted 5.1 4.7 5.2 5.2 3.6 3.0 8.6 2.5 2.9 
Total discounted 1.1 1.1 3.5 1.1 0.9 2.3 2.7 0.5 2.2
Source: British Energy Annual Report and Accounts 
Note: Liabilities are discounted at a rate of 3%
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British Energy 2005 onwards
The entitlement under the ‘cash sweep’ is the most significant 
change under the new arrangements and is expected to be 
the main source of income to the NLF. This entitlement can 
be converted into shares (1,042 million additional shares) 
and sold. Since the Government owns 65% of the company’ 
profits, the value of these shares would be equivalent to 65% 
of the company. This percentage is a maximum and could 
fall. In May 2006, British Energy was trading at about �6.30 
(�9.50), and the cash sweep was expected to yield about 
�3bn (�4.5bn) if converted into shares. 
One very important point that needs to be made is that the NLF 
is set up in totally the opposite way to other decommissioning 
funds. Decommissioning funds should be designed to try to 
minimise the dependence of the fund on the performance of the 
company so the money will be there regardless of the fortunes of 
the company. For the NLF, the funds will only be adequate if the 
company prospers.
In theory, the NLF was in surplus in February 2006. However, 
this surplus is based on a number of very powerful assumptions. 
First, it must be assumed that the estimated discounted 
decommissioning cost is accurate. The NDA has a supervisory 
role over British Energy’s plans for decommissioning, ‘reviewing 
and approving BE’s strategies and budgets for decommissioning 
its power plants and discharging its uncontracted liabilities’. If 
the NDA decides British Energy should also aim to complete 
decommissioning within 25 years instead of the 50-60 years 
assumed by British Energy, the undiscounted cost of stage 3 
would increase significantly because there would be more waste 
to dispose of and the discounted cost of stage 3 would increase 
by about 150%.
Second, it assumes the current British Energy share price 
is an accurate representation of the long-term value of the 
company. If we go back to the original British Energy launched 
in 1996 with a share price of about �2.40, the share price 
tripled in the first three years only to collapse completely in 
2002 to only a few pence. British Energy was re-launched 
in January 2005 at �2.63 so, as previously, the company 
has initially done well. However, it is not difficult to think of 
circumstances that could lead to another collapse. Indeed, 
by autumn 2006, problems with the AGRs meant that British 
Energy had to warn shareholders that its income would be 
down in 2006/07 knocking a quarter off the share price.
The current tight gas market in Britain could also easily become 
over-supplied with new LNG facilities coming on-line and gas 
producers anxious to take advantage of the high prices in the UK. 
This could lead to yet another ‘dash for gas’ producing surplus 
capacity and another collapse in wholesale electricity prices. In 
these circumstances, the ‘cash sweep’ would quickly become 
worthless if British Energy’s profits disappear and British Energy 
collapses. Given these uncertainties, it is difficult to see how the 
Government could now proceed, in good faith, with a sale of its 
share entitlement.
Third, it assumes that any proceeds of a share sale are paid into 
the NLF. The NAO report states: ‘if the Department decides to 
convert and sell all or part of the cash sweep, British Energy will 
issue a number of shares to the Nuclear Liabilities Fund.’ On the 
past record, can there be any confidence that the Treasury will 
not judge that it can use the proceeds of any such sale to better 
effect by diverting it to other public spending priorities?
A better way to manage 
decommissioning funds
If we take the polluter pays principle as our guiding principle, as 
enshrined in the EU’s justification for allowing the establishment 
of the NDA, the objective of decommissioning provisions is clear. 
It should be to provide maximum assurance that those who have 
to decommission our nuclear plants have access to sufficient 
money to do the job to appropriate standards whenever they 
choose to do it. It is the future generation that will have to carry 
out this potentially hazardous job. It is also they who will best be 
able to judge, on the basis of factors such as changes at the site 
(eg, rising sea levels), availability of skills and availability of facilities 
to take the waste, whether to decommission then or delay.
The first obvious requirement is that the provisions be placed in a 
segregated fund that will not be lost if the company fails. There is 
also an equally strong case for a segregated fund to pay for spent 
fuel disposal, although this should probably be separate from the 
decommissioning fund. Provisions should be invested in very low 
risk investments equivalent to the risk level of government bonds 
(which pay a commensurately low rate of return) to minimise the 
risk of being lost.
The plant owner should make financial arrangements so that the 
full cost of decommissioning will be available from the day the 
plant starts operation. This is to cover the risk that, for whatever 
reason, accident, corporate failure of the owner, unprofitability 
of the plant, the plant is closed well before the end of its forecast 
lifetime. This does not necessarily require that the entire funds be 
deposited in a segregated fund the day the plant enters service. 
Financial tools such as insurance or bonds, may be a cheaper 
but equally effective way to meet this requirement.
The fund should cover all stages of decommissioning and the 
liability should be estimated extremely conservatively. Many of 
the costs, such as cutting up contaminated structures, can only 
be guesses because these activities are unproven on this scale 
and costs such as waste disposal are rising rapidly with no clear 
end in sight. The UK’s Magnox stations were estimated to cost 
about �250m (�375m) each to decommission in 1989, but by 
2005, this figure had risen to well in excess of �1bn (�1.5bn). As a 
result, contingency allowances should be very high.
Decommissioning costs should be estimated assuming prompt 
decommissioning. It is not for the current generation to dictate 
when future generations should get rid of the facility we are 
burdening them with. Presuming prompt decommissioning also 
avoids the need to make a heroic assumption that funds will be 
able to earn a positive rate of interest long into the future.
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Energy efficiency in the 
energy [r]evolution Scenario
The report: ‘Energy �R]evolution: A sustainable World Energy 
Outlook’, produced by the European Renewable Energy Council 
(EREC) and Greenpeace International, provides a practical 
blueprint for how to cut global CO2 emissions by almost 50% 
within the next 43 years, whilst providing a secure and affordable 
energy supply and, critically, maintaining steady worldwide 
economic development. Notably, the plan takes into account 
rapid economic growth areas such as China, India and Africa, 
and highlights the economic advantages of the energy revolution 
scenario. It concludes that renewable energies will represent the 
backbone of the world’s economy – not only in OECD countries, 
but also in developing countries such as China, India and Brazil. 
“Renewable Energy will deliver nearly 70% of global electricity 
supply and 65% of global heat supply by 2050.”
A range of options has been considered in the energy �r]evolution 
scenario for reducing the demand for energy in the period up to 
2050.The analysis focuses on best practice technologies. The 
scenario assumes continuous innovation in the field of energy 
efficiency, so that best practice technologies keep improving. 
Industry
Approximately 65% of electricity consumption by industry is used 
to drive electric motor systems. This can be reduced by employing 
variable speed drives, high efficiency motors and using efficient 
pumps, compressors and fans. The savings potential is up to 40%. 
The production of primary aluminium from alumina (which is made 
out of bauxite) is a very energy-intensive process. It is produced by 
passing a direct current through a bath with alumina dissolved in a 
molten cryolite electrode. Another option is to produce aluminium 
out of recycled scrap. This is called secondary production. 
Secondary aluminium uses only 5 to 10% of the energy demand 
for primary production because it involves remelting the metal 
instead of an electrochemical reduction process. If recycling 
increases from 22% of aluminium production in 2005 to 60% in 
2050 this would save 45% of current electricity use.
Transport
Use of hybrid vehicles (electric/combustion) and other efficiency 
measures could reduce energy consumption in passenger cars 
by up to 80% in 2050.
Households / services
Energy use by household appliances such as washing machines, 
dishwashers, TVs and refrigerators can be reduced by 30% 
using the best available options and by 80% with advanced 
technologies. Energy use by office appliances can be reduced 
by 50-75% through a combination of power management and 
energy efficient computer systems.
Use of stand-by mode for appliances is on average responsible 
for 5- 13% of electricity use by households in OECD countries. 
Replacement of existing appliances by those with the lowest 
losses would reduce standby power consumption by 70%.
Electricity Generation
The development of the electricity supply sector is characterised 
by a dynamically growing renewable energy market and an 
increasing share of renewable electricity. According to ‘Energy 
�R]evolution: A sustainable World Energy Outlook’, produced 
by the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) and 
Greenpeace International renewable energy sources  could 
compensate for the phasing out of nuclear energy and reduce 
the number of fossil fuel-fired power plants required for grid 
stabilisation. By 2050, 70% of the electricity produced worldwide 
could come from renewable energy sources. ‘New’ renewables 
– mainly wind, solar thermal energy and PV – could contribute 
42% of electricity generation. The following strategy paves the 
way for a future renewable energy supply:
•  The phasing out of nuclear energy and rising electricity 
demand will be met initially by bringing into operation new 
highly efficient gas fired combined-cycle power plants, plus 
an increasing capacity of wind turbines and biomass. In the 
long term, wind will be the most important single source of 
electricity generation.
•  Solar energy, hydro and biomass will make substantial 
contributions to electricity generation. In particular, as non-
fluctuating renewable energy sources, hydro and solar 
thermal, combined with efficient heat storage, are important 
elements in the overall generation mix.
•  The installed capacity of renewable energy technologies will 
grow from the current 800 GW to 7,100 GW in 2050. Increasing 
renewable capacity by a factor of nine within the next 43 
years requires political support and well-designed policy 
instruments, however. There will be a considerable demand 
for investment in new production capacity over the next 20 
years. As investment cycles in the power sector are long, 
decisions on restructuring the world’s energy supply system 
need to be taken now. To achieve an economically attractive 
growth in renewable energy sources, a balanced and timely 
mobilisation of all technologies is of great importance. This 
mobilisation depends on technical potentials, cost reduction 
and technological maturity. Figure 22 shows the comparative 
evolution of the different renewable technologies over time. 
Up to 2020, hydro-power and wind will remain the main 
contributors to the growing market share. After 2020, the 
continuing growth of wind will be complemented by electricity 
from biomass, photovoltaics and solar thermal (CSP) energy
 
For more information  on the Energy �R]evolution, please visit: 
www.greenpeace.org/energyrevolution
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